Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

11-1972

The 1972 cigarette tax referendum: a mass
communication campaign
Gwendolyn Moore Danielson
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Health Communication Commons, Mass Communication Commons, and the Speech and
Rhetorical Studies Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Danielson, Gwendolyn Moore, "The 1972 cigarette tax referendum: a mass communication campaign"
(1972). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 1557.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1556

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and
Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF Gwendolyn Moore Danielson for the Master
of Science in Speech presented November 21, 1972.

Title:

TIle 1972 Cigarette Tax Referendum: A Mass

Co~munication

Campaign.

APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Thee 7reL:GI'OVe

During the past forty years, Oregon voters have appr.oved only two
tax proposals; both taxes on cigarettes.

The subject of this study is

the campaign carried out by proponents of H.B. 3064 to pass the most recent
Oregon tax referendum measure.

Central to the questions asked in the

investigation of the 1972 cigarette tax campaign was why the outcome of
this proposal was successful.

The thesis hypothesizes that the critical

variable was the involvement of major socio-economic interest groups in
formulating and disseminating persuasive campaign messages.
The rationale for entering ,into such a study was the shortage of
information on campaigns which focus not only on the effects of the "new
p~litics?t

on the electorate, but t,.Jhich fill in details of significance

to the historical setting within which the campaign takes place •. Further,
there is an apparent shortage of information on state-wide referendum
campaigns which describe the campaign setting, the structure of the decis
ion-making organization directing the campaign effort, and the voters
reaction to campaign strategies.
For these reasons two research methods were utilized for the des
criptive case study:

a field investigation and a two-part opinion survey.

The former traced the historical-political situation in Oregon, action
taken by the 1971 legislative assembly to correct the state budgetary
dilemma, the mobilization of public and private individuals following the
successful referral drive to place the cigarette tax on the ballot, and
campaign strategies carried out during the 40 day period prior to the
special election.

By reviewing all available news reports and interviewing those
persons active in the campaign, the field investigation revealed that the
state was indeed threatened by budgetary crisis and that the proposed tax
was the only immediately available solution.

An alternative source would

have required another special session, another 90 day waiting period, and
the threat of another referendum.

Without the tax, state agencies depend

ing for support on revenue coming from the General Fund would face a two
percent cut in funds for the 1972-73 fiscal year.
It was also found in the field investigation that the cigarette tax
had support from legislative leaders of both political parties; a ccllec
tion of large permanent interest groups; and an array of state officials
and private citizens with pocket-book interest in passing the ballot
measure.

Persuasive appeals developed by the involved groups focused on

the fiscal impact of a tax defeat on these and other special economic
"'"

groups in Oregon.
Results of the second research method, the voter-leadership survey,
indicated that the voters surveyed were generally accurate in assessing
the participation of interest gruups and were influenced by those groups
most visible and state officials most vocal.
the voters professed

tiD

It also revealed that while

being influenced by certain groups or individuals,

the reasons they gave for their vote choice were not those emphasized by
the influence sources.
The leadership survey found that interest group leaders were some
what more accurate than legislators in ascribing motives to the choices
voters made, but that there was a significant discrepancy between opinions
of voters and opinions of the state leadership relevant to the reasons
people voted as they did.
As to the central question of this thesis, the investigation did
confirm the proposition that interest groups made the difference in the
success of the 1972 cigar-ette tax measure.

Interest groups were effective,

chiefly because of the many roles they performed in each phase of the
campaign: as initiators of campaign activity, as legitimizers, as fund
raisers, and as channel sources for disseminating persuasive messages to
both their own members and to the general public.

The study strongly

suggests that it was the mediating activity of state and local influentials,
through the mechanisms of special interest pressure and cause groups which
provided the critical margin in the vote

outcome~
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CHAPTER I

iNTRODUCTION
The morning papers of January 19, 1972, served notice that the
cigarette tax proposal, House Bill 3064, had passed by the narrow mar
gin of two percent.

Of the 36 counties in the state, only 12 had ap

proved Oregon's newest tax increase.

For the people

invol~~d

in the

campaign this meant the culmination of 40 days of intense activity.

If

the "yes" vote did not indicate an overwhelming popular mandate, it was
1

still hailed by the proponents as a significant victory.
From 1930, to 1971, a period of 41 years, only one other tax
measure of any kind had been accepted by Oregon's electorate.

This was

the 1966 cigarette tax, imposing the original four Cel'.ts a package tax;
passing only after four previous unsuccessful attempts.

Moreover, a

variety of sales tax measures had been turned down on five different
occasions, the most recent in 1969 by an eight to one margin.

Income

tax packages had also been rejected by the people twice during the same
41 year period; and a constitutional amendment allowing the legislature
2

to impose an emergency clause on tax legislation was substantially de
3
It is not hard to see why Oregon voters are regarded as stub
feated.
4
bornly resistant whenever a new tax is at issue.
The question naturally arises--why was the outcome of the cigaret
te tax election different?
paign?

What were the features unique to the cam

From the first organizational meeting through the implementation

2

of strategies, the campaign took place within only 40 days.

Some politi

cal observers commented that had the campaigners had more time to mob
ilize their human resources the margin of victory would have been even
greater.

And yet, public opinion polls conducted in late December, com

pared with those carried out three days before the election, showed a
5

significant downward trend:

51 percent favoring the tax in December,
6

and only 32 percent by mid-January.
Reports on campaign expenditures from the Office of the Secretary of
State provide still another element in the puzzle.

Opponents of the
7

measure spent a total of $54,800, while those in support spent $29,363.
It has become a truism in American politics that large "war chests" are
8

essential to campaign victory.

The losing side outspent the victors by

nearly two to one, suggesting that other factors were at work.
The campaign managers attempted to explain their success by citing
careful utilization of funds, explaining that nearly all of the money
donated by supporters went into heavy media advertising in the metro
politan area of Portland.

Yet the voters abstract reveals that adjoin

ing counties, where all were exposed to residual metropolitan media
<television and radio primarily), had starkly contrasting voting patterns.
Benton county supported the tax by two to one, while Lincoln and Linn
counties defeated it, albeit by narrow margins.

Further, four of the

twelv~

counties registering a positive vote were northeast and eastern

Oregon

counti~s

far from any measurable exposure to the Portland tele
9
vision and radio stations.
Campaign success was also attributed to heavy door-to-door campaign
ing by college yputh.

But student leaders themselves have reported

3

practically no activity of this nature.

Personal contacts were made

but only. to other students or faculty members in higher education in
10
stitutions.
One last observation central to the questions asked in this thesis
has to do with the unusually wide support by special interest groups;
who, on past tax measures, have been at odds.

Elections Division reports

reveal that funds came from labor, business, elementary-secondary and
higher education sources, as well as from a wide variety of private
11
interests.
If pocket-book commitment is any index of political interest--then this measure seems to have had the attention of every major
occupational group in the state.

tt may be that the financial commit

ment of organizations dovetailed into political activity by members which
had some effect on the vote outcome.

It may also be that monetary sup

port indicates nothing more than leadership support and is not represen
tative of the membership at large.
Whatever the answers we know that too often political analysts

have been proven wrong when they attempt to second-guess the electorate.
This study is undertaken in an effort to obviate the problems of analysis
by bringing together the full range of campaign activity, leadership
opinion, and voter perceptions within the situational context of Oregon
in the seventies.
I.

RATIONALE

"Traditional rhetorical studies have lately come under attack
because of their too frequent focus on public address as the "rhetoric
12

of political campaigns. tt

With the advent of modern technology,

4

public speeches have become relatively unimportant as devices in mass
persuasion; replaced by printed and electronic mediums capable of car
ryin.g the message to far greater numbers of people.

Sociologists 1ike

wise criticize descriptive studies because they provide too little in the
13

way of soundly based evaluative judgments.

Strengths of descriptive

investigations are overshadowed by insufficient information regarding
voter effect.

Recent approaches to campaign communication use the tech

niques of empirical investigation to fix on combinations of a "few
variables without any accompanying sense of their importance or of their
14

ability to explain the vote-decision process."
Attempts have been made to resolve some of the more persistent
shortcomings of past research.

Lazarsfeld pi.oneered panel studies of

voter behavior, and sought to explain mass'communication effects in terms
of informal social relationships.

The resulting body of theory became

increasingly well defined as the investigators focused primarily on the
receiver in the communication continuum.

To Lazarsfeld and those who con

tinued his work, the central question was whether external factors such as
"advertising or another person's advice" could be traced to a decision made
.

IS

by a particular voter.

The results of the personal influence studies did

expand our understanding of the effects of mass communication on voter be
havior, but with only a few exceptions, it provides scarcely any informa
tion relevant to the communication process from the campaigner's point of
16

view.
'The social relations research paid little attention to setting.
Further, the studies measured only effects. of consumer, informational and
partisan campaigns.

Whether the theory can account for effects in

5

a campaign directed at "sell ing" the publ ic something as imper,sonal
and complex as a new tax has been challenged.
Local and state referendum electiGns are considered unique.
Existing studies do not account for campaign effects in the state or
local referendum campaign for two reasons:
is the same for all voters.

(1) Partisan identification

National research on partisan campaigns

has revealed that approximately four out of five people base their final
17

vote decision on partisan loyalties.

Those with weak party identi

fication depend for their choice on cues about the candidate's person
ality, or "image."

Taken together, campaigns for public office assume

that issues, personalities and parties are the basis for voter decision.
(2)

In the referendum there is only the issue;

and it has been found

that voters pay minimal attention to anything but the most general of
18

issues.

For instance, voters may dislike taxes but have scant under

standing of the way in which their tax dollar is

spe~t.

Therefore, cam

paign coordinators feel that the referendum campaign must be geared not
only to persuading the public that the measure is in their best interest,
but must attempt to educate the public as well.
Another problem with scholarly studies of political campaigns is
that the majority have focused on campaigns at a national level.
valent analysis of state or local elections is rare.

Equi

"In these elec

tions, far more common than presidential contests. the campaign can be
19

expected to have greater effect."

The reason is that on a national

level appeals are directed to a differentiated mass, predicated on the
20

early mass communication theory of stimulus-response conditioning.
At the local level it becomes possible to structure appeals to discreet

~

groups, or voting blocs.
For these and other reasons, most analyses of campaign effects do
not provide the communication scholar with answers as to why certain
referendum campaigns succeed while others fail.

Nor do institutional

leaders who actually participate in political life provide accurate in
formation on cause-effect.

We know that too often they have been proven

wrong when attempting to second-guess the electorate.

Those closely in

volved in a campaign frequently possess personal theories about voter
behavior that obscure the multivariable factors entering into voter
choice on a specific issue in a given election year.

Perceptual select

ivity dictated by special interests and past experience may trick leaders
into thinking they know "why" an election came out the way it did.
Group influences playa part in the "optical illusions" that de
velop between the elites' view of what the mass believes, and what they
really do believe.

Most state officials and organizational leaders spend

the majority of their time in informal communication about politics with
others in the same select group.

Rarely do they encounter a conversa

tion in which their assumptions of voter ideas is challenged.

Studies

comparing leadership perceptions with the electorate repeatedly confirm
the unreliability of election cause and effect determinations based on
21

leadership opinion.
Since the subject of this investigation involves a complex cam
paign waged and won in an equally complex social environment, it seemed
unlikely that the questions posed could be answered by utilizing only
one research method.

A campaign is defined as the activities of an

'J

individual or group (the campaigner), in a particular context (the
campaign setting), designed to manipulate the behavior of a wider
22

number of people (the audience) to the campaigner's advantage •.
Using this definition it becomes important to consider the variables
that intervene between the source and the receiver, because, as Schramm
says, "it is dangerous to assume any simple and direct relationship
between a message and its effect without knowing all the other elements
23

in the process."
Therefore, as a preliminary step in an area where explicit in
formation on state referendum campaigns is lacking, this study is under
taken primarily to obtain detailed descriptive data.

We need to know:

(1) the history of tax measures in Oregon, the events that led to a
referendum on the cigarette tax, and the implications of action taken
by the 1971 special legislative assembly in view of the successful referal of the tax; (2) tae mobilization of public and private individuals
and groups, the techniques they used to influence the electorate; end
(3) the voters reaction to issues, appeals, and general campaign strategy.
In order to gather information that focuses on each of the elements
ill the cigarette tax campaign (the setting, the campaigners, and the
audience), it was felt that a two-part case study was required that
utilized both the field investigation and survey research methods.
Such an account of the events under investigation will provide infor
mation wbet'sby: (1) reconstruction of a state-wide contemporary referen
dum campaign can be built, (2) certain inferences regarding the nature
of communication in such campaigns can be

dr~wn,

and (3) questions rele

vant to success or failure of campaign strategies can be answered.

8

In summary, methods employed may provide evidence that can become
part of a realistic analysis of the process that James Bryce referred
to as "the mutual action and reaction of the makers or leaders of opil'
24

ion upon the mass, and of the mass upon them.

tt

Campaigns that precede

democratic elections function not only to persuade the voter of the
value of leadership judgments on the course public policy should follow,
but values and attitudes held by the public have an opportunity to
surface when they would not under ordinary circumstances.

In a democ

racy it is the campaign which draws attention to the reciprocal relation
ship between state leaders and the citizenry.
II. PROPOSITION
Herbert Bauss and William Ross, owne·rs of a well known California
public relations firm, have written ·that in elections won by a close
margin in various parts of the nation, it has often been the activity
25

of groups like public employees that made the difference.

In observ

ing past Oregon referendum campaigns, the writer's own observations tend
to confirm the importance of interest group activity in the outcome of
elections.

The very nature of Oregon's initiative and referendum pro

cedures seem to require such activity; both in initiating a ballot meas
ure and in doing the work necessary to pass it.
MOre often than not, such interest gr0ups work against each other.
The 1966 Tax Limitation measure, for instance, was initiated by a group
called the Oregon Homeowners Association.

Once the measure was placed

on the ballot, groups representing busines.s and education, among others,
joined together in a campaign to defeat it.

In the ill fated 1969 Sales

9

Tax measure, business interests pushed its passage in the legislature
and upon referral to the people, attempted to organize other groups
in support.

Their attempts

fai1~d

as the large AFL-CIO organization

mobilized locals around the state in a successful campaign to defeat
the tax.
Given the accuracy of Bauss and Ross's observation regarding the
importance of employee groups in a close campaign, and the historical
nature of campaign support in Oregon, this investigator wondered what
might happen if major interest groups collaborated in their campaign
activity.

Preliminary investigation suggested that a large number of

groups were involved in the cigarette tax campaign, groups with exist
ing mechanisms for disseminating information to their membership; as
well as temporary cause groups which formed for the specific purpose of
working in behalf of the tax increase.

As a result, it was decided

that an investigation of the relationships of campaign activity that
existed between interest groups might reveal important contributing
factors in the outcome of the election.
The preceding overview of the political situati9n that existed in
Oregon in late 1971 and early 1972, suggests that the proposed tax in
crease faced a high probability of defeat.

The introductory comments

also stated that causal relationships are not readily forthcoming.

In

an effort to establish such relationships, therefore, it is the hypoth
esis of this thesis that the critical variable in the success of the
1972 cigarette tax campaign was the involvement of major socio-economic
interest groups.

The specific purpose of the thesis then, is to test

the hypothesis so that certain generalizations can be made regarding

10

the nature of participant involvement in a state referendum campaign.
Interest group as it is used here denotes either a permanent
pressure group composed of individuals who join together beca:..:se of a
specific social or economic long-range interest, or temporary cause
groups whose members are attracted because of a common interest in a
short-term issue.

Pressure groups are characterized by their formal

organizational structure and permanence while temporary cause or pro
motional groups may disband once they perceive the objective has been
achieved or have determined that it has no chance of attainment.
The thesis argues that all social action can be evaluated in
terms·of the flow, structure and content of communication.

In order to

assess the communicative processes of interest groups and the nature of
their involvement, the inquiry will exmine their activity in each of
the three phases of communication.
Pirst, we will contend that interest groups can be viewed as
channel sources for the dissemination of information (communication
flow) to their members.

Channel source is defined as the means by which

messages flow from the advocate source to the intended receiver, in this
case, the source is the state campaign coordinator who utilizes existing
organizations as vehicles to relay the arguments to the public.
general terms, a channel may be of two classes:

In

(a) secondary channels

in which messages move indirectly to the receiving source with no pos
sibility of immediate feedback, as in televized propaganda or public
speeches; and (b) primary channels utilizing the interpersonal medium
with its attendant source-receiver interaction.

Membership refers to

the uninvolved and initially uninformed individuals belonging to an

11

interest group, who depend on the group leadership for their "defini
tion of the situation."

Leadership identifies for these members group

goals, provides information relevant to the issue, and attempts to
influence group opinion.
Second, we will examine how interest groups structure their ap
peals in their attempts to define the relevance of the measure to member
ship needs (communication content).

Interest group leaders may attempt

to inform, educate, or indoctrinate members by using either factual or
emotionally loaded words in designing the message.

The way in which

messages are ultimately composed will reflect such deliberate efforts •
.Pinally,

we

will argUe that endorsements made by interest groups

provide a means by which specific arguments gain voter attention.

Among

the many possible issues that can be used persuasively, only one or two
will be chosen.

The argument that is used, finally, in announcing sup

port not only provides information of a general nature, but functions
to legitimize the campaign by drawing a connection between membership
goals and the effects on them of the ballot measure proposal (communica
tion structure).

Endorsements may take the form of public press releases

that can reach the total public; but they may also be known only to
members through organizational bulletins or newsletters.

In testing the proposition the following general questions will
be asked regarding the campaign itself:
1.

Which individuals and groups were involved in
the campaign, how did they become involved, and
why?

2.

What was the nature of individual and group in
volvement: the roles they performed and the resources
"they utilized?

· 12

3.

What was the perceived effectiveness of
interest group activity from the frame of
reference held by representative leader
ship?

4.

Was there any coordination between groups
in planning campaign strategy, decision mak
ing, and organization of resources?

After assessing actual campaign contributions by interest groups
we will inquire into their impact by asking:

....

1.

Did membership in a particular group make
it more probable that persuasive communi
cat~on regarding the cigarette tax issue
was received favorably?

2.

To what extent did the membership of a
particular group look to that group for
verification of an election choice?

3.

How accurate are the voters in assessing the
role of special interest groups in the cam
paign?

4.

Is there congruence between what the public
and private influentials believe and what the
voters believe when judging the impact of a
particular argument?

I

While the study focuses on the main question of interest group
participation and effectiveness in the cigarette tax campaign, it does
not exclude other questions.

Some of these questions are:

1.

Were there people who voted in this campaign
who do not typically vote in state tax elections?

2.

If so, did these "seldom vote" people identify
with either an interest group involved in the
campaign or a particular socio-demographic member
ship group?

3.

Did the people who by their own statements
rarely cast a ballot in a state tax measure
election believe they would have been affected
by passage or defeat of the tax measure,

4 •. To what extent does the voters judgment conform
to the fiscal impact identified by state in
f1uentials?

13

s.

In what ways do similiar demographic
groups conform in their awareness of
(a) issues, (b) channels used, (c) groups
involved?

6.

And an important question for any campaign
utilizing mass cqrnmunication techniques:
who, finally, is 'the audience who listens
to campaign messages?

It is virtually impossible to isolate all the relevant variables
that may influence the vote outcome.
deliberate campaign strategy:

But it is possible to discover

decisions made by coordinators such as

which voters are most likely to be swayed by appeals, the issues that
should be emphasized, the best means for' raising funds, how to allocate
personnel time, and the selection of points on which the opposition
26

seems most vulnerable.

By identifying the product of these decisions

and then asking a sample of voters their opinions about which appeals
and issues were most important, how they obtained their information,
arid what the impact of the measure would be on them, the most signifi
cant factors in the election should become clear enough so that a real
istic estimate can be made of the campaign impact.

This in turn will

offer arguments either in support of, or in refutation to, the thesis
-hypothesis.
III.

PROCEDURES

The Field Investigation
Part one of the research plan includes a descriptive case study
of the cigarette tax campaign, beginning with its inception following
the 1971 legislative special session through the post-election week.
The purpose of the field investigation was to reconstruct impor

14

tant aspects of the state referendum campaign.

The exploration sought

to establish who (the campaigner) said what (the message) to whom (the
audience) by what means (the channel) and to what effect (behavior of
27

the receiver).

In other words, the field investigation examines the

campaign in terms of the communication flow.
Information was gathered in three ways:

(1) through open-ended

personal interviews and correspondence with relevant information
sources, (2) by utilizing available news reports about the campaign,
and (3) through analysis of campaign messages directed to the electorate.
Interviews and Correspondence. Principal campaign coordinators
were interviewed as well as leaders within each major interest group
which played a role

~n

the campaign.

Some of those contacted were the

professionals paid to coordinate the campaign, leaders from the Oregon
School Employes' Association, Oregon State Employes' Association, Oregon
Education Association, Associated Oregon Industries, representatives
from higher education, and organized labor.

Representatives from govern

ment agencies who publicly spoke out on the issues comprised another
.c1ass of interviewees, as did legislators who endorsed the tax measure
through personal appearances and press releases.

Each time an inter

view revealed the name of a group or individual connected with the cam
paign. every effort was made to contact that person.

In this way the

net of communication gradually expanded to include every organization
active in any significant way throughout the state.
Appointments for the interviews were obtained by phone and in each
case were conducted in the informant's office.

The responses were re

corded on tape and afterwards transcribed sequentially and without inter

15

pretation.

They were begun shortly after the January 18th election

and continued through June of 1972.
When interviews were not J;.)ssible, letters were sent to orga
nizational representatives or to legislators.
pertinent

info~ation

The letters requested

related to the individual or group's specific

function in the campaign as well as any other information deemed pos
sible from that source.

A sample of the questions put to the formal leadership is ineluded in Appendix B.

They were designed not only to obtain retro

spective accounts of situations and events but also for opinion and
perceptual content.

All of the interviews conducted in person and by

letter included such questions as:
1.

The identity of individuals or social systems
engaged in the selection and dissemination of
messages.

2.

The roles played by individuals in decision making
strategy, issues chosen, design of the messages,
themes and slogans, channels utilized, and timing
of campaign strategy.

3.

The coordination of campaign efforts between
interest groups and cause groups or apparent
lack of cooperative effort.

4.

The evaluations made at any time regarding the
effect of specific message flow or issue appeal.
Also, the presence of any feedback provisions and
their impact on future decisions.

s.

The aspects of the campaign perceived as most
effective: selection of appeals, activity of
interest or ad hoc groups, or strategy decisions.

Other questions varied, depending upon the individual being inter
viewed.

In the case of Jack Thompson, Assistant Secretary of State,

opinion on general campaign effectiveness was solicited because he is

16

not only a long time observer of Oregon political events but becapse
he was uninvolved'yet intimately aware of campaign strategies.

Ted

Hallock, on the other hand, is familiar with Oregon politics both as a
state senator and as a professional public relations executive who was
not only closely involved in the campaign but directed much of the
fo~al

activity.

In sum, questions posed in interviews and by mail

were both general and highly specific depending on the interviewer's
judgment as to the best way to obtain the greatest amount of information.
News Reports.

Accounts of the campaign were collected from pub

lished reports of the events covering the period from December 16, 197J.,
to February 11, 1972, including the student newspapers from three state
universities:

Portland State University, Oregon State University and

the University of Oregon..

Newspapers published in each Oregon county

were collected covering the same period and an analysis made of their
contents: editorials, letters to the editor, regular news reports and
feature columns.

The newspaper files were a compilation of all releases

obtained by the Governor's office, the Oregon State Employes' Associa
tion, Oregon Education Association, and Oregon Department of Human Re
sources through the services of a professional clipping agency.
Campaign Messages. Press releases, radio and television copy,
organizational bulletins and campaign "fl iers" were the third source of
research data.

Whenever possible this material was obtained directly

from the diffusion source, i.e., the organization writing and distribut
ing the material.

Radio and television copy was provided by Ted Hallock's

public relations firm who developed it, newsletters were collected from a
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representative of the organization distributing them, and press re
leases or speeches were collected whenever available.
Tp.e Survey
Strategy.

Originally the research strategy called for mailed

questionnaires to a random sample of Oregon voters in order to assess
the effects of the campaign.

That purpose was abandoned as informal

conversations with campaign leaders and other interested citizens who
watched the progress of the campaign revealed discrepancies in opinion
regarding the "effect" of the referendum issue on the average voter.
Barly interviews similarly suggested a wide divergence in opinion.
It seemed more appropriate to the purpose of this study, therefore, to
survey not only a segment of the voting population but also organization
al representatives, involved individuals representing ad hoc groups,
legislators who spoke at public meetings in defense of the measure,
and newspaper editors in counties where the measure passed but where
28

there was very little direct media support.

This comparison of an

elite to a cross-section sample was done to obtain data for a comparative
analysis of perceptions about cause-effect.
Sample ..
(1)

Voters.

Because of financial limitations it was

decided to confine the voter survey to two counties: both, as was men
tioned earlier, representing areas where little in the way of publicity
via mass media was evident.

Douglas and Benton counties were chosen

because approximately the sane number of votes were cast in each.

Also,

since the chief objective of the survey was to discover which channels
were the most effective in influencing voter behavior, the counties
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represented contrasting vote patterns: Benton, passing the measure by
over 2,000 votes; 'and Douglas, defeating it by approximately the same
29

margin.

One out of every 50 persons who voted weta mailed survey

questionnaires.
(2) Formal leadership.

Leadership is defined as those indi

viduals within interest or cause groups who identify group objectives
for members, provide them with information concerning a particular
issue, and attempt to influence group opinion.

They might also be term

ed "general influentials," or "potential influentials," because they
are representatives of their groups by virtue of formal designation:
officers in professional or 'student organizations, and those who are
employed in positions of responsibility within their professions.
Since formal leadership as defined here is largely made up of
individuals in positions of responsibility, it was decided to query
both institutional leaders, heads of temporary task groups, and legis
lators who played a role.

The leaders were selected on the basis of

their visibility in the campaign.

The criteria used to identify them

was the occurance of public statements quoted in the press and the
testimony of others who knew from personal contact who had participated.
(3)

Newspaper editors.

Information gathetad from this group

was intended to provide only supplementary data and opinion concerning
activity taking place in the northeast and eastern part of the state.
Only

editor~

from the small newspapers of Malheur, Umatilla, Union and

Gilliam counties were queried, as well as editors from the two counties
previously mentioned, Benton and Douglas.

Most of the newspapers are
30
small, with circulation ranging from 3,000 to 10,000 readers.
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Selection
(1)

P~ocedure.

Voters.

Names of the voters were obtained from

county clerks in Benton and Douglas counties.

Only registered voters

who had cast their ballots in the January election were included in an
effort to naduce the number of subjects lost because they had not voted
or had no interest in the referendum.

A common validation problem in

mail surveys is due to the subject's low motivation in returning the
questionnaires.

This method of sample selection was an attempt to

partially alleviate the attending bias.

Since a certain amount of in

terest is preliminary to travelling to the polls, it is reasoned that 
the respondents obtained in this fashion might be slightly more aware
of issues and appeals used in the campaign.
The sampling method required the selection of every fiftieth

name appearing next to a signature in the county poll books.
(2)

Formal leadership.

A survey of newspaper clippings

for the period under investigation revealed the names of state legisla
tors; and a list of formal leadership was compiled by sifting through
transcripts of early interviews.

The purpose was to establish a tenta

tive state communication network as well as provide for a larger sample
of elite opinion.
(3)

Newspaper editors.

Names of newspapers and editors

were obtained from the Oregon Bluebook 1971-72.

Questionnaires were

mailed to every editor in the six counties representing the sample.
31
Questionnaire.

The questions were developed to parallel in
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content the questions posed in the formal interviews.

Questions form

32

ed six general categories:
1.

Validation data: pertaining to area of residence
age, sex, political party, and other data used to
provide a check on the sociodemographic composition
of the sample.

2.

Filter questions: designed to check the respondent's
awareness of politics in general and this issue in
particular, i.e., whether they had given any thought
to the election and the issues. Also, to ascertain
the extent to which they exposed themselves to sources
of information.

3.

Info~ation questions:
used to identify the re
spondent's membership affiliations and understanding
of the role played by his organization; and to dis
cover nonmembers awareness of group campaign roles.

4.

Intensity questions: attempting to determine the
strength of the respondent's identification with a
membership group; as well as the degree of interest
in political issues •

.5.

Explanation que stions :
or behavior.

asking "why" of an opinion

Because of the time that had elapsed between the occurance of
the event and the survey, and because of computer requirements, it was
necessary to maintain the closed-end question format.

Also, forcing

the respondent to make a selection from specified alternatives provided
data necessary to establish the degree of correspondence between com
municative intention of the political elite and the behavioral effect
on a cross-section of Benton and Douglas county voters.

Open-ended

responses were solicited as well, but because of their rambling nature,
these were used only incidentally in the narrative and discussion.
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CHAPTER II

SETTING
MOdern Oregon is a three zone country: an always green and lush
Pacific coast land, an often green strip of valley, and a rarely green
eastern Oregon plateau.

The state boundaries and natural geographic
1

divisions remain largely unchanged since statehood was granted in 1859.
While Oregon's population has grown rapidly during the past 20
years, the composition retains a predominantly homogeneous cultural
mix;

there has

ne~r

been a large ethnic community in Oregon, with

clearly defined cultural ties.

Immigrants from Germany, England,

Ireland, Canada and Scandanavian countries merged with immigrants from
Ohio and Mississippi during the 1850's.

According to Robert Burton,
2

the population has traditionally been white,

agrarian~

and Jeffersonian.

For the first ninety years of statehood, blacks accounted for
less than one half of one percent of the population and Mexican-Americans
were so few in number as to be absent from United States census bureau
figures.

The pre-World War II Indian population numbered less than

four tenths of one percent--an ethnic group certainly, but one which had
3

practically no impact on Oregon cultural or political life.

Burton

cites geographic isolation and a slow but steady rate of growth after
4

1850 for the cultural blend that characterized the old Oregon.
Today, minorities account for three percent of the population:
5

blacks, 29,308,' Indians 13,410, and other non-whites, 19,488.

The Ku

Klux Klan, which was among the most active in the nation during the 1920's,
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is out, and minority studies are in.
James N. Tattersall, University of Oregon Economics Professor,
savs that "today's population is younger, better educated, more con
7

centrated in professional and white
collar occupations, and richer."
I
Perhaps also more liberal.

Less homogeneity may, according to Profes

sor Tattersall, lead to even more change.

The "ne't-l electorate" will,

in his terms:
• . • demand high quality in state and local govern
ment services, particularly in education and recreation. It
should, on the other hand, be more willing to levy and ac
cept the taxes to pay for these expanded services. 8
Historically Oregonians depended heavily on wildlife industries,
but since the late 1930's, timber production grew to become the chief
source of commerce and, again, the trend is changing. Measured by
"value added" figures, manufacturing increased by 63 percent while
during the same period, value added by the forest products industry
9

increased only 46.2.
Fishing was once a major Oregon industry, second only to forestry,
but today the game commission keeps the major rivers stocked with, not
native, but hatchery raised fish.

Hence the growth of the tongue-in

cheek, James T. Blaine Society, whose largely fictitous membership is
said to be busy posting signs on Oregon borders:
10
visit, but please don't stay."

"You're welcome to

Politically too the state is changing--from a predominantly Re
publican one-party system during the years between 1900-1932 to a near
11
In 1969 Democrats
lyequal party registration during the late 1940's.
led by over 100,000, with a total of 521,662 registered voters and
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12
Republicans registering 410,693.
In practically every significant statististical way, Oregon in
the 1970's, wears a new face.

Bu:: in spite of, or perhaps even parallel

to such changes, one very significant facet of the state profile remains
unchanged--the political philosophy.

The state has never had an eastern style political machine mani
pulated by ward bosses, political hatchet men and the like.

A state

machine was never put together in part because of Oregon s ttpuritan"
13
public attitude toward politics,
and in part because politicians
t

seemed unable to get together--under the party banner.

According to

one political analyst, the adoption of the direct primary in 1904 broke
14
down what little party unity might once have existed.
Others claim
that Oregon's system of direct legislation, expressed in the primary
l5

law, but also in the initiative and referendum, minimizes partisanship.
Historically each candidate waved his own flag and campaigned on his
own merit, not on party.

In 1934, the Portland Oregonian concluded:

"Major contests are decided on the basis of personal fitness or personal
popularity of the candidate.

Practically the only party significance

any more to an election of governor is that success enthuses the party
16
Democrats and Republicans alike appealed
with which he affiliates.
to the voter on the basis of popularity and issues.

"An old style Demo

erat may look 1ike a new-style Republ ican and vice versa, tt when they
17
present themselves to the voters.
One only needs to observe the 1970 partisan to note that Oregon
is still possessed of a great many candidates 'who pay only lip service
to party.

Each election year since 1960, Democrats meet for their pre
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primary convention and set forth elaborate party platforms.

The plat

form makes news for one day and occasionally a bold challenger will
remind the voters that he, unlikp. the incumbent, represents best the
will of the party.

For the most part however, political aspirants,

especially during the primary, merely pretend to conform.

Some candi

dates have boldly discounted the party document as not being represent
tative, and therefore not a legitimate plank from which to campaign.
Republicans too have their official platform convention, Dut they also
have their Dorchester Conference founded by Senator Robert Packwood in
18

1963.

A glance at the respective results of such conclaves reveals

certain distinctive gaps in Republican performance versus Republican
philosophy.
But party registration and conformity to party platform does not
tell the whole story.

Voters frequently register in one party and vote

for candidates of the other party.

For example, in the 1970 general

election, Oregon voters elected a Republican governor and a Republican
19
majority to the House of Representatives.
While Democrats held a
majority in the Senate during the 1971 Legislative Assembly, the Senate
president was elected by the fourteen Republican members joining with
two Democrats to go dramatically counter to the Democratic caucus choice.
A similiar coalition of Democrats and Republicans was enlisted during
20

each of the past six sessions of the Oregon legislature.

The strength of a state Republican organization has been cited as
a critical deciding factor in voter response to candidates; an organization
21
that will work to develop candidates and work to get them elected.
But as to the functioning of partisanship in the legislature, ttparty

28
22
respons ibil ity ••• is strictly a euphemism in Oregon."
Oregon voters retain a considerable amount of independence and
the state is often ani accurately charactetized as a consistently in
consistent two-party state.
notably "clean

ft

state.

MOreover, in political climate it is a

One academic observer uses the phrase, "moral

istic political culture," to describe the political atmosphere, believ
ing that Oregon's government is predicated on the ideal of selfless
community service.

"Party, allegiance,

It

quotes Burton, "takes second

23

place to the public interest."

Former Senator Wayne MOrse is a case

in point; switching registration not once but twice auring the years
he served in the United States Senate and justifying his change by say

ing:
No Republican party officials, state or national,
ever had the right to assume that in the name of party
regularity I would sacrifice my responsibility to the
people of Oregon by voting party line whenever I though,
so-called party policy was not in the public interest. 2
The results of such a "moralistic culture" and relatively non
partisan
rhetoric.

cl~ate

finds expression in the issues selected for campaign

Rather than campaigning on the party plank as in many states,

candidates for state and national office tend to campaign on issues
aimed at all the people whether the issue be conservation today, or
prohibition and hydroelectric power yesterday.

"Principles above

party," "the greatest good for the greatest number," "not for the party
spoils but for the good of the country," are phrases that gl itter from
the pages of Oregon history books.

All of this is not to say that Oregon is' an untarnished state
lacking her own form of political intrigue.

The peculiarity that is

~
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distinctly Oregon is that odd political culture that struggles to
develop social and economic growth mechanisms while at the same time,
wielding the stick of referendum and initiative, knocking out money
for programs that will advance such growth.

Voters may ignore partisan

issues in choosing their leaders but they frequently confound those
they've elected by utilizing their right to referendum and initiative.
Historical View of Initiative and Referendum
The people in Oregon can create or destroy any act.

The adoption

of a political system that entrusts all of the power in the people
originated in a constitutional amendment passed in 1902 providing for
2S

the Initiative and Referendum.
Using the

initi~tive,

voters can submit a petition to the Sec

retary of State carrying a specified number of valid signatures and so
26

place any measure on the ballot..

By petition, also, any measure pas-

sed'by the Oregon legislature can be placed on the ballot thus enabling
the voters to sanction or aefeat the measure by a majority vote.

Any

constitutional revision passed by the legislature likewise must be refer
red to the voters before it can become law.

The outcome of ballot

measure elections rests in the hands of a majority of those casting
27

their ballots, not a majority of those registered.

Furthermore, the

Governor has no power of veto over laws passed with these methods.

The

legislature can later amend them, but the same process, the referendum,
is at the disposal of the people and using it they can prevent any amen
ded measure from going into effect.
The first exercise of the power of referendum was in 1904 when
the Direct Primary Law was submitted to the people and carried--enabling

/

30

any citizen anxious to participate in the political life of the state
28

to run for office without looking to party for support.
In the election of 1908 another significant measure, the Corrupt
Practices Act, was referred and passed by the people.

It provided or

iginally for a ceiling on campaign spending, prohibited electioneering
on election day, and generally set forth a doctrine for political be
29

havior.

A number of amendments to the original act have occurred

since, including the elimination of restrictions on public employee
participation in politics and the elimination of the prohibition against
campaigning on election day_

The Corrupt Practices Act in its present

40 page form, is notable in that it retains the populist character of
the original bill's intent.

By 1910 the people had adopted the Recall Act enabling a specified
number of registered voters in the state or voting district to petition
for an election to determine if the official under recall threat could
continue to serve.

Also adopted were the Initiative and Referendum to

Apply to Local Laws Act, increasing the power of the people in deciding
local policy; the Presidential Preference Primary law, requiring party
delegates elected by the people to cast their ballots, en toto, for the
presidential candidate approved by the people in their primary elections.
Among those measures initiated by the people and defeated, were the Equal
30

Suffrage Amendment (defeated in 1906, 1908, 1910);
gle Tax; and State Wide Prohibition.

Amendment for Sin

All of these measures, approved

and rejected, were placed on the ballot through the Initiative Law and
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have shaped the political destiny 'of the state,to this day.
Another constitutional provision that has added to the paradox of
government is the restriction against placing the emergency clause on tax

31
legislation.

This section of the Oregon Constitution provides that a

measure imposing a tax on the people cannot become law for 90 days
32

after the session has adjourned,

having the effect of providing extra

time for resourceful citizens or special interest groups to garner the
requirea signatures to call for an election.

Even if unsuccessful in

defeating the tax, a referendum can usually delay implementation of a
bill for nearly two years, or until the next general election.

Since

by constitutional law, Oregon must maintain a balanced budget, the
budget being drafted on the biennium, this clause has proved to be the
source of a considerable amount of frustration to officials charged
with the responsibility of maintaining a sound level of state services.
To summarize then, given sufficient energy and organizational
machinery, any individual or group can challenge any law enacted by the
legislature.

Allen Eaton, writing in 1912, described the system as an

"experiment in Democracy, tt and said of Oregon:
It is ••• a state where the people can and do enact
laws for the common good which their legislature has failed
to enact for them, where they can nullify any obnoxious
measure passed by the legislature .•••
It is ••• a state where the people can and dq amend their
constitution in the most radical fashion by a minority vote •• ,
where special interests hire citizens to circulate petitions
••• , where one-twentieth of the voters can and do cripple
33
the state educational institutions by holding up their funds •.••
In 1971 another author wrote:
Oregon today has its ••• best tax brains proposing stop
gap solutions and the people fire back objections. The whole
process !akes time and the money situation continues to
worsen. 3
Oregonians have rarely permitted a tax approved by the legislature
to become law without the "second legislature,ft the people, first scru
tinizing it by their vote.

The fiscal effects of the people's power

12

is one of the situational variables that is the concern of this thesis.
l I.

RECENT TAX MEASURES

It is unlikely that anyone finds pleasure in paying taxes.

It is

equally unlikely that anyone finds pleasure in a decline of living stan
dards expressed through cutbacks to public agencies that service the people
and their growing requirements.

At the state level, Oregon voters expect

the best in the way of services, but since 1930 have defeated over 82 per
cent of the ballot measures which included in the ballot title the word
"tax."
During the past decade five referendum tax measures have been placed
before the people for decision:

the 1960 Personal Income Tax, 1963 Per

sonal and Corporation Income Tax Bill, the 1966 Cigarette Tax, the 1969
Sales Tax and the 1972 Cigarette Tax.
tax proposals were apprGved.

Of the five, only the two cigarette

Those referred since 1966 are of particular

importance here, because of their similarity to the 1972 cigarette tax
and because of campaigning activity in connection with the measures.
The First Cigarette Tax
The first cigarette tax was a bill passed by the 1965 legislature
and referred to the people.

The May 24, 1966 primary Voters Pamphlet

described the cigarette tax as a measure that would "levy a tax of 4
35
cents on each package of 20 cigarettes sold in the State of Oregon."
The measure was expected to bring in a total revenue of $10,430,000 plus
annually, of which $430,000 would be retained by cigarette distributors
as partial, although significant, reimbursement for their expense in handling.

33
More important:
The funds collected would provide direct property
tax relief to all property taxpayers and would oe an ad
ditional source of revenue for cities and counties in the
state. . . • One half of the net amount collected annual
ly, or approximately $4,925~000 would go directly for
property tax relief . . . . 3
Only one argument appeared in favor of the tax in the informa
tional booklet compiled by the secretary of state; appealing to the
voters in the name of property tax relief, citing a concern for the
disproportionate share property taxes contribute to total revenue
receipts, and arguing its stability in state financing.

No argu
37

ments appeared in opposition.
No c-ampaign was launched.

No money was spent on advertisements.

And yet, for the first time in nearly forty

years, the people of Oregon had approved a new tax, by 310,743 to
38
181,957.
1968 Tax Limitation Referendum
In 1968 the one and a half percent tax limitation proposal was
placed on the Oregon ballot.

A group of citizens calling themselves

The Oregon Homeowners Association, successfully

colle~ted

54,000 valid

signatures in a'petition drive which began during the summer of 1967.
The resulting Ballot Measure Number 7 appeared under the title: "Con
stitutional Amendment Changing Property Tax Limitation."

If the meas

ure had been approved, the six percent limitation on property taxes
would have oeen repealed and taxes would have been limited to one and
one half percent of the market value of residential property_

The cost

to local government was estimated to have reached $150 million in lost
39
40
tax revenue the first year alone.
Since the source of 47.4 percent

34

of all tax moneys in the state in 1966 was derived from property
taxes, the initiative had serious implications.
An organization was quickly formed to fight passage of the bill
and proved to be one of the most tightly coordinated nonpartisan cam
paigns conducted in recent years.

A paper written by the campaign di

rector, Roy N. Vernstrom, outlines the sequence and scope of activity
that surrounded the anti-one and one half percent tax limitation cam
41

paign.
The original citizens meeting involved 25 persons representing
interests from business, labor, government, religion and education.
After the initial meeting, the group met biweekly throughout the cam
paign in an advisory capacity.

The S'trategy Committee, as it was ca1

led, was charged with the responsibility of reviewing progress on decis
ions made earlier in the campaign and acting upon new information obtain
ed from feedback provisions:

tours of the state and public opinion sur

vey results.
The campaign director wrote that a public opinion survey firm and
an advertising agency together with the Strategy

Comm~ttee,

Finance Com

mittee , four state co-chairmen, a Speakers Bureau and 36 county chairmen
made up the total task force.

The campaign director made personal con

tacts to potential channel sources (editors and television commentators
particularly), organized the "task force" phase, and generally coordin
ated the campaign in all of its details.

As a result, the campaign was

marked by clearly delineated areas of responsibility and frequent intra
42

group consultation with the teams involved.
On November 5, 1968, the voters rejected the Tax Limitation, even

35
though it meant a state budget that would continue to rely heavily on
property taxes.
43
to one.

The vote was 503,444 to 276,451, a ratio of nearly two

During the course of the campaign promoters had promised the people
I

that if this measure were defeated', the next legislature would take some
definite steps toward real tax reform.

But leadership opinion regard

ing the form such change should take was divided.

Republicans sup

ported a sales tax, while Democrats were, in general, opposed.

Follow

ing the defeat of the Limitation threat, Vernstrom wrote to over 500
representatives from interest groups around the state requesting their
opinions on the possibilities available for tax reform.
~artisan

trend emerged.

A- similiar

A high proportion of business leaders as well

as Republican legislators felt that a sales tax was the most viable
source for needed revenue, providing it included a provision for prop
erty tax relief.

The next session of the legislature put together just

such a package.
The 1969 Sales Tax Measure
The 1969 Property Tax Relief and Sales Tax Measure was referred by
the legislature and placed on the ballot in a special election called
for

~une

3, 1969.

The measure was a complicated one, involving both

cons~itutional and statutory changes.
i

mari~es

The official ballot title sum

the provisions: (1) the enactment of a three percent sales tax

exempting food and prescription medicine; (2) constitutionally dedicat
ing proceeds to reducing property taxes; (3) changing constitutional
school property tax limitations; (4) establishing new property tax bases
for schools which could not be exceeded without the people's vote.

The

36

measure also provided for (5) a restriction on the number of school
tax elections and provided for uniform election dates; (6) increases
to corporation taxes; (7) rebates to low income families from income
taxes; (8) prohibited increased property taxes on homesteads of $20,000
44

or less after the owner reached age 65.
The 1969 legislature was well aware that voters were dissatisfied
with increasing property taxes.

The 60,000 signatures obtained by the

Tax Limitation sponsors revealed voter discontent with Oregon's heavy
reliance on the local property tax and the legislature was determined
to put together a plan that would meet with a minimum.of opposition.
They knew that whatever tax reform was referred, no biennial projections

could be made until the voter had passed judgment.

It was for this

reason that the 1969 legislature set an early date for a special election
on the sales tax.
pted

~he

this way:

It was also the threat of voter rejection that prom

many provisions that were included.

Jaro1d A. Kieffer put it

"We think of government and the role it must play.

The real
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problem is that the people have terrorized the leaders."
The Republican controlled Oregon House had originally passed a
variation of the measure providing that all revenue would be earmarked
for support to public schools.

The Senate version incorporated an amend

.ant so that revenue would go to the property tax relief account estab
lished with the enactment of the 1966 cigarette tax.
The Heuse concurred with the Senate amendments.

But prior to the

conference committee approval, debate in both houses was characterized

by partisan conflict.

Democrats were

strongl~

opposed because the tax

did not provide sufficient relief to the homeowner:

all property owners,

including corporations, receiving a proportionate share.

The most serious
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disagreement, and the one that ultimately led to the sales tax defeat,
was the tax shift effect:

the homeowner would pay the tax, but would
46
receive little of the benefits.
As a result of this felt inequity,

the battle lines were drawn before the legislature adjourned.

The tax

was referred, and the campaign began.
Those supporting the sales tax quickly organized political groups
calling themselves, "Committee to Clear the Air," Committee for Sensi
ble School Budgets, It "Do Farmers Have a Future Committee, nand "Oregon
ians for Property Tax ReI ief Committee," all naming Mrs. E.C. Schmidtt
as secretary.

Together, the pro-tax groups spent over $100,000 in sup

port of the measure whereas opponents expended less than one fifth that
amount.
In spite of the relatively small expenditure level by opponents,
48

the base of support was much wider.

State union organizations and

many small locals joined with citizens and Democratic legislators who
had been opposed to the measure when it was under debate in the Oregon
legisl ature •
Barlypartisan conflict over the tax shift effects continued
thr~ughout

the campaign.

Leadership in the state was seriously divided,

major interest groups played conflicting roles, and in spite of intense
efforts at obtaining the cooperation of neutral groups, repeated resist
ance was met.

The voter remained unconvinced.

As Kieffer said, the

legislators were afraid the people would not "buy it," and they did not.
Ivery county in the state opposed the measure on election day, by a
49

total vote of 65,077 in favor and 504,074 opppsed.

The Fifty-Sixth

Legislative Assembly would face their biennial budget task once again
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without the benefits of tax reform.
III. CONTEMPORARY FISCAL SITUATION
1971 Legislative Dilemma
The biennial balancing of the state budget reflects the general
state economic climate.

When the 1971 Legislative Assembly met, the

state was once again facing financial crisis.

Continued pressure on

high property taxes combined with minimal increases in projected rev
enues were complicated by the Federal Governments decision to increase
the personal deduction on individual income tax which automatically
reduced Oregon revenue.

In an effort to simplify tax forms, the state
50

had patterned their program after the Internal Revenue Code in 1969.
The chief source of revenue in the General Fund is the income tax,
extremely susceptible to outside economic conditions such as changes in
the Federal Income Tax law on personal deductions.

Not only was this

change a contributing factor to the prospect of a budgetary deficit,
other characteristics of the General Fund structure created fiscal weak
ness.

The General Fund is the least flexible of

stat~

financial sources,

obtaining its revenue and prerogatives for change in accordance with
51

legislative action and constitutional limitations.

Both reflect its

capacity to meet demands.
Required to balance the budget by constitutional law, the 1egis
1ature's role was, ironically, like that of a woodsman with a broken
axe.

In the foreground stood the competing branches and departments of

government urging upward adjustment in budget. appropriations, and in
the distance stood the constituency, only recently reminding the 1egis
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lature of their extreme reluctance to hand over the revenue needed
for repair.

Any tax measure that might come out of the 1971 session

would face the possibility of another referendum.
The 1971 legislature responded to a projected deficit in the
General Fund by adopting a bill allowing an increase in taxes on cig
arettes, and by freezing the level of the personal income tax exemp
tion at its current level.

Even then the fiscal situation was rela

tively unstable as a dock strike that had started in January failed
to be settled.

By the time the regular session adjourned, the water

front strike had shut down port activities for over 100 days, reducing
52
the work force and halting all exports of Oregon commodities.
Without the revenue expected from the cigarette tax increase,
the Fund faced a deficit which might have reached or even exceeded
53
$35 million in the biennium.
The cigarette tax was judged to be the
most acceptable to the people and met with the least opposition from
opposing factions in the state legislature from tax measures proposed.
Even so, historically the tax was not popular with the voters.
In 1945 the legislature had approved a
it to the voters only to have it turned down.

cigaret~e

tax and referred

It was proposed three

more times--1947 , 1952, and 1956--only to be rejected by increasingly
greater margins.

After waiting 10 years, the legislature had tried

again in 1966 and finally won the voters
54
cents a package tax.

pe~ission

to impose a four

The increase of five cents a package to the old tax was supposed
to take effect on September 9, 1971, and was.expected to bring in $24.5
million during the biennium.

A portion of the additional revenue was

4Q
needed to finance a new low-income property tax relief package that
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would go into effect with or without the increase in the cigarette tax.
The original cigarette tax approved by the voters in 1966 pro
vided that a portion of revenue realized through the tax would go into
a property tax relief account (half of the revenue went to cities and
counties, and half to the property tax relief account).

From this ac

count, all property--business, industrial and homes--received an amount
of relief proportionate to the assessed value of the property.
legislature voted to change the distribution formula.

The 1971

The new refund

provision established an open appropriation going to all property owners
whose property tax exceeded four percent of their income.

All of the

cigarette tax funds, including the additional five cents in the new bill,
was to go directly into the General Fund.

"The result of this change
56
was the abolishment of the old property tax relief account.
After the 1971 regular legislative session adjourned it was re

quixed that 90 days pass before the revenue changes could take effect.
It is the activity that occurred following adjournment that is the major
focus of this study.

Chapter III and IV include a

de~cription

of the

referral drive placing the cigarette tax on the ballot and the special
legislative session called by the governor to deal with revenue loss
created by the delay caused by the tax referral.

It is also a descrip

tion of how the state succeeded within only forty days at convincing
the public that a tax increase was in their best interest, when in fact
certain groups stood to gain more than others.

It is the story of the

salesmanship of interest group leaders, elective and appointive state
officials, paid campaign managers, and the people themselves.

In sum,
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it is a case study of the communication processes in an issue based
campaign on a referendum measure.

42

Notes
10regon Bluebook 1961-62, p. 261.
2Robert E. Burton, Democrat~ of Dreson: The Pattern of Minority
Politics, 1900-1956 (Eugene, Oregon: University of Oregon Books, 1970),
p. 4.

3o.s. Bureau of Census, Characteristics of the Population, Vol.
II, Part 37, 1950: Oregon (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1952).
~urton, p. 4.
Su.S. Bureau of Census, 1970 United States Census: Oreson
CNashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).
6.For an interesting analysis of the Ku Klux Klan activity in
Oregon, see Burton, pp. 46-49.
'Lila Acheson Wallace School of Community Services and Public
Affairs, Oregon's Dilemmas: Second Annual Conference (Eugene, Oregon:
University of Oregon, May 16-18, 1968), p. 24.
8 Ibid •

9For a discussion of Oregon's economic growth, see James N.
Tattersall, "Economic Growth, Population, and Policies," ~.

10Governor Tom McCall repeatedly refers to the slogan when speak
ing in other parts of the nation; Senator Robert Packwood was public
ally reprimanded by the Lincoln County Chamber of Commerce in 1971 for
a s~iliar statement.
11Secretary of State, Trends in Oregon Votins 1858-1960 (Salem,
Oregon, 1962), cited in Burton, pp. 150-151.
120regon Blue Book 1971-72, p. 237.
13
Jonas, p. 310.

l~urton, p. 10.
lSpor an excellent discussion of direct legislation effects during
the first ten years, see Allen H. Eaton, The Oregon System: The StOry of
Direct Legislation in Oregon (Chicago: A.C. McClurg and Co., 1912.)

43
l6Burton, p. 11; Senator Mark Hatfield, in his 1958 bid for
governor virtually ignored the party organization. His campaign adver
tisements contained no mention of the Republican party, and he did not
encourage the entry of supporting national party figures into the state.
Governor Tom McCall followed thiJ pattern in his successful guberna
torial race in 1966. Robert Straub, his opponent, made much of party
affiliation. McCall carried 33 of 36 counties.
17Jonas, p. 310.
laThe liberal Republicans answer to the Demo-Forum.
19A1so elected were: two Republican Congressional Representatives,
two Democratic Representatives; nine Democratic State Senators, seven
Republican; 26 Representatives from the Democratic party and 34 from
the Republican party. Oreion Blue Book 1971-72, pp. 253-255.

20Jonas, p. 319.
21Representative Frank Roberts,. Democrat Multnomah County, con
versation in July, 1972.
22Jonas, p. 319.
230aniel J. Elazer, American Federalism: A View from the States
(New York, 1966), p. 90, cited by Burton, p. 14.
240regon Democrat, Vol. 23 (February, 1955), p. 9, cited by Burton,
p. 16.

25Jonas, p. 320.
26Signatures are determined by the number voting for governor at
the last election: 4 percent for referendum; 6 percent for initiative;
8 percent for constitutional revision by initiative. "Constitution of
Oregon," Article IV, section 1, in Oregon Bluebook 1971-72, p. 266.
27Eaton, p. 8.
28 Ibid ., p. 106.
29Jonas, p. 310.
30Baton credits activity by the liquor lobby, afraid that a femi~
ist vote would bring on prohibition, for the amendment's defeat.

44
31See Eaton for a detailed description of the 33 measures re
jected and 31 pass~d during the first eight years of the power of
direct legislation, pp. 16-81.
320regon Constitution, Article IV, Section 1.
33Eaton, pp. v-vi.
3~ewsletter, Association of Oregon Industries (Salem, Oregon,
December 28, 1971).

35State of Oregon, Voters' Pamphlet: Primary Nominating Election,
May 24, 1966 (Compiled and Distributed by Tom McCall, Secretary of State,
1966), p. 4.
36Ibid •
37Summary Report of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures: 1966
PrimaEl Election (Compiled and Published by Tom McCall, Secretary of
State, Elections Division, 1966), p. 73.
380regon Blue Book 1971-72, p. 259.
39Taken from notice sent to County Elections Officers by Clay
Myers, Secretary of State, State of Oregon, September a, 1968.
40Robert T. Campbell, "Oregonts Fiscal Dilemmas and Alternatives,"
in Lila Acheson Report, p. 31.
4l Roy N. Vernstrom, "The Politics of Taxation, It unpublished M.S.
paper, Political Science Department, Portland State University, December,
1968. (The paper will be available in September, 1972, at the University
o~ Oregon library, Eugene, Oregon.)
42 Ibid •
430regon Blue Book 1971-72, p. 260.
44State 0f Oregon, Voters' Pamphlet: Special Election, June 3, 1969
(Compiled and Published by Clay Myers, Secretary of State, Salem, Oregon,
1969).

4SJarold A. Kieffer, ftSummary,tt Lila Acheson Report, p. 119.
46Roberts interview.

4,
47Summary Report of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures:
1969 Special Election (Compiled and published by Secretary of State,
Elections Division, 1969).
48Ibid.
490regon Blue Book 1971-72, p. 260.
5°George Anala, editor, Your Taxes: Oregon Tax Research, Vol.
37 (Portland, Oregon, January, 1972), p. 2.
SittEconomic Report of the Pres ident,'~ February, 1970, p. 181,
cited in "A State-Wide Income Tax for Oregon Local Governments and
it· s Distribution to Cities t Counties and School Districts," Joint
Finance e"'mmittee of the Oregon School Boards Association, Association
of Oregon Cities, . League of Oregon Cities (1970), p. 1; Expenditures
authorized by the legislature can come from two sources: the General
Fund and "other funds." Close to 30 percent of total state expendi
tures.originate from appropriations out of the General Fund and the
remaining 70 percent is basically controlled by expenditure limitat
tions imposed on other funds, most of which provide or contribute to
a special service or function of government
Property taxes do not
go to the General Fund; personal income taxes provide 47 percent of
General Fund revenue. Oregon Tax Research, p. 2.
S2 Ibid .
S3In an interview on June 30, 1972, George Anala, editor of the
tax research bulletin, was asked about the possibility that Governor
Tom McCall had overstated the significance of this deficit
Anala's
response indicated that McCall had not, and that projections made by
the state economist on the revenue to be realized by the cigarette tax
was accurate. "If there is a surplus," said Anala, "it would be in
the second year of the biennium."

S4Oregon Blue Book 1971-72, p. 259.
SSInterview, Anala.
S6ttWar of Words over Cigarette Tax Vote Heats Up," Oregon Journal,
January S, 1972.

CHAPTER III

CHROWLOGY

O~

EVENTS

June 10, 1971

Regular legislative assembly adjourns.

August 27

Attorney General indictes anti-tax promoters on cor
rupt practices violations in petition circulation
procedures.

August 31

Accused violators arraigned.

September 10

Secretary of State receives petitions referring the
Cigarette Tax to a popular vote.

November 16

Governor convenes special legislative session.

November 22-30

Toba~co

November 23

Special session adjournes, H.B. 3064 approved.

November 29

Interested citizens hold first campaign planning ses
sion.

December 1

Agencies from public sector meet in Salem for planning
session.

December 2

Coalition meets in governor's conference room.

December 7

Announced formation of committee in favor of the tax:
"Citizens Against Raising Property Taxes."

December 17

Tobacco distributors appeal corrupt practices convict
ion.

December 27

Kennedy polls show pro-tax forces leading.

De.cember 28

News conference held announcing "Legislators Opposed
to Cigarette Tax" formation.

January 3, 1972

State officials protest misleading anti-tax advertising.

January 4

First of series of OSEA-OEA public meetings in support
of the cigarette tax.

distributors tried and convicted of corrupt
practices violations.
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January 6

~ttorney

January 7

Television advertisements withdrawn.

January 7

Opposition attorney files letter with Secretary of State
requesting prosecution of proponents for violations of

General notifies tax opposition forces that
television advertising is violation of law.

l~.

January 8

Attorney General rules "wild language" not violation of
corrupt practices law.

January 10

Secretary of State requests apologies for misleading
Voters' Pamphlet statements.

January 10

Committee in favor of tax apology issued.

January 12

Senator accuses state officials of partisanship and cor
rUpt practices law violations.

January 12

Day and Davis respqnd to charge.

January 16

Kennedy polls show 37 percent Oregonians "undecided."

January 18

Special election held.

July 7

State Supreme Court affirms early 0pLnLon: tobacco dis
tributors found guilty, fined, and placed on probation
for illegally soliciting petition signatures.

1972 Cigarette Tax passes.
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CASE STUDY OF CIGARETTE TAX CAMPAIGN
"War is political campaigning spiced with bullets," writ'as the
author of Politics Battle Plan. "Both involve a collision of organi
zations seeking absolute victory; both are played in defined theatres;
both are fought by tactics of applied weaponry; and both are won by the
grand strategy best combining factors of time plus force and the abil
ity to win confrontations--surmounting hostile pressures while impos
1
ing decision upon the enemy."
While the "war" analogy will not carry us very far, it is apt.
In

mi~itary

campaigns as in initiative campaigns in Oregon, it is dif

ficult to know with certainty which tactical maneuver succeeded and
with whom.

But upon close observation certain recurring patterns tend

to assert themselves and certain personalities and social systems be
come distinct.

In the 1971-72 Cigarette Tax campaign both a coalition

and collision of interest group forces seemed to have dominated the
battlefield.
I. FORMAL PRESSURE GROUPS
Special interest organizations have traditionally played key
roles in Oregon politics.

"Idea" groups, like the Oregon Council of

Churches, the League of Oregon Voters and the Federation of Women's
Clubs, consistently take positions on measures and occasionally on
2
"Economic" interest groups such as the vending machine,
candidates.
race track, and public utility interests are small in terms of the number
of persons they' represent, but have proportionately greater funds avail
able than groups depending on membership dues for lobbying activity.
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Accordingly, they feel no reluctance in using their financial advantage
in attempting to irifluence both the legislature and the public in their
behalf.
Lumbering, labor, education and transportation interests, accord
ing to political scientists Swarthout and Gervais, make up the "big
3

four" pressure groups in the state.

The Grange, active in past years,

Lhas now been replaced in influence by the larger Oregon Farm Bureau Fed
4
eration, made up exclusively of farm interests.
Of the two pressure group functions--traditional lobbying (work

ing for favorable legislation and supporting candidates friendly to
their interests) and the less frequent function of attempting to influ
ence the electorate at the polls on key ballot measures, the latter is
of particular importance in Oregon, and of special interest to this
study.
Popular legislation, after all, represents a direct
battle among interests, without the intervening influence
of party or legislative structure. Interest groups often
are the driving force behind an initiative or referendum
petition at the outset. 5
Such was the case in the Cigarette Tax Referendum of 1971.
Tobacco wholesalers funded the opposition after successfully placing
the measure on the ballot.

In the following months the Oregon State

Employees Association, Oregon Education Association, Associated Oregon
Industries, and a

~yriad

of smaller cause and interest groups met the

opposition head on.
II. THE REFERENDUM DRIVE
The original offensive was launched when the tobacco interests
combined with a professional lobby to finance and coordinate a drive to
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refer for popular vote the increase to the cigarette tax passed by the
1971 legislature •. During the summer months and especially the third
and fourth weeks of August, workers gathered over 26,656 valid signa
6

tures.

Unlike the large formal economic interest groups, the tobacco

wholesalers lobby had no membership to draw from in circulating petit
ions.

Accordingly, Ron Campbell, a Portland teacher, coordinated the

drive and hired high school and college students to circulate the
7
petitions in the Portland metropolitan area.
Both Campbell and Ken Rienke, the tobacco lobbyist sponsoring the
initiative drive and coordinator-planner of the anti-cigarette tax cam
paign that was to follow, were
was illegal.

awa~e

that paid solicitation of signatures

On August 19, 1971, they told the Marion County Circuit

Court that the petition drive would test the constitutionality of the
law.

The court ruled that the law could not be tested until it had been

violated.

Together with Ed Collins and Sylvan Campf, local tobacco dis
S

tributors, Rienke decided to go ahead with the plan to hire circulators.
The petitions had been drawn and the language approved by the
secretary of state in late July_

By August 1, the petitions were in

circulation, first in a fair booth at the MUltnomah County fairgrounds
9

and later on the streets of Portland.
The major signature collecting effort began and terminated within
an eight day period.

By the end of this time, over 300 students had

been placed en the payroll.

When the attorney general obtained a court

injunction ordering a halt to the arive, most of the necessary signatures
10

had already been obtained.
When several high school students hired by Campbell were arrested,
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the drive caught the attention of the Oregon press.

News of the student

arrests, and charges leveled against two of the petition sponsors-
Sylvan Campf and Edward Collins--for violations of the Corrupt Practices
Act (Section 260.) forbidding "petition-hawking," made front page news.

The students were fined and released, but charges against Collins and
Campf, supported by the courts after an appeal attempt, resulted in not
11
only a fine, but a three year probation as well.
Oregonians are generally opposed to ethical violations in political
campaigns of any nature, with or without a law to direct them.

Even

though the Corrupt Practices violation attracted public attention to
the petition drive and may have resqlted in more signatures, according
to Campbell, public opinion polls demonstrated that any support for the
12
anti-tax forces had dissolved by December.
III. McCALL CONVENES SPECIAL SESSION
On November 16, 36 days after the cigarette tax had been

referre~,

Governor Tom McCall called the legislature into special session.

The

purpose of the special session was to reduce state expenditures by
$32.6 million in order to accomodate shortages created as a result of
reduced individu& and business tax collections, reduced interest earn
ings, reduced liquor sales and potentially reduced cigarette tax reve
nues.

The

legislature~

first act was to advance the election date on

the cigarette tax increase from the November General Election, to Jan
uary 18, 1972, in an effort to minimize losses in revenue to General
Fund recipients (Figure 1).
With the explicit task of revising the budget, the legislature
passed H.B. 3064, requiring a reduction of two percent in all General
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Figure 1. Editorial cartoon illustrating Oregon fiscal
situation in 1971; Oregonian, December 3, 1971.
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Fund appropriations for the 1971-73 biennium (with the exception of the
Emergency Fund) if the cigarette tax increase were to fail.
tax relief benefits were to be reduced an equivalent

Property

percentag~

but

only in the second year of the biennium.
Translated into dollars, H.B. 3064 provided that defeat of the
tax increase would have these effects:

from an estimated $270 million

in aid to local governments, $5.4 million would have been cut, forcing
city and district agencies to look to an increase in property taxes to
maintain the status-quo.

Education, which accounts for approximately

55 percent of the General Fund budget, was to be left intact; but Basic
School.Support, increased at the 1971 session, would lose more than
$4 million and community colleges were scheduled to lose approximately
13
$735,000.
For a detailed account of the adjustments made during the
special session, see Table 1.
Small wonder that special interest groups quickly resolved to
take action.

The two percent cuts translated from dollars to human

costs meant new programs eliminated or severely threatened, cutbacks in
jobs, and recent gains in ptoperty tax relief reduced.

For business

interests there loomed the possibility of an alternative revenue source,
an increased corporate tax, being approved by the legislature in another
special session.

With only one out of a thousand persons in the state

corporation owners, the possibility of launching a successful initiative
or referendum to counter such a development would be dim.
14
spect business interests were especially vulnerable.

In this re-:

IV. MOBILIZATION ACTIVITY

As soon as the referendum drive was known, leaders of the groups
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TABLE I
EFFECT OF DEFEAT OF TAX MEASURES
ON MAJOR STATE PROGRAMS

1971-73
Net Approp.*

Cig. Tax
Income Tax
2% Reduc.
2% Reduc.
Total
(Effec.Feb.1) (Effec.Ju1y 1) Reductions

$203,490,468
36,770,720

$4,069,809
735,414

$4,069,809
735,414

$8,139,618
1,470,828

Department of Higher
Education:
General Support
~chng Hospitals

130,636,890
14,746,034

2,612,738
294,921

2,612,738
294,921

5,225,476
589,842

Department of Human
Resources:
Public Welfare
Mental Health
Corrections Div.

66,555,110
60,584,060
20,230,722

1,331,102
1,211,681
404,614

1,331,102
1,211,681
404,614

2,662,204
2,423,362
809,228

37 z850 2 OOO

757 z000

757 z000

1 z514 2 OOO

..

Department of
Education:
Basic Support
Comm. Colleges

Property Tax Relief
(Estimate)
TOTALS

$570,864,004 $11,417,279

$11,417,279

$22,834,558

*Origina1 appropriation by Regular Session plus Emergency Fund
allocations, less Special Session reductions.
Source:

Oregon State Employees Association, "Fact Sheet," December, 1971.
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potentially affected became concerned.

They were well aware that

some form of fiscal impact on their membership was imminent.

The

problem was identifiable but the dimensions were not clearly outlined
until the special session convened.
Independent of action by other groups, the Oregon State Employees
Association leadership decided that their members were among
would be seriously affected.

~hose

who

On November 20, 1971, the OSEA Board of

Directors, upon the recommendation of their executive secretary, Thomas
.
15
Bnrignt, approved $5,000 to launch a defensive campaign.
Jacob

Tanzer~

the newly appointed Director of the Department of

Human Resources, is unclear about

t~e

exact date when he decided to

move:in behalf of his agency, but noted an early belief that something
shouLd be done and expressed these feelings to Bob Davis, the governor's
16

assistant, at a regular staff meeting in early November.
Other groups in the state were also independently evaluating the
potential impact; Ruth Shephard, a private citizen working with the
Council on Aging, and Alton King, administrative assistant to the student
body president at the University of Oregon, both in Eugene; John Danielson,
legislative director of the Oregon Education Association in Portland;

Roy Lieuellan, chancellor of the Board of Higher Education, Eugene; Ike
Congleton and Lou Norris of the Association of Oregon Industries, Salem;
and Donald Jones, executive secretary of the League of Oregon Cities.
Mrs. Shephard and Alton King met infomlally in mid-November and
agreed to cooperate in forming a coalition between youth, representing
college students from state colleges, and senior citizens contacted
through the State Council of Senior Citizens.

In November, Mrs. Shephard
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presented a proposal to the State Council meeting in Salem, urging
that they take acti"on.

At the same time, Jack Nelson, president of

the council, accepted an offer made by King suggesting the advantages
of a student merger.

The coalition officially formed; as youth joined
17

with senior citizens for the first time in an Oregon political campaign.
In the early stages, prior to and during the special session,
activity among the formal organizations was largely confined to inform
al conversations within the leadership structure of each group.

For

example, William Lesh, of the ADI, reports that he was unofficially as
signed the task of working directly with the state committee before the
18

committee had even been designated..

John Danielson, representing

public school teachers, said that once the referendum was assured, his
organization realized that some form of campaign activity would be neces
sary.

During the special session legislators made it known that public

education

~uld

be expected to contribute to the campaign effort as did

the governor's assistant.

Accordingly, on November 29, 1971, the OEA

legislative director mailed a memo to every local OEA affilliate in the
state alerting them to prepare to "develop strategies in support of the
19
cigarette tax measure. It
MOst of the groups that were to play a role in the next several
months of active campaigning were concerned, but with the exception of
the OSSA and the youth-aged coalition, none made visible campaign commit
tments until the legislature had spelled out the exact form impending
budget cuts would take.
Activity in Phase I
The two percent cuts provided for in H.B. 3064, seemed to be the
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impetus that brought formal organizations and informal cause groups
finally together in the first phase of formal activity.
Alton King, of the student-aged coalition, reports that the week
following the special session's adjournment, representatives from uni
versities and high schools in the state met with representatives from
the Council of Senior Citizens in Salem.

At this meeting, the first

inter-group gathering of the campaign, Jack Nelson, Ron Schmidt (press
assistant to the governor), Robert Davis (executive assistant to the
governor), former state senator, Arthur Ireland, and King discussed the
resources available and considered who might be recruited to coordinate
a state-wide campaign effort.
..

The meeting was informal and only tenta

tive strategies were decided upon, but' they did decide to meet the next
20

week when more people could be involved.
On December 1, also in Salem, representatives from the public
sector gathered, including: the executive secretaries from the Assoc
iation of Oregon Cities, League of Oregon Cities, Oregon School Boards
Association, Oregon State Employees Association, and Oregon School
ployees Association.

Also in attendance was the

legis~ative

E~

director

of the Oregon Education Association; Dale Parnell, superintendant of
public instruction; and Roy Luellan, chancellor of the State System of
Higher Education.

These men met with the purpose of deciding on the

direction their organizations or agencies should take.

They agreed to

emphasize the internal campaign, each group utilizing its own resources
and channeling communication to their members.
there be a focus on the external, .state-wide

Only secondarily would

g~neral

campaign.

Each

representative also agreed that his organization would contribute money
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to the general campaign.
On December

2,

a third organizational meeting was held.

time over 25 interested citizens gathered in the governor' s

This

conferenc~

room, and included among others, the original coalition members.
additions to the original group included Wally

Lie~s,

New

president of the

Community College Student Association; Charles Dunn, administrative
assistant to the Oregon State University student body president; Raymond
Hollaway of the Martin Luther King Foundation in Portland; and at least
.
22
one representative from a Salem area ~igh school.
Robert Davis, executive assistant to Oregon's governor, was also
in

att~ndance,

and as the governor's closest assistant, would play an

important role in future weeks.

In an interview, Davis reported an early

concern about the possibility of a successful referendum drive.

Talking

the issue over with Governor McCall, and obtaining his permission to
perform. an active function in the campaign, Davis began to make prelim
inary contacts while the special session was still meeting.

It was a

conversation with Mrs. Shephard that resulted in his presence as the
governor's representative at the two coalition meetings.
According to Davis, it was at this second meeting that the cam:- '
paign peramaters were set.

With the limited time available to organize

and implement strategy, it was decided that the large committee should
not be involved with every strategy d,ecision.

Apparently there was con

sensus, and the decision making authority revolved to the governor's'
assistant and subsequently, the two other members of the soon to be de
veloped "team":

Brad Davis , private campaign consul tant, and Ted
23

Hallock, owner of Ted Hallock Public Relations, Inc ••

S9
V. STATE CAMPAIGN

Decision making authority in the general state campaign was di
vided.

Bob Davis brought in Ted Hallock, with the coalition committee

approval, and together with Hallock, decided on the third member of the
team--Brad Davis, a free-lance campaign consultant.

In no respect can

anyone of them be said to comprise what is generally recognized as a
formal campaign manager.

Each had clearly defined responsibilities.

The three consulted qlmost daily on a variety of campaign concerns, but
24

they might better be termed "technical specialists."
As a communication specialist, Hallock had almost sole responsi

bility"for implementing and planning media appeals.

His public relations

firm not only wrote and produced radio and television spots, but deter
mined where they would be used, the audience to whom they were to be
directed, and the timing of the appeals during the forty-day campaign.
Working directly with Brad Davis, and conSUlting with the governorts
assistant, the public relations firm settled on a "theme" which then
dominated all mass communication appeals in both visual and auditory
2S

mediums.
Brad Davis was selected because of his experience in past Oregon
political campaigns.

It was he who was to contact and coordinate the

activity of various interest groups, provide speakers to civic clubs
upon request, write specialized appeals for interest group members, and
generally guide all features of the campaign not directed by either
Hallock or Bob Davis.

By letter and by telephone, the consultant learned

the interest group organizations and disseminated the only printed
26

materials put out by the state "committee. tt
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The governor's assistant worked with all groups and organizations
although official coordination was the responsibility of Brad Davis.
"The role of this office cut across the entire campaign," writes Bob
27

Davis.

Aside from daily consultation with the other two members of

what will be called the State Committee, Davis's chief responsibility
was fund raising.

Quietly and behind the scenes, Davis and John Fulton,

also on the governor's staff, made informal contacts with government
and organizational influentials, keeping them informed of the campaign
progress and providing direction when requested.
if Brad had a probiem with a group.

"1 would surface only

Late in the campaign 1 surfaced

publicly, first in television appea~ances with Haas ~enator Harl Haas,

D-Port1an~, and began to appear both against him and by myself.
were public affairs view-point kinds of programs.
I appeared was to respond to Cook's

These

The only other time

Vern Cook, D-Gresham

criticism
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that my position as a public employee was illegal."
William Gilbert, a Lake Oswego realtor, was designated treasurer
of the committee that became the cover organization for the general state
campaign, "Cit izens Against Rais ing Property Taxes."

But aside from

keeping the records of contributions and expenditures, Gilbert had little
to do with the actual campaign.

The three-man team of Hallock, Davis and Davis, formulated and im
plemented campaign strategy; and while they

info~a1ly

conferred with

members of the original coalition, and a few others, it was in every
29
practical sense, a "three man team. n
Ted Hallock and Brad Davis had decided that, in view of the com
p1exity of the funding issues, "the thrust would be emotive rather than
30

physically directed."

They would talk about issues vital to specific
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groups of Oregon voters

The same men decided that instead of trying

to talk to all of the voters with the same arguments they would create
messages directed to six or seven categories within the population:
people in higher education; on welfare; in Oregonts private collages
and universities; community colleges; public employees; in business;
and the general property owner.
Once that decision was made, a number of men, Itpaid loaned exec
utives or paid to operate full time," were informed.

After talking

with them, and several state agency heads, Brad Davis and Hallock began
working on the strUcture of the messages.

Davis explained that the

final decision making authority on s.tructure and content of the various
canpaign messages evolved to three people.

"In a longer campaign you

can get away with making a series of mistakes and then adjust.

With

one like this youtd better put the ball into the hands of a few people
who know the mechanics of political communication and rely on their
31
abil ities. It
(Figure 2)
Campaign Strategy
The State Committee was concerned with three major activities:

fund raising, mass media utilization, and special interest group co
ordination.

Of the first two, media use was contingent on sufficient

funds, therefore a great deal of early campaign energy was directed to
this phase.
Fund Raising.

The "Vote Yes" people had set their early campaign
32

fund goal at $60,000, but later revised it downward.

Bob Davis assign

ed several organizations modest quotas, principally those in the business
sector.

A large number of organizations contributed fUnds prior to being
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qENERAL CAMPAIGN DECISION MAKING STRUCTURE

STEERING COMMITTEE

\

STATE COMMITI'EE

ADVERTISING FIRM

I

r

ORGANIZATIONAL
DIRECTOR

1
I

:

CITIZENS COMMITTEE

INTEREST GROUPS

Figure 2. Decision making structure of otate campaign.
Hallock, interview in Portland, July, 1972.

Source: Ted

-r
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asked and others, for the most part, fulfilled their assigned quotas.
MOney had been authorized by the board of directors of the Oregon
State Employees Association prior to the formation of any

stat~

campaign

committee and it was unlikely that they would have contributed more.
MOreover, the mere fact of a contribution from this organization consti
33

tuted a "first."

The Oregon Education Association's political action

arm, a parallel organization with revenue dedicated to advancing educa
tional interests through the political process, donated $1,000 directly
to the State Committee, like the OSBA, prior to any direct contact from
34

the governor's assistant.
Qther organizations also knew ,that requests for money would be
forthcoming.

One business source reports that in mid-November, Bob

Davis had announced the governor's intention to call another special
session if the tax proposal failed at a meeting of the Emergency Board.
A number of business interests were represented at that

me~ting.

Faced

with the possibility of an alternative source of revenue being drafted
at a second special session, perhaps a corporate tax, the business com
35

munity was prepared when the request for money came.

The secretary of

state's records show 17 major contributions coming from lumber producers,
insurance interests, produce wholesalers, and retailers.

Other industries

contributed to the State Committee indirectly, through the ad hoc com
mittee associated with higher education.
Many of these same organizations were asked not only for financial
assistance, but for "loaned executives" to assist in the coordination of
volunteers in canvassing other potential contributors, or as one such
36

executive put it', "influencing the influentials. tt
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A great many methods of fund raising were used.

Mass solicita

tions are frequentI"y emphasized by consultant personnel in national
political campaigns, and were used to some extent in Oregon, but in
direct means were used more often: with interest groups and the small
locally based cause groups.

Direct personal soliciation was used by

Davis to make the initial contacts to special interest groups: letters
and phone calls principally, and direct face-to-face conversation.

Mass

solicitation was used in appealing to the individual citizen without
37

calling on him in person.

At Portland State University, for example,

memos appeared in the mail box of every university staff member, asking
that a.contribution of any size be sent to the local tax committee chair
man of Friends of Higher Education.
In spite of the impressive figures and the number of organizations
contributing, the secretary of state 1 s ledger sheet does not tell the
entire story.
campaign.

MOney came in from isolated and unusual sources in this

George Diel reports that the ad hoc committee for higher

education interests received contributions from a total of 1,524 sep
arate sources; 1,511 people donating less than $25.

Many contributors

38

gave less than $5.
In Corvallis, where the strongest on-campus activity occurred, the
fund raising drive was kicked off at a large gathering of civic leaders,
businessmen, and members of the academic community, called together by
the university president, George McVictor.

At Oregon State University

the president pointedly requested contributions; Corvallis businessmen
39
were asked for $50 or more.
Later, the Gazette-Times editor appealed
for funds through an editorial reporting the status of the state cam
paign.

Numerous university affiliated organizations requested money
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from members.

At Portland State University, University of Oregon, and

on most of the smaller college campuses in the state system, various
fund raising activity was carried out, ranging from "low key" Pl?peals
to faculty and staff members, to "passing the hat" in dormitories and
40
fraternities by student volunteers.
Ursel Narver and Frank Brawner, chairman and treasurer respectively
of Friends of Higher Education, mailed an Emergency Memo to all members
of governing boards, community colleges, independent college governing
boards and other people who were judged to have a deep interest in
41
The memo urged that recipients vote, influence
higher education.
their

~riends

and associates to vote, and called for contributions,
42

~

"whether $10, or $1,000, or less, or more."
Fund raising became a major communication function of the state
campaign and it is important to note the activity of many individuals
as well as the larger outright contributions from interest groups.

The

final $13,152 sum collected by the higher education community represen
ted the commitment of a great many "little" people and their concern
43
that the cigarette tax pass.
Communications related to the fund raising phase originated in
the office of the governor and flowed throughout the state.

In the .in

stance of higher education, the network began when Bob Davis issued
messages from his office by way of direct personal telephone contacts
to the chancellor of the State Board of Higher Education who in turn
issued a memo to George Diel in the Portland chancellor's office.

Diel

then set into motion the mechanisms that would further disseminate the
plea

fo~

funds to increasingly more finite groups and individuals.

One
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of these groups, the Oregon State University administration, further
passed the message -along to staff members, faculty, and in some cases,
students, depending on the nature of the request.
In some instances the message channels crossed as they did in
Corvallis, when Robert Ingalls, editor of the Corvallis Gazette-Times,
obtained information about financial needs directly from the legislature
where he serves as a house member, from Friends of Higher Education, and
44

from the Oregon State University administration.
the information on to his readers.

He in turn passed

Unfortunately, after this point we

have very little way of knowing to what extent the network widened.
In any case, desp ite the

seve~e

1 imitations of time, a war chest

was collected, many communication channels were opened, and it remained
the task of the State Committee to decide how the money might best be
spent.
Mass Media Utilization
In the early days of the formal campaign the coordinators had no
equipment and no advertising program.

The final sum collected by the

fund drive was something in excess of $29,000, therefore maximizing
effects of somewhat limited resources was the major objective of the
State Committee and all decisions were directed at this objective.

It

had been decided that the most effective way to reach a great many
people was to utilize existing organizations and pitch appeals to the
specialized economic interests in the state.

This was Brad Davis's

function.
The d4cision that led to this maneuver is of sufficient import an
ce in a consideration of campaign strategy that the text of Brad Davis's
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comments deserves to be quoted extensive1

1:

Previous methods of describing campaigns in this
state has been to describe the impact in terms of dollars.
We felt that people were surfeited with this. They were
numbed by three hundred million dollar figures, so we
decided early that rather than talk about simply the effect
of the increase, the 17.6 million dollars that would be
generated by the tax, we would talk in human terms about
the impact.
So we transformed the measure from dollar impact to
human impact. Even more, we knew that we couldn't talk
to the entire body-politic, so we picked out five cate
gories of people that could have lost severely should
there have been a selective tax cut. The groups we looked
at were: the stucents; public employees, broken down into
highway crews, public employees like OSEA and OEA members,
state policeman; labor; business; and a fifth group, "other,"
which represented major associations that didn't fall into
the other classifications.
While the opposition was trying to lay charges at
our feet Which were irrelevant and mostly false--they were
general arguments so they dilluted their campaign dollar.
We maximized ou~s by saying that we could not talk to all
of the people of Oregon at one time with one story. We
will talk in human terms to all of the interest groups
who will lose if the measure goes down. 45
Within these dimensions, the campaign progressed, from an early
and in the overall picture, minor attention to public meetings, to
later communication including radio, television and brief "fact sheets.1t
Davis put out 15 different fliers, each with the same theme but each de
signed to appeal to a specific group of Oregon voters.
Two of the fliers were generalized: one, a five page informational
photocopied brochure described the selective cut argument, and the other,
a single page table describing cigarette tax rates nationally with
Oregon s tax percentage set in bold type.
l

The thrust of arguments in

the several fact sheets was the creation of a hypothetical situation:
t1IF the governor called a special session, cuts MIGHT be directed at
one particular program."

Then followed the argument that the two percent
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across-the-board cuts would not be implemented until the following
year, doubling the percentage.

Compounded by an additional two per

cent cut if the federal and state income tax laws were not divorced,
a cumulative eight percent COULD be slashed from existing programs.
I

Further, the fliers said that it would be possible that a special ses
46

sion would be called by the governor to deal with the problem.
(Several fliers directed to special interest groups are included in
Appendix E.)
Other fliers followed the same general line of reasoning, but the
language was structured to appeal only to the group to which each was
directed.

The following structure was used in a message intended for

the low income voter:
Without your "yes" vote, the following state assistance
to the poor may be stopped: 1. PROPERTY TAX RELIEF for low
income homeowners. 2. 5,362 PATIENT DAYS in the Multnomah
County Hospital and University of Oregon Medical schoois."
3. $180 'ANNUAL for a family of four receiving public assis
tance. 4. NEEDED MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT for one out of
47
eight persons with drug, alcohol and other emotional problems.
"A doubling of tuition, reduction of teaching faculty, and halt
ing of general fund expenditures for OSU Cooperative Extension, Exper
ime.ntal Station, teaching hospital and clinics, etc.," was directed to
higher education.

Fliers going to community colleges warned of "a re

duction of 84.3 percent of state support"; to the property owner, "loss
of $97"; to public elementary and secondary schools, "loss of $34 per
.48
child"--all IF the cuts were made selectively.
'These pointedly exaggerated fact sheets were disseminated to the
leadership of each of the interest groups with a footnote saying that
further information would be provided upon request.

In many cases the
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leadership of the organization receiving the advertising decided not to
use them.

Enright, of the OSEA, expressed dissatisfaction with the
49

"scare approach" accentuated by "loaded language. f~

Using the same

basic information, the OSEA designed and distributed its own version.
Friends of Higher Education did the'same, as did the staff of the ORA.
Of the many interviews conducted in preparation for this study, only
two informants reported that the materials were appropriate for use in
their organization.

We can conclude from this that the flow of influ

ence provided by this communication medium ended at the institutional
level, reaching few people beyond the leadership in each organization.
The target audience for the electronic media appeals was the
"uninformed, uninterested, and independent voter" who, according to
Nimmo, is the audience most influenced by television and, to a slightly
50

lesser extent, radio.

Hallock's public relations firm was well aware

of the nature of the audience and had clearly formulated theories about
how to reach them.

According to Hallock, the goal was to reach people

who were not members of formal interest group organizations and who
would be unlikely to be influenced by "objective, colorless advertis
51

ing."
Media support was altogether planned for the Portland area; a
decision made necessary by the shortage of campaign funds.

Television

was the top priority, but spot advertisements on radio stations accounted
for 20 percent of the budget.

Approximately 200, 10, 30, and 60 second

time slots were purchased on the three Portland stations with the largest
52

audience.
In addition to the arguments used in the printed literature, the
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radio advertisements adopted several more: smoking is a luxury; if the
tobacco lobby wins, Oregonians loose; and smoking is bad for the health.
Eleven seperate messages were designed for the radio audience and of
these, three used the property

t~~

relief argument; one each referred

to public health, the tobacco lobby, cuts in environmental quality con
trol, cuts to school s and kids, and smoking as a luxury. ; . The three 60
second slots used all of the arguments in staged spontaneous dialogue.
The following is an example:
(A friendly male voice) Yeah, I'm going to vote
for the cigarette tax. I mean •.. those guys in the tobacco
industry, you know •.. they can. defeat the cigarette tax
'an pick up their profits and run home. But me ••• I gotta
live here •... I'm the guy who, if the cigarette tax fails,
doesn't get property tax relief. Either that, or they
could take more money from the school budgets. Some guys
say, you know, cut the budgets some more .. " Cut-out the
spending an' throw out the bums. And I say, OK, which
bums? You mean •.. bums like the kids in mental health?
You know ... there's this little girl ...Desiree. She couldn't
feed herself, couldn't walk. They said she'd never walk
but she's walking. You want to throw those bums out? I
don't. Oh, I smoke, Man, do I smoke. But--am I gonna
vote for a cigarette tax? Yeah. Yeah, you bet I am. (DR~
Vote yes January 18th. Tax cigarettes, not property.
(Disclaimer) 53
Another ad explained the benefits of the Boy Scout program to
the mentally retarded boys in Fairview who had "convicts for den fathers,tt
so "they both learn, and it lets two institutionalized groups help each
other ••• it doesn't cost much."

The third 60 second slot also pleaded

the benefits that the Human Resources Department provides to Oregonians.
The remaining 80 percent of the media budget went into television
advertising, far more expensive, and consequently fewer advertisements
were purchased.

Like radio, the video

mess~ge

argued the human impact

of dollars cut, the dangers of smoking, potential increases to property
taxes, and out-of-st'ate tobacco "carpetbagging."

Also like radio, the
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longer advertisements strived for spontaneity and emotional impact.
The same advertisement that on radio talked about mentally retarded
boys, used a pan shot focused on the boys working on their badge's,
followed by the expressive voice of a man saying, "This is just ONE of
S4
the programs that can die without the cigarette tax.
It

It is impossible to know how many people attended to the radio
and television advertising, and more important, how many were actually
influenced to vote yes.

The state campaign coordinators felt that media

support on the four Portland area television stations was vital to the
election success.

We do know that some of the television advertisements

were viewed as far away as Ashland, on the southern Oregon border, but
only those homes serviced by cable television.

The only potentially

measurable effect of the media campaign was in the Portland viewing area.
Newspaper advertisements were not used

Only one ad was purchased

in Corvallis, and this only because the laison chairman in that city in
sisted that local contributors needed a visible demonstration that their
SS
money was being used to help them in their county campaign.
In considering priorities in the media, we had a
television budget to hit. Once that was hit, we 'had two
options: In the metropolitan area there are four tele
vision stations. In Eugene cable television reaches 20,000
and in Corvallis 5,000. So we get a spinoff by using
Portland television. Once we surpassed the goal of tele
vision advertising in this area we had to decide whether
we would complement the television advertising by radio
here or extend the television to the valley. We decided
on radio here. Newspapers were never considered, because
of the drama of television and radio
We wanted to present
the message emotionally which is not possible to the same
extent in print. 56
Timing of the advertising campaign was

p~anned

to achieve maximum

media saturation the last 20 days before the election.

Increasingly

longer advertisements were used as the election neared but the number
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remained fairly constant over the entire period.

A few taped public

information programs appeared on television in other parts of the state,
but these were debates or information panels not funded or controlled
by the State Committee.
Other State Committee Activity
Two other tasks were performed by the campaign consultants in the
early stage of the campaign: (1) hiring a public opinion research firm
and (2) arranging for speakers to explain the issues when requested by
local civic groups.
Public speeches in political campaigns attract notoriously small
audiences in Oregon, as in other parts of the nation.· Campaign coordi
nators knew that the chief advantage to be gained through speeches was
press coverage and free column inches in regular newspaper reports.

In

the beginning the only means of obtaining this kind of exposure was
through appearances before civic clubs, public forums, and at "knife and
fork" clubs.

For this reason, Brad Davis spent a high proportion of his

time in the first week or two of the campaign writing speeches.

Another

reason attention was given to public meetings was that in the early days
of the committee's formation, meetings provided the only form of public
legitimization.

"The only way we had to communicate a message was to
57

write a speech and run out and give it ."u
According to Brad Davis, his office was very selective in filling
speaking requests.

"We tried to go one for one; to pit equals against

equals.

When Harl Haas stepped in we'd get a Betty Roberts or a Vic,

Atiyeh.

People were paying our salaries for a win.

would not have been enough.

Our credentials

We never accepted a speaking spot unless we

7~
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knew in advance who the opposition speaker would be."
No formal press releases were issued from the Committee Against
Raising Property Taxes for two reasons:

no money was available to

hire a professional press man and the committee was getting what they
considered was sufficient coverage through statements issues by state
59
For example, Jacob Tanzer, director of the Department
influent ia 1 s •
of Human Resources, gave only two or three speeches during the 40 day
campaign, to groups ranging in size from 15 to 35 persons; yet his com
ments were picked up and carried in newspapers in every part of the
state and a 1 arge port ion of the speech was reproduced in the OSEA
60

newsletter which went to over 17 thousand state employees.
The firm of Richard Kennedy and Associates, in Eugene, Oregon, was
61
selected to conduct the opinion surveys.
A total of four polls were
taken, but only the first was compiled and tabulated according to the
usual categories (age, sex, occupation, probable voter).

The purpose

of the survey was to determine voter awareness of the tax election,
62

and the reasons they might favor or oppose such a tax increase.
The December poll showed 61 percent favoring the cigarette tax,
34.2 percent opposed, and 4.8 percent undecided.

The mQst·frequently

mentioned reason for voting yes, was "property taxes will increase if
the measure is defeated" (25.3 percent); the next most frequently men
tioned reason was "smoking is dangerous and an increase in the cig
arette tax will discourage smoking" (22.8 percent).

Those opposed

named Ita cigarette tax is aimed at a small group of people" as the best
reason for voting no (29.3 percent), "cigarettes cost too much already"
(16 percent), and Itthe cigarette tax is a sales tax" (14.7 percent).
(Table II)

The poll also determined that 72.7 percent of the general
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TABLE II
KENNEDY POLL RESULTS ON ISSUES
COMBINED BEST REASONS FOR VOTING FOR THE CIGARETTE TAX

ielson

Percentage

Property taxes will increase if the measure is defeated.

18.8%

Local schools will get less state money.

18.8

Smoking is dangerous and an increase in the cigarette
tax will discourage smoking.

17.9

Out-of-staters help to pay our cigarette tax.

9.2

Local police and fire protection will be impaired.

8.3

College tuition will increase.

7.9

Out-of-state tobacco interests are trying to control
Oregonians

4.8

Not sure.

14.3
100.0%

COMBINED BEST REASONS FOR OPPOSING THE CIGARETTE TAX INCREASE

Reason

Percentagze

A cigarette tax is a sales tax.

62.710

A cigarette tax is aimed at a small group of people.

50.6

Cigarettes cost too much already.

37.3

Defeat of the cigarette tax will force economy in
government.

24.1

Defeat of the cigarette tax will force economy in
educational budgets.

22.7

Not sure.

69.0

10'0:0%

Source: Richard Kennedy and Associates, UAttitudes Toward the January
18, 1972 Special Election" (Eugene, Oregon, December, 1971), p. 14-21.
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population was aware of the special election and 27.5 percent was
63

not.
Brad Davis said that the poll did not alter the decisions made
by the coordinating team.

Unlike the Bardsley-Haslacher poll taken
64

prior to the Tax Limitation campaign,

the information was not seen

by anyone during the campaign except the men making up the decision
making triad.

Davis explained the reason:

work is vital to success.

It

"People need to think that

Had the early resul ts been known to others

involved, the committee feared that activity would have slowed and time
would have worked against them.

Also, the committee was never certain

that the poll was accurate. "The best poll can be off by five percent
65
either way."
Poll results obtained near the end of the campaign were
phoned in:

showing a 32 percent "yes" vote; 31 percent "no"; 47 percent
66

"undecided. "
The large increase in "undecided" voters was credited to confus
ion resulting from opposition claims about the property tax relief
issue and the attorney general's warning of potential corrupt practices
violations in television advertising and the Voters' Pamphlet. But Davis
67

also felt that the later polls were more accurate.

The director of

the poll reported that if the "undecided" voters were eliminated, the
"yes_no" percentage fell within one tenth of one percent of the actual
vote cast.

In a follow-up survey conducted by phone, the public opinion

firm. found that, in gemral, the "not sure" category reacted to their
68

indecision by not voting.
Summary
The cigarette tax issue was known to Oregonians prior to any
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formal campaign activity; the petition drive gained wide publicity as
the sponsors gained notoriety through Corrupt Practices Act violations-
hiring students to obtain voter signatures.
Tobacco wholesalers had initiated the petition drive and were suc
cessful.

As a result, the governor called the legislature into special

session.

The 1971 Special Legislative Assembly likewise drew attention

to the cigarette tax measure, especially when they passed a bill calling
for two percent cuts to agencies funded out of the general state budget.
Once the effect of cuts was known, both permanent and temporary
interest groups began to initiate activity that resulted in the selec
tion of three men to coordinate the campaign:

one responsible for plan

ning the media advertising, another attempting to organize and coordin
ate interest groups, and the third directing the fund raising drive from
the governor's office.
Responsibilities of the State Committee was at once structured
and fragmented:
other groups.

the shortage of time prevented decision checks with
Major strategy decisions were made by only three men.

But this same shortage of time prevented genuine coordination between
workers in various parts of the state.

As a result, a variety of in

dependent coalitions formed and campaign strategy carried out by each
group.
Chapter IV describes the strategies implemented by interest
groups from the public and private sector, state officials, and elected
leaders.

It also is concerned with the manner by which the communica

tion network expanded--including only a few interested individuals who
talked with others of sUniliar concerns in the early phase.

Finally,

the chapter includes a description of the opponents and their campaign

77.

methods, an account of charges and counter-charges leveled by those
on both sides of the measure, the ensuing confusion and outrage of
uninvolved observers, and a reflection of all that had gone before-
the final vote on January 18, 1972.
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1Herbert M. Baus and William Ross, Politics Battle Plan (New
York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 2.
2Jonas, p. 314.
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8, 1972. Every indication suggests anti-Ballot Measure Nine campaigning
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CHAPTER IV

According to Erwin Bettinghaus, formal

legit~izers

often clear

the way for persuasive activity carried out by campaign promoters: by
lending their influence, or the weight of their positions, to proposals
20

they have publicly endorsed.

In the cigarette tax campaign state of

ficials seem to have performed just such a role.

One important phase

of the campaign was successfully secured when influentials endorsed the
tax.

Each official represented the top leadership of agencies associa

ted in the public mind as apolitical, reputable, and performing services
important to the general welfare.
iliar function.

Elected officials carried out a sim

Public statements issued by the governor and by state

legislators attempted to

establi~h

the integrity of the proposal by

creating a positive link in the mind of the voter between agencies of
value and the state tax measure.

In this sense the most important role

officials and elected leaders performed was legitimization, clearly one
of the most important functions of the persuasive process in politics.
I. PUBLIC SECIDR M:>BILIZES
Activity by Influentials
The names of state officials and well known legislators provided
the pro-tax forces with an aura of respectability and marked the cam
paign with a "prestige" stamp of approval.

Of the officials in state

agencies publicly endorsing the measure, Directors of the Department of
Environmental Control and the Department of Human Resources were the
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most visible.

L.B. Day, heading the newly formed state environment

division, spoke to the Salem Rotary Club in early December on the topic
of todayfs environment.

In a response to questions posed by the press,

Day outlined the expected effects on the environmental fight.

The loss

of revenue to a budget he considered already meagre might be permanently
crippling.

Day made no public appearances for the specific purpose of

.supporting the tax, but issued three press releases (December 6, 13, and
January 12), the substance of which found its way into major newspapers
2
around the state.
According to Day, the DEQ became involved in the campaign on its
own volition, not as a result of requests by campaign coordinators or
others interested in passing the cigarette tax increase.

His agency

stood to loose a considerable sum if the tax went down to defeat and
this was both the reason for his participation and the thrust of his
3

arguments.
Comments made by Day were not only picked up by the press in
nearly every Oregon county, but excerpts from the releases were quoted
in the newsletters sent out by the Environmental Council and the Oregon
Shores Conservation Council.

He thus created a communication linkage

between public and private organizations drawing people together through
4
Day appealed to these
their common interest in natural resources.
people by saying:
Our budget is tight.

If voters defeat the cigarette
ha~ enough
money to carry out the clean air plan adequately.

tax increase January 18, the department won't

But he did not confine his remarks to the impact of a tax defeat
on his own department.

"Defeat of the cigaret tax would mean less

money available for 'basic school support, with still further drain on
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6

property taxes."
Aside from issuing press releases, Day was in contact with the
governor's office during much of the campaign, as was Jacob Tanzer,
7
the Director of the Human Resources Department.
Neither state offic

ial was directly associated with planning by the State Committee, how
ever decisions made at the state level were definitely punctuated with
issues and themes that had been recommended by the two men.
suggested to Brad Davis,

tt

Tanzer

certain types of scenes, ideas from our in

stitutions" which were adopted and used in the filming of campaign ad

a

vert ising.
The early thrust of the formal state campaign was not popular

with Tanzer.

It was his feeling that rather than discuss the fiscal

impact of a tax loss by saying that money could be taken away from "XU
group, it should be stated in terms of loss to "XU program, "and by
program we mean programs for children and programs to assist people in
their efforts to get themselves off the tax rolls.
abstract.

Dollars are not

Dollars have real gut meaning in the ability of the state to

heal broken lives and when you're talking about tax dollars, it is real
9
ly those lives you're talking about."
Tanzer commented in an interview that there is a fine line betwe
en ttscare tactics" and "facts put in human terms."

He did not approve

the early "sloganeering," used by both camps, the "simple little con
cepts" emphasized over the significance of cuts to programs important
in human lives.

ttl am perfectly confident in the electorate that if
10

the facts ever sink through, people will

vo~e

the right way."

In

private conversations with some legislators who were going to oppose
the measure, Tanzer"obtained an agreement that they would remain silent.
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"Some were hung up on it being a sales tax and that this would hurt the
poor.

It was pointed out that failure of the cigarette tax would hurt
11
the poor and they shut Up.1f
Radio and television advertisments did reflect the Tanzer philo
sophy and there is no doubt about 'the importance of his role in the

ca~

paign: as an advisor behind the scenes, and as an influential in the
public eye
Other agency directors within the Department of Human Resources
perfo~ed

different roles.

Clarence Jones, Director of the State Eco

nomic Opportunities Office said that while his office did not solicit
votes or action, his field people did. "We couldn't have staff paid
12
by federal funds involved in this,"
but through non-federal staff
members, fliers went out to over 30,000 people in the Community Action
13

program.

Jones said his office pulled in representatives from local

CAA volunteer boards for an informational briefing on what happens to
a tax dollar in Oregon.

If

We made no pretense of knowing where the tax

cuts would come--we told them where they could come.

Health and welfare

14

stood to take the brunt of the cutS.1f

After the briefing, the CAA

volunteers were to stimulate voters to go to the polls, appealing to
-welfare recipients, the disabled, and minority groups--sections of the
population other interest groups would not reach.
Mrs. Edward Hughes, coordinator of the State Program on Aging,
gave "technical assistance to the State Council for Senior Citizens

15
who had endorsed passage of the cigarette tax."
Mrs. Shephard and Jack Nelson in

distributi~g

citizens assisted by her department.

She cooperated with

literature to senior
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Labor Commissioner, Norman O. Nilsen recommended passage too,
but "with mixed emotions."

Beyond a grudging public endorsement, he

16

did little.
In eastern Oregon, Thomas Young, chairman of the Oregon Liquor
I

Control Commission and former state representative from Baker and Grant
counties, made at least one public speech that was covered by the press.
His appeal for "yes" votes was based on the measure's "freedom of choice"
character, but otherwise his speech was, in general, directed toward
17
educating the 'audience about the provisions in H.B. 3064.
Roy Lieuallen, chancellor of the

St~te

System of Higher Education,

spoke to the Portland City Club on December 17, and like Young, was
quoted in newspapers the next day

According to the coverage of the

Grants Pass Daily Courier and the Portland Oregonian, the text of his
speech argued the state's severe financial crisis:
Some of my colleagues have tried to persuade me that
it is not politically wise to be so candid as to say a vote
for the cigarette tax is a vote for education. However,
passage of the cigarette tax is at least a partial solution
to our financial emergency. Should the cigarette tax proposal
be defeated in January, and if current legislation is imple
mented, it will become necessary to cut back an additional 2
percent of our general fund appropriation, or about $2.7 mil
lion. Added to our $4 million reduction for next year, the
full cut thus totaling $6.7 million or nearly 7 percent of our
total operating budget . • . and, of course the primary vote
in May on the income tax could add another $2.7 million to
that figure. 18
The chancellor'S office also participated in the campaign, as noted
earlier, by alerting administrators in each of Oregon's colleges and uni
versities of the state of financial contingency threatening the state
system and requesting their assistance in

p~ssing

the cigarette tax.

He too was in contact with the State Committee triad, although less
19
frequently.
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Officials Day, Tanzer, Young and Lieue11en appeared in the early
weeks of the campaign, but there was almost a total absence of press
20

statements or public speeches in the closing days.
ers their function was chiefly to endorse.

As early 1egitimiz

Only secondarily did they

fulfill an informational role, one which was attempted by other inf1uen
tials in the state.
Elected Officials
Numerous state legislators were involved in making public speeches
and in initiating activity on a state and local level.

In a letter to the

editor appearing in the Oregonian, Senator Hoyt (R-Benton, Polk) summar
ized the reasons for legislators involvement:
Remember, the Legislature has gone over the governor's
austerity budget twice making substantial reductions, once in
the regular session and again in the special session.
Some legislators voted against referring the cigarette
tax at an early special election because they preferred income
tax reform, a state lotterY, or the temporary expedient of ac
celerating the withholding tax on incomes. Some admittedly
voted against it for political reasons.
21
No legislator questioned the need for additional revenue.
Senator Jason Boe (D-Reedsport), spoke on every major campus in
Oregon, explaining the financial need argument.

"My analysis of the pre

election needs was to mobilize the campus and the new voters; I believe
22

that this was the swing vote."

He also addressed groups in Roseburg,

Coos Bay, Florence and Portland.

With Representative Mary Rieke (R-

Portland), Boe conducted a long information session before the Legislative
23

Affairs Committee of the Portland Chamber of Commerce.

To the Florence

Rotary Club, Boe cited the ftsteep price in human suffering and hardship,ft
24

that would follow the tax defeat.
In southern Oregon, Senator L.W. Newbry (R-Jackson) gave numerous
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talks

favori~g

the measure and in addition wrote the explanation appear

ing in the Voters' Pamphlet, commended by secretary of state Clay Myers
as being one of the rare "responsible" statements appearing in the much
maligned special election pamphlet.

In the pamphlet Newbry stated that

options open to the legislature were severely limited, explaining the
"two plus four" plan which called for a two percent cut in all budgets
for the first year of the biennium and a four percent cut in the second
26

year.
In Klamath Falls, Representative Fred Heard (D-Klamath Falls),
spoke to an audience at Oregon Technical Institute, pointing out that
while he voted against an increase in cigarette taxes at the regular
and special sessions, "the fiscal picture has changed" partly as a re
suIt of actions by Congress on income tax exemptions and deductions,
27

and partly as a result of the wage-price freeze.
In the most populated area of the state, the valley region, a
great many legislators were expousing the issues.

In Portland, Represen

tative Frank Roberts (D-Multnomah), spoke to the North Democratic Forum
and the Gresham Chamber of Commerce upon the request of the State Commit
28

tee coordinator, Brad Davis, and the

O~OSEA

leaders respectively.

Senator Edward Fadeley (D-Lane), cooperated with the governor's
office and the Joint Ways and Means Committee in their request for sup
port.

He appeared six times in Lane County in behalf of the "yes"
29

forces, including a half-hour televised debate.

Fadeley shared the

platform with Bob Davis in behalf of the proponents, against Senator
Harl Haas (D-Portland) and Representative Keith" Burns
the debate, broadcast over KEZI-TV, Fadeley said:

(D-Portland)~

In
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If the tax' is approved, Oregon will still be 14th
from the bottom among all states in the amount of taxes
on cigarettes. Forty percent of the current Oregon cig
arette tax is paid by out~of-state residents who boot
leg cigarettes home. 30
The debate was reported in a three column spread in the January
8, Sunday edition of the Eugene Register-Guard, reaching a potential

audience of 53,541.
Representative Jack Ripper (D-Coos), gave at least four speeches
on the Oregon coast: to teachers groups, public employees, the Interna
tional Woodworkers of America locals, and the Central Labor Council of
Coos County. ,; He characterized his role as both a legitimizer and as an
31
information source to the general public.
Like the speeches made by
other legislators, Ripper's appearance's were covered and reported in
~he

press.
In eastern Oregon, House Speaker Bob Smith (R-Burns), told an

audience that "people will suffer property tax reI ief loss" if the tax
32

is defeated.

Stafford Hansell (R-Umatilla) spoke to the Hermiston

Rotary Club saying the tax increase "will be necessary to maintain many
33

state government services."
The chairman of the Legislative Interim Committee on Education,
Senator Victor Atiyeh (R-Washington), told voters that "earlier budget
cuts were painful and drastic, but if the cigarette tax fails, the situ
34
ation in my opinion will be grave."
Representative William Gwinn (R-Albany), a member of the Joint
Ways and Means Committee which oversees budget needs, and a member of
the Oregon Emergency Board, reassured Oregon State University engineers
who were concerned about fund reduction on research then under way on a

99
field burner, but did say that the cigarette tax money was important
35

for related research at the development center.

In a "speakers cir

cuit" swing later in the campaign, Gwinn provided a modicum of measured
reason, saying that "campaign claims on both sides of Oregon's cigarette

tax issue are exaggerated.
izing."

There's been a lot of illogical hypothes

His argument in favor of the tax was based on temporary relief
36

in a crisis situation.
Many of Oregon's legislators participated in public debates.

One

such appearance was in Albany under the sponsorship of the Committee for
Progress Through Law, an ad hoc arm of the Benton-Linn Economic Oppor
tunity Council.

Senator Hector MacPherson (R-Oakville), argued the pro

side against Alice Toland, president of the Linn County Taxpayers Pro
tection Association and Ron Campbell, the Portland teacher who had re
37

cruited students to circulate petitions in the referendum drive.
Legislators who opted to publicly support the cigarette tax were
about equally divided between the two political parties: Newbry, Smith,
Eivers, Gwinn, Atiyeh, Carson, Johnson, Rieke, and Howe from the Repub
lican camp; Fadeley, Lang, Boe, Ripper, Roberts, Cole, Heard, and Byers
from the Democratic.

Arguments ranged from "band-aid" solution for long-

run fiscal needs, to appeals designed to reason the impact of special
budget cuts to special programs.

Party partisanship seemed forgotten

as leaders in the two parties appeared on the same platform in behalf of
the measure.
Governor Tom McCall
Members of the Oregon legislature were joined in their public en
dorsements by their independent Republican governor, Tom McCall.

The
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governor issued a press release immediately following the adjournment
39
of the special session urging that the cigarette tax be approved.
At
every available opportunity he spoke in behalf of the measure.
In eastern Oregon, at the annual Milton-Freewater

of Com

Chambe~

merce awards banquet, McCall spoke to over two hundred, structuring his
remarks around two upcoming ballot measures.

First he appealed for

support of a bill important to eastern Oregon farmers which would permit
the state to issue bonds for the purpose of making loans to farmers
for irrigation.

His other appeal seemed at that time important to few-

an "all-out" plea for passage of the five cent a pack cigarette tax
increase:
The cigarette tax is more" than dollars and cents. It
is a symbol--of what kind of situation we face, What small
moves we must make--what kind of concern we must now evince.
If we lose the cigarette tax, it will be more than
revenue that goes with the wind. lie will have lost the mom
entum to achieve. The people of this state must stop retreat
ing.
This is the edge of the pr!8ipice. Our heels are hang
ing over. There is no backstep.
Using an analogy likening public voting patterns with the "group
will to survive," McCall spoke earlier in the day to
School students.

~tanfield

High

To this group as well, the governor spoke in favor of

the tax and went on to express the opinion that "the people of Oregon
have a phobia against a sales tax, but it is a bona fide, necessary
41

form of public finance."
As the elected official charged with the responsibility of propo
sing a state budget that meets the needs of all agencies of state govern
ment, McCall had seen $36 million deleted

fro~

his original budget pro
42

posal by the Ways and Means Committee at the regular session.
additional cuts made necessary by the successful referal of the

The
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cigarette tax eroded a budget he already had deemed inadequate.

In a

state where the legislature and the people are co-equal legislative
organs, each able to make, repeal, or modify law on its own, the
governor is no more powerful than the support he can win for his pro
grams

MOreover, the governor has no power of veto over legislation

passed by the people; once the tax was referred the only course avai1
able to McCall lay in using the influence and prestige of his office
in a persuasive attempt directed at the voters.
Fearing partisan identification in the public mind, McCall did
not make extensive persuasive efforts, but did issue an early press
release threatening another special session if the January 18th e1ec
tion negated the cigarette tax.

And he exerted the influence of his

office in personal contacts to legislators, 'lobby groups, and in some
cases, newspaper editorial staff; encouraging support both by monetary
43

means and public endorsements.
The governor's participation took various forms not the least of
which was the tt1oaned" activity of his assistant, Bob Davis, and the
tacit approval of his office for participation by other agency personnel.
Public appearances and press statements by the governor extended the
communication chain.

When the governor appears in Wheeler, population

261, he makes news.

When he issues a press release, the media attends.

Bconomic Interest Groups
The discussion thus far has considered the involvement of inf1u
entia1s from agencies perceived by their directors as most seriously
affected by a negative election outcome.

Their appeals were directed

at a general audience that was expected to support the notion that
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human and environmental resources were a necessary and desirable func
tion of government.
interests.

Elected officials likewise struck at constituent

In contrast, the activity of large public and private organi

zations appealed to clearly definable and relatively more narrow economic
group interests--ttpocket-book" interest of the people from whom they
drew their membership.
Changes in the Oregon constitution providing for legalized politi
cal activity by state employees was an important factor in both the
visibility of influentials from state agencies and the utilization of
state employee organizations to promote the cigarette tax measure.
Prior to 1967, public employees were not permitted to contribute any
thing of value--time or money--to any .sort of political campaign.

In

a bill titled the Corrupt Practices Amendment, the Legislative Assembly
repealed all sections of the constitution inhibiting political action
44
by state employees except. those relating to coersion.
In the 1971-72
cigarette tax campaign, public employee organizations not only partici
pated but used their organizations in an overt attempt to influence
voters.

In other parts of the nation, activity by public employee groups

has resulted in the winning margin in a close election and certain de
velopments suggest that this was also true in Oregon.
Of the economic interest groups in the public sector, the Oregon
State Employees Association was the most active.

Beginning their formal

activity while the 1971 special session was still in progress, the OSBA
was involved in nearly every phase of the campaign: as legitimizers, as
initiators of the campaign on a state and local level, as information
source to OSEA members, and as

consul~ants

decision making on the state level.

in some aspects of general
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According to Thomas Enright, instigator of OSEA participation,
the primary objective was to sell state employees and only incidentally
to convince the general public.

After obtaining the approval of the

OSIA board of directors, Enright sought the cooperation of other state
employee organizations including the Oregon Education Association,
Oregon School Employees Association, Chancellor's office of Higher Ed
ucation, Oregon School Boards Association, State Department of Educa
tion, Oregon Community Colleges and the American Federation of Teachers.
Of these groups, two (the ORA and OSEA) maintained close contact and
co-sponsored 14 public meetings in every region of the state where there
was a large concentration of association members.

The meetings were

directed to the membership of the aKA .and OSEA but were also held open
45

to the public.
The meetings were poorly attended according to Enright.

Those who

did attend were either strongly for the measure or strongly against it.
46

"Not many came who were uncommitted."

Although the audiences were small,

press and television coverage extended the visibility of the state em
ployee organization and their participation in the campaign.

The pres

ence of either a state senator or representative on the same platform
with nonpartisan organizational leaders made news.

In Klamath Falls,

an isolated city in southern Oregon, television cameras recorded and
carried over five minutes of Representative Fred Heard's speech in the
47

evening news broadcast.
An overriding "survival" issue dominated the OSEA arguments--paral

lei to the arguments originating in the State Committee headquarters but
with a lesser degree of emotional loading.
a~ut

Enrig~t

was deeply concerned

the inaccuracies and emotionalism that characterized the early
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materials disseminated by the State Committee and decided that the
OSBA should develop their own.
geration.

"Our people wouldn't stand for exag

They were not pleased that we had decided to promote the

issue, but after awhile they became educated to the reality of the
situation.

The results show at the polls.

Where we had a large por
48

tion of state employees, the margin was significantly greater."
The 1971-72 campaign was the first that the OSEA had been finan
cially and editorially involved with.

They had decided to sell their

members early in the campaign so that opposition publicity would have
a minimum influence.

With this objective, newsletters were sent to

members in 80 chapters.
state employees.

Seven thousand copies went to other non-member

Communication carried out by the OSEA central staff

also included individual mailings explaining the tax measure and announ
cing the meeting dates, and information in the form of a one page bul
letin which organizational district representatives were requested to
post on staff room bulletin boards.

Even though Bnright considered the

'activity of his organization "reaction strategy," poorly structured and
weakly implemented because of the Shortage of time, various printed
49

material did reach the households of at least 17,000 state employees.
A special section of the OSEA News, January edition, carried four
pages of information devoted to the cigarette tax election.

A detailed

description of the background on the tax election, written by Enright,
included an eight-point evaluation of the potential effects of a defeat
and the reasons the legislature elected to draft H.B. 3064.

Summarizing,

Bnright said:
OSEA legislative representatives believe that the
present fiscal crisis is real; that the automatic cuts in
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B.B. 3064 are no mere threat.

As Governor McCall has
said, defeat of the cigarette tax would be a disaster.
The disaster can be averted if the 17,000 non-federal
employees i~oOregon and their families vote "yes" on
January 18.
The second and third pages included (1) the complete text of

Jacob Tanzer's speech delivered to the Washington County Forum, (2)
detailed figures on revenue loss to each of the 13 community colleges;
(3) anticipated job reductions at state institutions, and (4) costs to
Oregon schoo1s--quoting Dale Parnell, Superintendent of Public Instru
ction, and Roy Lieual1en of the State Board of Higher Education.

The

final page provided a list of agencies and the cuts each could reason
ably expect to loose expressed in dollars.
Participation in local OSEA chapters was spearheaded by the state
organization.
named.

Enright said that approximately 50 local chairmen were

In Benton county, an area where many groups were working together t

th$ Oregon State University campus chapter named Professor Myron Cropsey
as chairman.

In cooperation with the sister chapter of OSEA, composed

of classified personnel, and faculty members belonging to the American
Association of University Professors, Dr. Cropsey organized and directed
"approximately 92 persons u whose task was to inform friends and neigh
bords in a person-to-person telephone campaign.

Each delegate was to

contact at least 10 people and ask them in turn to relay the message to
51
at least five more.
Unlike OSEA membership, people represented by the Oregon Educa
tion Association did not have as much to loose.
ests depend chiefly on support from the

Ge~ra1

Whereas the OSEA inter
Fund, Oregon teachers

and administrators obtain 70 percent of their district revenue from local
property taxes.

In spite of this lesser pocket-book impact, the OEA
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recognized that Basic School Support decreases would make impending
salary negotiations more difficult.

Further, the increasing number

of school budget elections being defeated over the preceeding five
52

years reflected a state and national property tax rebellion.

"The

taxpayer revolt" made the OBA legislative staff sensitive to the need
for long-run tax reform and, as an intermediate and temporary solution,
53

the 1972 cigarette tax increase.
Members of the OEA staff worked jointly with the OSBA in publici
zing and organizing the public employee meetings (Figure 3).

Press

releases were mailed to newspapers in the, area where a meeting was to

be held, cooperation of legislators' in the area was obtained, and staff
members made available to supplement the explanation of the issues by
1egi81~tors

and the OSEA staff representatives.

Cecil Posey, executive

secretary, and John Danielson, government relations director, divided
responsibilities, generally appearing on the platform with
54
either Enright, or his assistant, Everett Stiles.
spe~king

Legislative chairmen in local school districts were notified by
the ORA central office of campaign needs and were used to inform teachers
and encourage local participation.

Direct mailings to the membership

were not used but a list of ORA workers was provided to Brad Davis who
in turn disseminated the State Committee's printed literature to Oregon
teachers.

Again like the OSEA, ORA directors were not satisfied with

the emotive appeals used by the State Committee and developed their own
"fact Sheets," which included information sent in bulletin form. to
legislative chairmen, and a comprehensive edition of the

aKA tabloid.

Danielson estimated that "over 19,000 teachers received the news through
55

one or more of the organizational channels."
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·9~

Activity by the state organization paved the way for other
educators favoring the tax.

Officials attending the twenty-second

winter conference of the Oregon Association of Secondary School Admin
istrators, an ORA affiliate, voted 90-55 to maintain their stand in
favor of the cigarette tax after several members objected on the basis
that a resolution urging stronger smoking laws for minors was inconsis
56
tent with public endorsement of the tax.
~tivity

of Other State Organizations

The Oregon School Board Association and Oregon AFL-CIO endorsed
the measure but played a relatively minor role in the total campaign.
They did provide members with information through their regular house
organ$, but according to Thomas Scanlon, public information officer of
57

the AFL-CIO, "We did no more than asked to do."

Thomas Rigby, execu
58

tive secretary of the OSBA,

reco~nded

endorsement to his state board.

Robert Ridgley, OSBA president, said on January 8, "We cannot stand any
59
cuts in an already meager state school aid budget, n
and on January 10,
the Hilhi School Board in Washington County, and the Enterprise School
60
Board in Wallowa County, passed endorsement resolutions.
Many other
local school boards came out in favor of the tax, perhaps as a result
of the example set by the state organization.
The League of Oregon Cities and Associatiori of Oregon Counties
mailed informational memos to city and county government administrators
notifying them of the dollar cuts to their agencies.

No attempt was

made to influence public voting behavior by either of these groups.
cigarette tax had no direct effect on city government activities or

"The
c~ty

government revenues, and therefore was not deemed an appropriate subject

lOP

61

for activity by the league."

A letter from P. Jerry Orrick, exec

utive secretary of the Association of Oregon Counties provides sub
stantially the same information, only substituting "county government"
62

for "city government. 1t
Oregon Community College Association Executive Director, Dr.
Donald Sheldon, cooperated with the State Committee by requesting do
nations to the campaign effort through letters mailed to administrators
63

at each of the Oregon campuses.

The only publication compiled by the

OCCA is distributed only five or six times a year and includes primarily
information of general interest to community college personnel.

The tax

measure was mentioned briefly in one such bulletin, but according to
Dr. Sheldon, the circulation is limited and therefore not an appropriate
medium for persuasive communication.

Further, the organization is sup

ported by state funds, unlike most of the membership organizations in
the public sector, is relatively new on the Oregon scene, and has a
small, apolitical staff.

Its attempts to influence was accordingly

limited.
The efforts of higher education, on the other hand, were not re..
stricted.

The ad hoc committee, Friends of Higher Education, has already

been mentioned in connection with fund raising activity.

They not only

raised proportionately more money, they did so by drawing in businessmen
and others around the state who were interested in preserving qual ity
in higher education at the state schools.

"Get a man to give dollars,

and you have his vote," reasoned Wil Post, laison campaign chairman on
64

the Corvallis campus.

In Eugene, the Lane

~ounty

Referendum Committee
65

obtained community support and donated over $2,000 to the campaign effort.

.10.J.

This was the first Oregon election" to be held under the new law
requiring that campaign expenditures be made known 10 days prior to the
election.

With the contributions made by higher education generally

known, still another source of influence emerged in the growing chorus
of campaign voices.

The citizens of Oregon were made aware of the ed

ucational community's committment to passage of the cigarette tax.

Summary
An answer to the question of who, in the public sector, generated

the most in the way of visible campaign activity would clearly be the
three major

emplo~nt

groups:

the Oregon State Employees Association,

the Oregon Education Association, and higher education through its ad
hoc interest group, Friends of Higher Education.

In sum, the groups

'provided leadership by utilizing personal and mass communication chan
nels:

public meetings, printed literature, personal influence through

direct personal contacts, and printed and electronic mass media indirec
tly through news coverage of organization sponsored public meetings and
financial contributions.
II. ENOORSEMENTS
Public endorsements constitute important campaign activity and
66

sometimes provide the important difference in success or failure.
During the short cigarette tax campaign, newspaper morgues filled with
endorsements from each side of the political continuum and from orga
nizations representative of nearly every phase of Oregon life.

The

following section deals primarily with general endorsements made at the
local level, support by private state organizations, and the important
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activity performed by the Youth-Aged Coalition.
General Endorsements
In Klamath Falls, one of the few areas in the state where the
local paper took an editorial stand against the tax increase, the
Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce voted unanimously to endorse the

measure

Officials from that organization said the endorsement was

based on the "critical condition" of the state's finances due to fis
68
cal imbalance.
The Hillsboro Chamber, North Clackamas County Chamber
of Commerce, and Eugene Area Chamber all reported endorsement, as did
69
other city groups scattered across the state.
As the campaign moved forward, reports began coming in about an
increasingly greater variety of groups making public their approval •.
Wallace McCrae, president of Blue Mountain Community College in eastern
Oregon, emphatically stated his support, fearing a decline in educational
70

quality_if the two percent cuts went into effect.

George Analla, of

the Orelon Tax Research publication, and Herman Kehrli, director emeritus
of the Bureau of Government Research and Service at the University of
Oregon, distributed studies clarifying the fiscal impact on the state
budget that, while not direct endorsements, had strong positive influ
71

ence.

Kehrli's remarks were reprinted in their complete form in the

strongly pro, Oregon State University paper.
Senator Robert Packwood responded to a question on the tax posed
by newsmen, saying, "I'll support it, but not with the feeling that we
72

must have it or civilization will come to an end."
Senior citizens from Columbia county adopted a resolution called
a "Prepaid Health Plan for the Smoker," widely quoted in the Oregon press:
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Whereas a good share of these victims will need
tax support to. pay all or part of their medical expenses
and living costs, whereas, cigarette smokers have ninety
five percent of all lung cancer and emphysema, be it re
solved that Citizens of Oregon pass the cigarette tax
bill.
By doing so--sick smokers who end up on welfare, re
habilitation, and unemployment or other tax supported state
services will have had the opportunity to help prepay
these expenses. 73
In Lane county, six of the seven members of the Lane legislative
delegation, both Democrats and Republicans, approved a resolution urg
ing passage of the tax increase:
Raving·watched and participated in the many millions
of dollars of cuts in the state budget, and the inadequate "
funding of local units of government, we believe further
cuts cannot be made in these areas.
We believe further cuts in state support of local
government will inevitably result in increased property
taxes. Based on existing laws, the loss of local property
tax relief in Lane county could be over $1 million next
year.
Intentional inaccuracies used in this election, in
cluding statements in the Voters' Pamphlet, must be counter
ed. A "no" vote will reduce property tax relief. It is a
falsehood to suggest otherwise.
A "no" vote will increase property taxes. 74
In contrast to the Oregon Farm Bureau, one of the few interest
groups who opposed the tax in a public statement, the Oregon State Home
Builders Association voted to support it.

The association president,

B.D. Greene, said, nit was very clear that defeat of the tax would place
75

an increasing burden on property taxes. tt
The State Housing Council, an appointive committee selected by
Governor McCall, also urged voters to approve the cigarette tax incre
76

ase, again, because of the property tax linkage to the ballot measure.
77
An extremely conservative

journal, the Oregon Voters Digest,

wrote "we oppose'discriminatory special sales taxes on principle, but
this particular cigarette tax increase should get a "yes" vote,"
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because of the severe time limitations involved in obtaining any other
78

form of state revenue.

Their support and the unanimous support of

college and university alumnus papers provided more evidence of bi
partisan, conservative-liberal approval.

Summary
Even where endorsements were not forthcoming, little opposition
surfaced.

Only three major newspapers (subscription 10,000 or more)

came out opposed:

!!!!,

the Medford Mail-Tribune, Klamath Falls Herald and
79

and Ashland Daily Tidings.

The endorsements, whether they were

in response to membership pressure or the result of speeches by presti
gious citizens, added to the general network for delivering the campaign
message, and to some extent may have created a bandwagon rationale
ever more groups to privately support the cigarette tax.

~or

In a political

campaign to win public office, endorsements are used to convert highly
h

impersonal propositions into personal issues.

In a campaign where there

is no candidate, no popular appeal, no personalities; speeches to Rotary
and Chamber of Commerce groups are doubly crucial for campaign organizers.
80

If "many voters judge a candidate by the people who endorse him,"
then perhaps it is also true that when no personality or popular appeal
exists, a group which endorses the abstraction of a ballot measure, pro
vides voters with an even greater measure of direction.
At any rate, on an impersonal measure like the tax referendum, the
proponents need to create a situation that would attract public atten
tion.

The wide variety of endorsements, along with other developments

to be described in another section, served th'is purpose.

Even when

voters remained unaware of the approval of anyone group, the group
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itself, if consensus was genuine, served to extend the influence of
the campaign.
Business Interests
In 1969, Oregon business interests had presented a united front
in support of the sales tax, but in 1971-72 their enthusiasm for reve
nue measures was limited to somewhat grudging financial contributions
and the loan of a few "executives" to the campaign committee.
is good evidence to

There

that what little support did materalize

~uggest

from this group reflected the implicit threat of increased corporate
taxes.

One informant, whose organization contributed $1,000 to the

canpaign, expressed the opinion that' any future dole would be subject
to considerably closer scrutiny by his board of directors, in part
because of the bad publicity resulting from inaccuracies emerging from
both camps, and in part because of a negative corporate reaction to
81
f)
"blackmail tt by the governor s office.
f

Whereas many corporations were asked for manpower, only a few pro
vided it.

These were the "invisible men," working behind the scenes

with other volunteers, with civic clubs, and in whatever way the State
Committee decided to use them.
An Associated Oregon Industries employee, Bill Lesh, "on loan as

a volunteer,

tf

urged students, college professors and other state and

local employees to volunteer their time going door-to-door as well as
making whatever financial contributions they could.

"Oregon's 100,000

public employees and their families can have a major impact on the vote
if they go to the polls, tt said Lesh to a Portland Chamber of Commerce

82

meeting in December.

This public statement was strong, but the sole
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visible evidence that business employees had any part in the campaign.
Apparently the State Committee had divided responsibilities among
three volunteers.

Don Arvidson of Northwest Bell Telephone Company,

~

made a limited number of contacts in Clackamas county; Les AuCoin, state
representative and public information officer at Pacific University,
worked Washington county.

Bill Lesh, loaned from ADI, was responsible
83

until the first of January, for MUltnomah county.

Scott MOntgomery,

paid assistant to Brad Davis, was assigned the southern part of the state
and worked with Al King and other students in establishing contacts
84

there.
The @Pal of these volunteers was to contact as many opinion makers
as possible, obtain from them names of workers, potential contributors,
and gain their public or private endorsement.

Lesh described the acti

vity as a "communication task": trying to convince leaders to "get
85

involved. tt
Brad Davis had hoped to appeal to business interests more strong
ly.

The State Committee felt that the business community would carry

arguments to their own employees--specifically the argument of property
tax relief.

There is no evidence that they did.

They had little finan

cial stake in the outcome of the election and very little to say about
the manner in which the campaign was run.

It can be assumed that the

transmission processes available through private enterprise were not
used.
Youth-Aged Coalition
The woman

origin~ting

the youth-aged merger, Ruth Shephard, was

guided by two motives: (1) public visibility for senior citizens, and
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(2) creating a situation whereby the elderly could actually work to
good purpose for a "positive "cause."
On November 10, 1971, prior to the special legislative session,
the Oregon Council of Senior Citizens had issued a press release ob
jecting to the budget balancing strategy proposed by the Joint Ways
and Means Committee.

The Legislative Committee of the State Council,

as well as representatives of several other organizations with state

wide senior citizen membership, sought to "maintain tax relief" by
encouraging the Ways and Means Committee to "keep faith with the prin
ciple of Itability to pay" as reflected in the present tax relief law,
87
and not to cut any part of the

assi~tance

that was promised last spring.tf

It was on the basis of this senior citizen sentiment that Mrs.
Shephard approached Alton King, then executive secretary of the University
of Oregon student body president, a 27 year old student who had worked
with Mrs. Shephard on a variety of senior citizen projl"\cts"

It was upon

her recommendation that King drafted the letter to Jack Nelson.

In the

letter, the student leader suggested a coalition of students and senior
citizens, the possibility of media visibility based on the unusual image
such a diverse and frequently opposing cooperation of interest represen
ted, and promised student cooperation from existing campus organizations
throughout the state.

He closed the letter to Nelson by saying, "Let
88

us make senior citizen power a fact."
On November 22, Nelson mailed a reply to King's offer, saying:
Senior citizens are much interested in today's youth
and the "new" voters--we salute your fine effort to be in
volved in such a responsible way, and look forward, very
much, to working with you,,89
""

From this point on, cooperation between the two age groups 'made

108
news.

~myththan

But the coalition was more

by a wish on the part of both King

~the

a

reality~ ~tuated

State Committee £Oordinators

to maintain the appearance of a popular :f.ront organization.. .A .somewhat
90
limited mailing was accomplished by the ~enior citizens.,
':but :for the
t

IIOSt part the participation by the Btate Council was li.1llited,.

With the

sanction of officers of the council., ~:ss releases and ,~spondence
written and distributed by the yout_h.,we.nt out under the
coalition.

Throughout the campaign, the "united" front

"Dale

1ilia:S

of the

maintai.ned:

Senior citizens have found 'wry good helpers with
these young people, in our mutual fight to passth.e cig
arette tax and hang on to the property tax relie£ that
was promised us by legislators last spring. Seniors
have banded together in this effort because we know that
the state can f t run, just 1 ike we haven f t been .able to
run, on inadequate incomes .91

92
Campaign leg work was done

~

the stUdents.

Under -tbedirect ion

of King, a state-wide communication network between student leaders at
each state and community college was establ ished.

Prior to the second

coalition meeting in November, King had written representatives from
Portland State University, Oregon State University, Portland, Chemeketa,
8114 Lane Coumnmity Colleges, and South Salem High School..

Someone from

each of these canpuses was present at tbe meeting in the governor s
t

conference room in Salem.

Following the meeting these same student

le.aders provided the'" momentum for activity on their own campuses; dis
tributing leaflets sent them by King and Mike Park (also a student at

the University of Oregon), and providing speakers to explain the measure
to any local group requesting information.
As part of the responsibil ity of stu4ent coordinator. King wrote

a two page informational essay, several s anple "letters to the editor,

tf
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and a speech text--distributed to the "prime movers" at each of the
state colleges and universities.

In both the essay and the speech,

King cited (1) the two percent cuts to state programs provided for in
H.B. 3064, (2) the compounding four percent cuts threatened by failure
of the federal and state income tax separation measure, and (3) the
cigarette tax as a "user tax."

He pointed out to the students the costs

to the state created by cigarette smokers in increased state building
costs because of higher insurance rates, and the reforestation of burn
93

ed timber land as the result of smoker carelessness.
In addition to the materials sent to over 50 student leaders,
King distributed the State Committee's printed literature

di~ectly

from

his office in Lane county and by providing a list of students to Brad
Davis who delivered additional packets of material.

The student leader,

like the leaders of the large state interest groups, expressed dis
pleasure with the contents of the leaflets.

"It really hurt us' when we
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used them.

People are not fools."

On January 13, King addressed the delegates of the Inter-institu
tional Union of Students of the State System of
meeting on the OSU campus.

Highe~

Education (IUSOSSHE)

Delegates decided to distribute the ttfact

sheet" on the negative impact of a "no" vote, but stopped short of formal
95

endorsement.

King said that the agreement to disseminate the State

Committee literature was reluctantly given.
According to King, the most significant contribution his commit
tee made in the campaign was

the personal contacts: to people new to

a state campaign, to editors and electronic media personnel in behalf of
the coalition, and to community and civic leaders.

In a three day swing
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through southern and western Oregon, King and his assistant, Mike Park,
contacted people in Medford, Grants Pass, Roseburg, Coos Bay, North
Bend, Coquille, Reedsport, Newport, Florence, Tillamook, Wheeler, Sea
side and Astoria.

Mrs. Shephard had written to senior citizens in

these areas alerting them to the student visit, and Brad Davis made
available names of media contacts.

As a result of the tour, many news

papers and civic clubs publicly endorsed the ballot measure and applaud
ed the coalition effort.

Student and faculty members in Ashland, "

Reedsport, and Astoria began to make public speaking appearances, and
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a "great many students got busy handing out 1iterature by the gross."
On many of Oregon's state campuses student leaders were busy.

In

Corvallis, Oregon State University student body president Ron Wilkinson
voiced his support of the tax measure and organized students in a large
98

registration drive on campus.

Forty or more students were involved

soliciting votes, distributing infoDnation materials, providing tran
sportation to the polls and speaking to Corvallis, Lebanon and Albany
99

civic organizations as well as housing groups on the OSU campus.
Reflecting the OSU student and faculty interest, the campus newspaper,
The Barometer, published a special election edition giving a full range
of coverage to the special election.
The student council at Blue MOuntain Community College went on
record January 11, favoring passage, by a 12-1 vote.

Tim Mabry, BMCC

student body president said that the "student council is a representative
sounding board of the opinions of the campus, tt and that students were
busy distributing materials on campus in a demonstration of earnest· sap
100
port.
Wally Lien, president of the Oregon Community College Student
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Association and current president of Chemeketa Community College, had
made the materials available to Mabry.

Additionally he circulated a

special bulletin to students on his campus in which he stated·
Recent past tax defeats cause legislators to be ex
tremely conservative about proposing future tax increases
to provide necessary funds for programs. When state funds
• • . are cut, it places additional demand for local property
taxes. This demand, on top of regular demands usually
causes hardening of the arteries toward the alternative
source of revenue. The only remaining alternative is our
tuition. If you are eventually planning on transferring to
a four year college be advised that they rely even more on
state general 'funds.
Even if you smoke, you cantt afford the luxury of a
negative vote on a fund source that pays half the cost of
you r educa tion. . . . Make sure that all the voters you
can get
the polls understand why a YES vote is of such
.urgency. 1
.

P8

At Southern Oregon College in Ashland, student leaders were work
ing with faculty.

Also in Ashland, Pat Overhand, Ashland High School

student body president, attempted to involve those under 18 in distri
buting literature on the tax.

King said that parental

sup~ort

was

sought through the high school students but that tUne worked against
102

them and this effort failed.
Summary
Under the cover of the youth-aged coalition, Kingts committee
was successful in distributing literature, obtaining press cover
age of the coalitionts activity, and in working with other student
leaders in mobilizing activity on campuses around the state.
Following the election, the Eugene Register-Guard wrote in an
editorial:
The youth vote is widely credited for the narrow
passage of the cigarette tax increase Tuesday. That
credit is due. But the young voters didn't do it alone.
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Bvidence is strong that older people teamed up with the
young in a fortunate dual effort to keep Oregon from
bankruptcy.103
Mrs. Shephard commented after the election that while the elderly
citizens of Oregon "dropped the ball" in actual campaigning, the objec
tive had been met.

As a group they ttfel t" involved, the Oregon publ ic

was made aware that elders could be a positive influence in events af
fecting all Oregonians, and the tax measure did pass.
104
the coalition was a success.

In this respect,

III. THE OPPOSITION
Campaigning originated by the ,anti-cigarette tax people is not

of primary concern to this thesis.

However it would be an error to

suppose that there was no such activity.

In one sense the referral

drive can be considered the first phase of the opponents campaign to
defeat the tax.

Once the measure was placed on the ballot an aggressive

campaign was launched, punctuated by hyperbole and inaccuracies.
In one of the few efforts to obtain legitimacy on the "no tt side,
Senators Vernon Cook (D-Gresham) and Harl Haas (D-Portland) formed
"Legislators Opposed to the Cigarette Tax Increase." The press coverage
obtained by the announcement of a legislator's committee was extensive.
Many papers quoted Cook as saying, "It's pure baloneytt to say that state
services would be irreparably crippled.
the financial problems of the state by

"A special session could solve
qu~rterly

state income tax re

porting, and state tax reforms: increasing corporate income taxes,
forcing out-of-state businessmen to pay their full share; taxing capital
gains as ordinary income; instituting a policy of estimated tax pay
105
ments by corporations and self employed. 1t
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On December 28, Haas, Cook and Representative Howard Willits
(D-Gresham) , issued another press statement identifying their chief
arguments: (1) defeat of the cigarette tax increase would force Repub
licans to adopt tax reform measures, (2) a special session was needed
for reform, (3) the cigarette tax was a sales tax in disguise, and
106
(4) it was a selective tax hitting middle and lower income families.
Other news reports picked up an extemporaneous statement by Willits in
which he said that

u

a higher cigarette tax would make the state more de

pendent on this type of tax and thus less inclined to discourage smok
107
ing."
The majority of the legislators opposing the tax remained silent.
Only a highly vocal minority made news.

In a speech to a southern

Oregon civic group, Representative Sidney Bazett (R-Josephine), said
that weak spots in the state budget could be connected to absorb ,the
108
loss.
Another state senator, Thomas Mahoney (D-Portland), publicly
opposed the measure, and in an editorial reply, the Corvallis GazetteTimes, chided him and attempted to reduce his credibility by naming him
as attorney for the tobacco distributors who sponsored the referendum
109
and funded the opposition campaign.
Clyde Brummell, president of the Oregon Homeowner's Association,
the only visible private membership ,organization coming out in opposi
tion to the measure, said that his organization opposed the tax because
110
It was the homeowners association that had
of its "selectivity.tt
sponsored the initiative placing the Tax Limitation measure on the 1967
ballot.
Still another source of opposition emerged in what was a move to
counter the popular pro-tax youth-aged coalition.

Two committees

114"
111

surfaced.

The Coos Bay World called it a "raft of opposition, tt

but

their activity began and ended in two $50 page arguments appearing in
the Voters' Pamphlet.

"Students for Sensible Tax Reform" argued the

discriminatory nature of the tax:

u

a

miserab~e

excuse for true tax re

form and property tax reI ief," and "Senior Citizens Against Property
Tax Increase" called the proposed tax "excessive, restrictive, and dis
112
criminatory."
The man named treasurer of the student committee was
a young law student friend of Ron Campbell, organizer of the summer
petition drive; the treasurer of the senior citizen committee was the
113
law student's grandmother. Campbell wrote both ads.
Kenneth Rinke, the man who initiated the referendum drive and a
lobbyist for the tobacco distributors, surfaced only once--as a con
tributor of $1500 to the "vote no" war chest, representing 10 days of
time donated at $150 a day.

He did far more but all of the activity

was behind the scenes.

He planned the media campaign, hired the public
114
relations advertising firm, and supervised all strategy decisions.

Summary
The enemy forces included then, five state legislators: one
(Mahoney) employed by the tobacco interests, and four private citizens,
two of whom were employed by the same people (Rinke and the attorney
for "Oregonians Against Any Sales Tax" committee).

And

80

the war was

fought on both sides of the battle line by people with similiar motives:
economic self-preservation.
IV. CAMPAIGN

HEATS UP

By early January, the campaign became heated.

Both those in

115

favor and those against the tax began making increasingly stronger
charges and counter-charges.

Arguments were deliberately and system

atically selected to influence opinion by methods calculated to call
forth emotional reactions in the voter's mind.

It would be a euphem

ism to call what became daily campaign exaggeration anything but pro

115
paganda.
MOst of the charges revolved around a statement made by the anti
cigarette tax campaigners that a "yes" vote on the increase would mean
,
116
a cut in property tax relief--an argument that was in no way accurate.
Statements to this'effect appeared both on television and in radio ad
vertisements and in the ant i-cigare~te tax argument s found in the .
Voters' Pamphlet and campaign brochures.

Newspaper ads carrying the
117
slogan, "Beware of Tricks," alluded to the same issue (Figure 4).
When the "Vote No" advertisements appeared, L.B. Day reacted.

In

a press release issued on January 4, Day called the television ads "one
of the most misleading pieces of sloganeering and scare tactics I've
ever heard.

He went on to say that "such outrageous propaganda might
118
wry well deprive Oregonians of clear air and water."
ft

Day was quoted on Tuesday.

Wednesday, Cook responded by calling

state Officials, "prostitutes of the governor who are being paid to tell
119
lies about the governor's sales tax."
The gove rnor' sass istant t Bob
Davis, shot back "The truth is that property tax relief will be cut only
i f the cigarette tax is defeated.

The statement made by Cook, that my
120

part in this campaign is illegal, is absolutely outrageous and untrue.

U

On the same day, Attorney General Lee Johnson said that he had

seen one of the ads about which Davis and Day were complaining and felt
121
it was tlnot a total misstatement of fact."
Sylvan Campf, a Portland

I
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Against any Sales Tax Committee, 1971-72.
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tobacco distributor who was among the leaders of the campaign to refer
the tax hike to the voters, and one of the two men who were charged
with corrupt practices violations in soliciting methods, said that the
sponsors of the ad, "Oregonians Against Any Sales Tax Committee," were
122

not misleading anybody.
~n

ttl think it t s the other way around."

Thursday, January 6, upon the request of Secretary of State

Clay Myers, a letter was written to Ron Collins, chairman of Oregonians
Against Any Sales Tax, and Alan Campf, treasurer, warning them that the
advertisements did make misrepresentations and were in violation of
Oregon law.

The attorney general said that if the ads were not with- .

drawn by 5:00 p.m. Thursday, his office would take action, perhaps by
placing the matter before a state grand jury.

Another letter went to

Clyde Brummell, president of the homeowner's association, concerning
statements made by his organization in the Voters' Pamphlet.
atto~y gemral' s letter stated that: "Both

Q:wo

The

disputed television

ad!l contain statements . . . that Ballot Measure 1 . . • would abolish
the local Property Tax ReI ief Fund and that cigarette tax revenues are
presently appropriated to that fund, rather than the State General Fund.
It is ~lS~ a misstatement of fact to say that Ballot Measure 1 abol
ishes the Property Tax Relief Account since that account had already
been abolished and cigarette tax revenues are presently earmarked only
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for the State General Fund and the cities and the counties."
On Friday the television advertisements were cancelled.

The ad

vertising firm of Clenaghen and Associates, Inc., declared that the ads
were "an honest mistake."
some. degree of error.

Brummel wrote a le1;ter to Johnson, admitting

"We regret our structure in the Voters' Pam.Phlet

was in error as you see it.

However, laymen do not structure sentences
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in the best of the King's English.tt
Also on Friday, those apologizing for error went on the offense.
Having appeased the attorney general, the anti-cigarette tax people
charged that the Voter's Pamphlet contained erroneous statements--this
time, by the proponents.

Maurice Sussman, attorney for the anti-tax

committee, filed a letter with the secretary of state asking that he
prosecute those responsible.

He objected to statements in the Voters'

Pamphlet because of the prediction about "possible" total cuts to only
one or two state agencies, declaring that there is no evidence that can
predict what the legislature might do in a special

se~sion.

He also ob

jected to the statement which said, "How about the state police.

They'd

be fair game.

Eliminate them and you've found your $17.2 million in
125
one fell Hselective cut"."
Sussman also objected to a statement that
conveyed the idea that the tobacco companies would pay the tax.

He

said the tax is a consumer tax and would be paid by the purchaser of
126
Another objection the attorney had
cigarettes, not the manufacturer.
to the pro-tax pamphlet argument was the statement that the legislature
127
would cut property tax relief if the ballot measure failed.
Saturday, January 8, the attorney general's office issued an infor
mal opinion that statements made by the tax proponents were not in vio
lation of Oregon law.

George Bell, assistant to the secretary of state,

said his office received an assistant attorney general's informal opinion
that the Voters' Pamphlet statements in question were speculation and
could not be regarded as facts.

"While the author may have used "wild
128
language,tt it does not constitute-falsehood." .
Newspapers carried nothing more on the matter and it began to

1..1 9

appear that the proliferation of corrupt practices violation charges
had ended.

Myers asked for apologies from persons who made false or

misleading statements in the Voters' Pamphlet, statements he termed
129

"extravagant and designed to frighten and intimidate the voters."
MOnday, an apology was received in the secretary of state's office from
William Gilbert, treasurer of the Citizens Against Raising Property
Taxes Committee, the State Committee cover organization, in reference
to a statement that all of the $17.2 million deficit could be taken
from the state police budget.

He

ackno~ledged

in the letter that the

General Fund doesn't contribute that much to the state police, so the
deficit couldn't be met in that way, and informed the secretary of state
that committee volunteers throughout ·the state had been instructed to
130
stop distributing any information containing the error.
Then, on January 12, only six days before the election, Senator
Cook brought a charge in another form, perhaps as a reaction to:: Myers
request for an apology.

He accused Oregon's secretary of state and

attorney general of "violent partisanship" in handling of cigarette
tax measure matters, and demanded a special investigation to see whether
there had been election law violations.
Since the referral by the people, both the secretary
of state and the attorney general have worked hand in glove
with supporters of the cigarette tax. I demand that the
attorney general request either the Oregon State Bar or the
chief justice of the Supreme Court to suggest to him an im
partial lawyer to be appointed as a special assistant attor
ney general to investigate and bring charges for the viola
tion of t~e Corrupt Practices Act during the course of this
election. 31
MYers had replied to a public outcry

o~r

exaggerations in the

state publication by saying that state law denied him authority to
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screen false or misleading statements.

Cook challenged this.

He said

Myers had deleted, without consent, a reference in the Voters' Pamphlet
material submitted by Haas and Cook, which described Cook as chairman
of the Senate Tax Committee and Haas as the 1971 Democratic House
132
leader.
In the same release, Cook also charged McCall's staff and some
appointees of violations of the Corrupt Practices Act: Tanzer, director
of the Department of Human Resources, and L.B. Day, director of the
Department of Environmental Quality.

He accused them of soliciting

funds in support of the five-cent increase, illegal under the Corrupt
Practices Act permitting state employees to support partisan candidates
and state political issues except during working hours.
On

the same day Cook made the charges Day replied by saying that

he had not violated the corrupt practices provision.

At a news confer

ence January 12, he handed out copies of a resolution adopted by the En
vironmental Quality Commission:
The Environmental Quality Commission, as part of its
responsibility to the citizens of Oregon, hereby declares
its unqualified support of both the cigarette tax and income
tax programs adopted by the 1971 legislature and'instructs
the staff to disseminate full information to Oregon citizens
on the effeci of loss of revenues from these sources on Oregon
environment. 33
Day called Cook f s accusation "sheer nonsense.

If m do ing exactly

what the commission asked me to do.,,134
On the same day Cook and Day were having their public debate, the
governor made a last public plea for passage.

At a special press con

ference January 12, McCall termed ,the tax boost 'the "most important tax
135
issue ever presented to the people.
It

At the. same time the Oregon Journal criticized all parties in the
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dispute:
While there are reasoned arguments coming from both
sides, there is also this campaign of distortion and deceit,
of trying to outscare each other.
How nice it would be if we could back up and start
over, leaving out the terror tactics and just leveling with
people honestly. Both sides can make strong cases without
getting into the gutter.
"
It's tempting to call for a plague on both their
houses. 136
A few closing shots were fired, but after the week-long series
of minor scrimages, it was all anti-climax.

Brad Davis recapitulated

arguments used by the State Committee and then said:
MOst of the money to finance the anticigaret tax
program came from a Richmond, Virginia tobacco lobby. Do
you really believe that a tobacco lobby from Virginia
really gives a damn about your property tax relief, or
your public schools, or mental 'inst~tutions or any other
program in Oregon for Oregonians~13
Last minute voter opinion surveys were conducted by newspaper
columnists in Portland, Corvallis, Salem, Pendleton, and Bend, query
ing the man on the street and resulting in the usual balanced crosssection of opinion characterizing such surveys.

The public relations

firm employed by the State Committee, reported a pre-election survey
showing 32 percent in favor; 31 percent against; and 37 percent unde
138
In an election even column, Doug Baker quoted a radio poll
cided'.
139
conducted by radio station KPOK, "nearly 2 to 1 against.
"
On January 18, 1972, Oregon voters passed the 1972 cigarette tax,
Ballot Measure Number 1, by 245,717 to 236,937--roughly a 51 to 49
140
Clay Myers had predicted slightly less than a 50
percent majority.
percent voter turnout--5l4,000 ballots. On election day, 482,654 were
141
cast.
The voters of Oregon had determined to accept the "band-aid"
142
tax. By a small majority, voters chose to believe it was necessary.

r
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V. POST-ELECTION REACTIONS
On the Sunday preceding the election, the Sunday Oregonian
"Forum" section carried an article with the following warning:
If Oregon history means anything" backers of the
cigarette tax increase are facing heavy odds in trying
to get it passed at a special election January 18.
Oregon has had 10 special elections in its history
and 12 measures referred by the voters, as was the cig
arette tax increase, have been won over the years.
Only five of the 12 measures were approved by the
people and fO~~30f them were in the first special election
held in 1913.
While not altogether accurate in reporting Oregon's historic
voting record, the writer was correct in one respect:

the proponents

did have sizable odds working against them.
But the voters said "yes" in the clos'est tax election in Oregon s
t

history, a majority by only nine tenths of one percent. (Figure 5)
None of the advocates felt the public would vote against their
own best interests.

Tanzer bel ieved that if the "facts" were made
144
Governor McCall felt
known, the voter would vote the "right way."
that the public's independence and clear-thinking would save what was
145
.
left of his budget.
Al King said that "cigarettes are basically very
146
KGW-TV
unpopul ar, and even sD10kers didn t worry about the tax.
t

tf

news analyst, Floyd McKay, felt the "opponents strained their credibil
147
and Jack Thompson, chief state elections officer and assis
ity,"
tant secretary of state for more than ten years, said that "the people
148
could not be duped."
In Oregon, as in national and internatipnal politics, leadership
opinions varied and those closest to the campaign expressed markedly
different views about why the measure passed.

Only the voters them
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Editorial cartoon; Oregonian, January 20, 1972.
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selves, in the privacy of the polling booth, knew for certain why the
tiniest majority passed the cigarette tax increase.
Summary

The campaign had been waged on many fronts, appealing to special
groups as well as Oregonians in general.

In summary, the proponents of

the tax increase said:

1.

'lhe state government is in a fiscal jam. It needs
the money the tax hike would raise to pay the bill
for services rendered the public.

2.

An expanded property tax relief program aiding persons
on low incomes will suffer if the tax hike is turned
down.

3. Oregon's present cigarette tax (four cents a pack) is
fourth from the bottom among the 50 states. Even with
the increase Oregon can still expect to sell cigarettes
to Californians who pay a 10-cents-a-pack tax and
particularly to Washingtonians who pay a 16 cents tax.
4.

While alternatives to the cigarette tax can be found,
getting the legislature and the voters to approve an
other type of tax increase during the current fiscal
period are minimal at best.

The opponents argued:
1.

A cigarette tax per se is bad. It is a sales tax and
hits the poor man hardest. It is not based on the
ability to pay principle.

2.

If the voters okay the tax hike they may be actually
delaying a meaningful overhaul of Oregpn's tax structure
based on ability to pay.

3.

State government wen' t collapse if the tax hike is
vetoed. It can survive the estimated $17.5 million
drop in revenue if the voters turn down the tax.

There is, of course, .no way to know for certain how many people
were influenced by the

issues~

and the structure of t1:e arguments.

The

previous commentary demonstrates how muddy the issues became as the cam
paign progressed.
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We do know, however, that nearl y every available channel was
used in an effort to influence the voter.

Specialized campaign

literature was directed to group members in the form of memos, fact
sheets, letters, and organizational publications.

Personal appearances

by an extensive army of speakers further disseminated the message to

specific audiences with similiar interests.

The electronic media was

utilized to channel messages to more generalized audiences using
television advertising, public debates, editorial commentaries.

Radio

advertisements, talk 'shows and news broadcasts reached a smaller

audi~

ence--one confined 'to only the Portland metropolitan area.
Newspaper reporters picked up

~nformation

from press releases and

public statements and relayed that information to a wider audience
across the state.

"

Editorial writers and feature columnists commented

extensively on both the substantive issues and the campaign methods em
ployed by the cover committees on both sides.
Campaign strategy did not attempt to change attitudes toward tax
ation.

The media campaign did not dwell on the functioning of state

government or the dollars needed for general governmental needs per se;
not did the speeches made by state officials, legislators, and special
interest group representatives.
inforce existing positive

Instead, the appeals attempted to re

attitud~s

toward: (1). job security (in the

case of specialized appeals to state employees), (2) aid to the handi
capped and emotionally disturbed (appeals through radio and television
advertising as well as fact sheets and public speeches), (3) preserva
tion of Oregon's quality of life (chiefly through appeals by L.B. Day
calling attention. to environmental needs), and (4)
homeowners (the issue of property tax relief).

self~interest

of
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According to researchers in persuasion effects, long term at
titudes and voter predispositions toward issues cannot be changed to
149
any measurable degree by a short term campaign.
But persuasion can
affect short term perceptual change by creating a linkage between past
positively valued attitudes and neutral or inactive attitudes.

The

campaign strategy used this theory in planning the content of persuasive
messages.

Ecology, property tax relief and job security were connected
ISO
to an extension of a tax already approved by the electorate.
Voters

were asked to vote, not on a tax increase, but for their own special
Utterests.
Underlying the substantive

re~lity

of Oregon's fiscal dilemma,

were the innuendos, threats, and charges of ethical and legal violations
made by opposing sides.

Publicity that was obtained by the charges drew

attention to the issues even if they did not clarify them.

And the

charges were merely an outgrowth of the fear appeals themselves.
A seasoned veteran of political campaigning, Herbert Baus, of the
California public relations firm of Baus and Ross, says that it is the
task of a successful campaign to "tastefully frighten voters into believ
l~

ing that failure of the issue would be disasterous . .

It

Although

to differing degrees, both the supporters and the opponents must have
believed this.

The state committees on both sides couched their cam

paign rhetoric in fear provoking language.

Even the directed appeals

of interest groups focused on loss of jobs or programs.
Chapter V. considers the effect on the voters of campaign

stra~:

tegies in the 1971-72 referendum campaign, asking whether or not they
believed arguments presented in support of the cigarette tax increase.
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CHAPTER V

THE SURVEY

Large national campaign management firms recognize that a popu
lar referendum differs considerably from the election of a candidate
because there is no major personality demanding voter attention.

In

stead the election "involves complex debates about . . . technical ities
1

of funding. tt

The principal problem in a referendum or initiative cam

paign then, is to convince the public that passage of the ballot measure
would be of public benefit; and motivate them to travel to the polls to
cast a favorable ballot.
Taken together, the facts of Oregon's fiscal situation, the acti
vities of interest groups on both sides of the question, and tradition
al Oregon voter behavior on tax measures, suggest that a great many
variables were at work on the vote outcome.

Without a comprehens ive

survey of the entire state we cannot state with certainty that the mea
sure passed because of, or in spite of, the formal campaign

However

an analysis of voter opinions taken from two highly divergent counties

may provide evidence supporting the thesis hypothesis.

That is, that

the united efforts of special interest groups was the deciding factor
in the narrow margin of victory.
The voter survey, reported in this chapter, was an effort to an

swer three major questions:

(1) Who voted in this election? (2) How

did they vote? and (3) Why did they cast their ballots as they did?

The

poll attempted to discover which issues were most important to the voters, 

13a
how they obtained their information on the tax, which influence source
was primary in their vote decision, and how they viewed the activity of
interest groups in the campaign.
The leadership survey attempted to find out what influentials

thought were the reactions of the voters.

The questions paralleled the

voter questionnaire.
I.

BENTON AND OOUGLAS COUNTIES

Benton and Douglas counties are dissimilar by practically every
measure.

Benton is smaller geographically, has a smaller population

(53,77.6 to Douglas at 71,743), and .fewer registered voters.

Yet ap

proximately the same.number of persons in each county voted in the Jan
uary special election (56 percent of the .tota1 registered voters in Benton;
2

49 percent in Douglas).

It may be that the campaign generated more

interest in Benton, but it may also be that a comparatively higher socio
economic level provides for a generally higher vote turnout in special
elections.
The 1970 census figures show that the median grade of school com
pleted by residents of Douglas county is 11.8, while in Benton the median
grade completed is 12.9.

Educational level and income are generally

recognized to be directly related, and so they are in the sample counties.
Benton's mean family income is $11,412; while Douglas is lower at $9,470.
Nearly twice as many persons in Benton are employed in the professional
or technical fields.
3
as laborers.

Douglas has a larger proportion of residents employed

The higher education and per capita income in Benton is a reflection
of the chief employment industry.

Oregon State University is now sit
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uated in Corvallis, the county seat (population 24,795).

The heavi

est concentration of Benton's population resides in or around the col
lege town and Corvallis businesses depend heavily on income from the
4
OSU academic complex.
Douglas, on the other hand, is chiefly a logging, mining and fish
ing area extending from the coast town of Reedsport, to the Cascade
Mountains.

Many small towns within Douglas county boundaries have pop

ulations of less than 1,000.
seat (population 13,902).

The largest city is Roseburg, the county

No large state facilities are located in

Douglas, and the only institution of higher education is Umpqua (enrol
S

lment, 1,507)
Benton county receives a significantly larger volume of electron
ic aedia information through Portl and stations.

The actual market share

that Portland stations receive in Benton is 57 percent of totaltele
vision households (13,400 T.V. households).

Douglas

~ceives

only lim

ited Portland television, five percent of the total possible market
share, through a franchised cable firm (21,700 T.V. households); and
6

has practically no radio reception.
Benton is also more affected by newspapers than is Douglas.

Forty-

percent of households receive either the Portland Oregonian or Journal,
7
as opposed to only 21 percent in Douglas.
In sum, both geographically and culturally, Douglas county is
more isolated from the influence of large metropolitan newspapers, and
8

television and radio stations.
In Benton county the cigarette tax measure was approved by over
9
2,000 votes; Douglas defeated it by the same margin.
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II. mE VOTER SURVEY
Survey Procedure
In Chapter I, the survey methodology was described as having
been composed of a random sample selected from a population of indivi
duals who had actually cast their ballots in the January 18, 1972
Special Election.

Approximately 250 questionnaires were mailed to

voters through the random procedure.

Of total questionnaires mailed,

28 percent were returned (Benton, 71; Dougl as t 69).
Validation of Survey Sample
A comparison of the sample to the population in each county
demonstrates that the response is representative by two measures:
party registration t i.e., number of Democrat and Republ ican ballots
issued by election officials; and total "yes" and "no" votes cast.
The number of Democrats and Republicans issued ballots in each county
was obtained from the "Official Voter Abstract of the 1972 Special Elec
tion," as was the vote tally.

Based on these figures, the number of

expected returns in each category was computed using
nomial experiment

a~

test for a bi

(~~~~).

This procedure demonstrates that the party preference and the
"yes-no" distribution of those responding in the sample population was
not

signific~ntly

different (at the 10 percent level) than the entire

population (Table III) '.
It would have been desirable to compare other factors such as the
percentage of those 18 to 21 years old casting their vote and the per
centage of this age group who responded to the questionnaire.

Since
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TABLE III
VALIDATION SCORES BASED ON ACTUAL BALLOTS ISSUED
AND QUESTIONNAIRES RETURNED

FRACTION OF
VOTES CAST
# E:.eected(a)

B Cnty D Cnty

DIFFERENCE

SAMPLE
# Received
B Cnty D Cnty

Z Value
B Cnty D Cnty
%
%

#

#

36 .. 39

23.

34.

-1.62

-.59*

35.08

28.66

38.

29.

.70

.08*

49.75

26.90

.49.

32.

- .19

1.26*

#

#

Democrat

29.67

Republican
Yes vote

*No significant difference at the 10% level.
(8) Fraction of number returnes expected in each category based on

actual votes cast.
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there is no way to discover such variables as age, sex, income and
education within the limitations of the survey design, there is no
apparent way to validate the resulting data further.

However, based

on the above measures of variability, the survey is judged to be a
valid representation of the voter population in each of the two Oregon
counties.
III. SURVEY FINDINGS
The Voters

With respect to demographic factors, it appears that the largest
voter turnout in both counties was

~ong

persons between the ages of 30

to 60; those who reside in urban areas; and persons employed in white
collar occupations.

It would also seem that a definite majority of

those who voted in the 1972 special election also vote in every, or
almost every election (Benton, 97 percent; Douglas 98 percent).
A large number of females, persons over sixty and housewives
voted.

There is no way to determine whether the high percentage is

bias due to the fact that certain groups are predisposed to return mail
questionnaires, or whether a proportionately larger number of females,
housewives and persons over sixty actually voted in this election.

Re

suIts of other 'voter surveys conducted on a national level in presiden
tial elections, demonstrate that a slightly larger percentage of women
10

than men do in fact vote; and more persons over 45.
In Benton, more Republicans voted than did Democrats (54 percent);
in Douglas sl ightly more Democrats (49 percent).
11

party registratiQn in each county_

(Table IV)

This data reflects the
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TABLE IV

POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN SAMPLE

Benton

!i!
18-21
22-29
30-39
40-49
SO-59
60

%

N

Douglas
N

%

3
9
20
15
12
11

4
13
28
21
17
15

1
9
10
17
13
16

1
13
14
25
19
23

70

9a

-66

9s

§.!!
Male
Female

24
46
70

34
65
99

26
40
66

38
58
96

Residence
City
Suburb
Rural

Benton Douglas
Union Membership

~

%

N

%

Member
Non-member

20
50

28
70

21
46
67

30
67

97

2
20
23
8
7
0
2

3
29
33
12
10
0
3

Occupation
Farm Operator
Housewife
Profes-Tchnc1
Bss-Mngr1
Retired
Unemployed
Clerk-sales

0
28
22
7
7
1
1
66

0
39
31
10
10
1
1
92

62 90'

Under $5,000
$5,000-9,999
$10,000-14,999
$15,000-25,000
$26,000 plus

17
12
21
15
3
68

23
17
30
21
4
96

9 13
21 30
21 30
13 19
2
3
66 9s

Total Returns

71

-

Income
54 - 76
7
5
10
!!
69
97

45
6
14
65

94

6
24

5
23
18
11
6
63

7
33
26
16
9
91

35
29
3
67

49
42
4
95

65
9
20

Bducation
Sm. H.S.
B.S.
Sm. C1g
Clg
Post C1g

70 9a

4
17
11
13
18

24

69

9a

18
25

69

Part~istration

Democrat
Republican
Independent

23
38
8

69

32
54
11
97

*Difference indicates no response from some informants who returned
quastionnaires.
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Population Group Vote
According to the survey findings, over 50 percent of all age
groups voted "yes" in Benton county_

In Douglas county only those

under 29 years of age and between, 50 and 59 voted in favor of the cig
arette tax increase.

The largest "no" vote appeared to be in th 30 to

39 age group in both counties ..
Unfortunately the sample of persons affiliated with a profes
sional association or union was small, and for other reasons not use
ful in ascribing group affiliations to voting behaviors.

Also, most

of those answering "yes" to the question'of union membership, were mem
bers of organizations inactive in this campaign.

Therefore, certain

questions posed in the introduction must remain unanswered: (1) "Did
membership in a particular group make it more probable that persuasive
communication regarding the

iss~es

emanating from their group would be

received favorably?" and (2) "To what extent did they look to that group
for verification of an election choice?"
In regard to other population groupings there is a substantial
representation in the sample.

In Benton county 71 percent of males

surveyed voted "yes," and 63 percent of females;

in Douglas county an

equal proportion of men voted for and against the measure (50 percent),
while more females voted "no" (53 percent).
More people living in open country fz:-om both counties voted "no."
In Benton those who lived in suburbs or cities voted "yes," more, where
as in Douglas the "yes-no" vote was divided between rural and urban resi
dents with slightly more voting "no" who lived in cities or suburbs.
Based on level of education, the only group in Benton with fewer
than 50 percent voting "no" were those with less than a high school

1"
degree.

In Douglas county, the only groups tallying a higher percen

tage of "yes" votes, were those with college or post-college educa
tions, suggesting that in this election at least, the more highly ed
ucated voter favored the tax.
Occupational groups with the largest number of responses to the
survey-housewives--voted 71 percent "yes" in Benton, while in Douglas
only 40 percent voted in favor.

The only occupational group register

ing over 50 percent "yes" votes in Dougl as were those employed in pro
fessional technical fields.
In answer to the question of what is the relationship between
population groups and the "yes-no"· vote, we can say that in both count
ies it was the urban voter with a moderate to high income, a college
education and a white collar job who supported the cigarette tax.

While

a high percentage of women in Benton voted "yes"--in both counties more
me~

favored the tax (Appendix F).

Attention to Political Messages
Respondents were asked how often they listen to political messages
thIOUgh (l) attendance at public meetings or debates, (2) attention to
political advertising over radio or television, and (3) conversations
with friends or relatives (Table V).
Few from either county said they attended meetings or political
rallies on a regular or frequent basis.

They survey found that among

Benton voters, 62 percent rarely attend and 24 percent never attend
such meetings;

57 percent of Douglas county respondents said they

rarely attend, and 36 percent said they never did.

Those who said they

did attend meetings frequently (eight percent in Benton; three per
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TABLE V

TOTAL RESPONSES TO QUESTION RELATING TO GENERAL AT1ENTION TO
BOLlTICAL MESSAGES FROM BOTH COUNTIES

Douglas

l3enton
Nt
I.

PeNT

~

PCNT

POLITICAL MEETINGS
Regularly
Frequently
Rarely
Never
No response
Total

0
6

...!

0%
8
62
24
6

1
2
39
25
2

1%
3
57
36
3

71

100%

69

100%

17
31
20
1

13
39
14
1

2

24%
44
28
1
3

2

19%
57
20
1
3

71

100%

69

100%

36
31
3
0
1

51%
44
4
0
1

31
28
6
2
2

45%
41
9
3
2

71

100%

69

100%

44

17

II. POLITICAL ADVERTIS ING
Regularly
Frequently
Rarely
Never
No response
Total

III. CONVERSATIONS ABOOT POLITICS
Regularly
Frequently
Rarely
Never
No Response
Total

1,47

cent in Douglas) are persons between the ages of 30 to 39, with high
school or some college.

But again the sample is too small to form any

conclusions relating age or education to attendance at political meet
ings.
MOst people apparently receive the largest proportion of their
political information either from conversations with friends or by
listening to political advertising over radio or television.

In Benton,

44 percent named frequent attention to electronic media sources; 57
percent in Douglas.

The highest percentage in both counties said they

either always or on a frequent basis talk with friends about politics
(51 percent always, 44 percent frequently in Benton; 45 percent always,
41 percent frequently in Douglas).

These are people between the ages of

30 to 49, of both sexes, and with at least 'some college education.
Those who listen to political advertising most have high school
or some college educatiun and fall into every age group, with slightly
more in the age bracket of 30 to 49.
ted by both sexes.

These voters are equally represen

The only population groups in Benton with a notable

number of responses indicating rare attention to

poli~ical

advertising

were those between the ages of 30 to 39, with college or post college
educations.

This group named personal conversations on political matters

as a regular occurrance.
We can reason from the survey findings that persons with high in
terest in politics among the better educated engage in a proportionately
higher percentage of their time talking politics with friends.

Those

with less than college educations also have a. high incidence of politi
cal conversations with friends, but also attend to electronic media ad
vertising with more frequency.

It is not surprising that persons in

l4a
the age range of 30 to 49 engage in more active political attention.
These are the child rearing, working years, when expenses are high
est and income is reaching its peak.

Hence these people can be ex

pected to be more alert to changes in public policy that may have an
affect on them.
Reasons for the Vote
Fiscal Impact. The question was asked: "Would you have been affec
ted if the cigarette .tax measure had failed?"

The purpose of the ques

tion was to discover if a high proportion of voters cast their votes
because of a belief that they would be adversely affected by a defeat
of the 'tax increase.

In general the answer was "no," they did not

vote because of potential economic affect.
(1) Age.

Persons over 40 and between the ages of 22 to 29 from

Benton county believed that the tax increase would have had no affect
on them (Table VI).

In Douglas county the only group responding by a

"}Jes" to the question of economic affect, were persons in the 40 to 49
age group (53 percent).

The only group registering a high "no" respon

se were those over 60 (56 percent).
(2) Sex.

In both counties mpre women than men felt that the tax

defeat would not affect them (54 percent in Benton; 50 percent in Doug
las).

Also, more women than men were uncertain about possible affects

of a tax defeat.
(3)

Residence.

Interestingly, rural dwellers in Benton believed

that they would not be affected (80 percent), while in Douglas people
living in stimiliar areas

believ~d

they would (50 percent).

In general,

persons living in cities or urban areas in Benton county believed that
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TABLE VI

TOTAL TALLY AND PERCENT OF RESPONDENTS
NAMING FISCAL IMPACT

Would there have been a fiscal impact on you had the cigarette tax
measure been defeated? *

NO

YES

N

PCNT

N

Benton county

29

48%

Doug1 as county

24

35

*

UNCERTAIN

PCNT

N

28

48%

11

26

37

14

Reasons for yes-no response to this question varied. Few
naned ttcost of smoking" as a reason for their opinion of
fiscal. impact.

PCNT

4%
28

lSP

they would not be affected, whereas Douglas county urban dwellers did
not.
(4) Education.

The largest percentage of respondents in Benton

who believed there would be a
post-college educations

fi~cal

impact on them were people with

These persons believed that they would exper

ience some affect (67 percent) probably as a result of cuts to higher
education.

In Douglas county the same percentage of those with post

college educations, principally persons in medical or legal professions,
believed that defeat 'of the tax would have no fiscal Unpact on them
(67 percent), while those with college educations felt, more than any
other group, that there would be an.affect (45 percent).

Those who

thought that the tax would have no impact on them were respondents with
less than a high school education in both counties (50 percent in Benton;
60 percent in Douglas).
(5) Occupation.

The only occupational group believing that they

would be adversely affected by defeat of the tax were persons employed
in professional or technical fields in both counties (64 percent in
Benton; 48 percent in Douglas).
unaffected.

All other groups felt themselves to be

Retired persons (71 percent in both counties) were the

largest occupational group in this category.

Housewives were about

equally divided between "yes-no-undecided" responses, particularly in
Douglas county; suggesting that confusion was present in relation to
the implications of the tax on property tax relief, school costs, and
cuts to state agencies.
(6) Income.

Persons with incomes over $15,000 in Douglas county

answered "yes,"·there would be a fiscal impact, for a variety of reasons
ranging from "hate others who smoke," to "if not this one, then an
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increase in some other tax."

In Benton county the highest "yes"

response was in the $5,000 to $9,000 range (SO percent).
data reveals a surprising fact:

Again, the

oersons from both counties with in

comes less than $5,000 felt defeat of the tax would not affect them.
These are the people who might have lost the most through cuts to pro
perty tax relief providing for increased relief to low income families
12

and retired persons.
(7) Professional or Union Membership.

Only in Benton county is

there a large concentration of state and public employees.

In only

this county did a high proportion of organization members believe they
would have been affected by a defeat of the tax increase (55 percent).
In Douglas it was largely non-members who saw personal cost in a negative
vote (41 percent).
(8)

Voting Patterns.

Those persons in each county who by their

own statements vote in every election registered the least number of un
decided responses in answer to the question of "Will you be affected?"
Among those Who vote most of the time, there was slightly more indecis
ion (27 percent in Douglas; 32 percent in Benton)

sugg~sting

again that

among the less informed, less frequent voters, confusion regarding
critical implications of the tax increase was present.
Important Issues
Voters were asked the two reasons most important to them in their
decision on how to vote in the cigarette tax increase.

The reason for

asking the question was two-fold: (1) to determine in general terms why
they voted as they did, and (2) to discover to what extent voters were
influenced by the issues selected as arguments on both sides of the

152.

campaign.
A significantly large group in both counties naned "continued
property tax relief" as the most important reason they favored the
tax (53 percent in Benton; 60 percent in Douglas).

Those voting "no"

did so largely because they felt the cigarette tax was a fonn of re
gressive taxation with those least able to pay carrying a disproportion
ate share of the cost (63 percent in Benton; 62 percent in Douglas) •
The second most important reason named for voting "no" was the
opposition claim that there was "no guarantee of property tax reI ief
(54 percent in Benton; 54 percent in Douglas).

ft

Campaign coordinators

supporting the ballot measure had argued that property tax relief would
be cut if the tax failed.

Opponents misrepm sented the effect by sar

ing that if the tax passed, the entire property tax relief fund would
be completely abolished.

Based on voter response to the survey query

on this issue, people in both counties remained confused about the ac
curacy of campaign claims.
The second most important reason for voting

u

yes" was the "threat

to Basic School Support lt argument (35 percent in Benton; 28 percent in
Douglas), although. the ..argument that "smoking is dangerous" was nearly
as.important to Benton county voters (30 percent) and more important
to those from Douglas county (37 percent).
Apparently the argument that tobacco interests from outside the
state would benefit mODe than Oregonians by a
less relative interest in both counties.

def~at

of the tax was of

It was the least often reason

mentioned for voting "yes t It which -conforms to the earl y findings by the
,

professional polling agency which queried voters on the same issue.

13
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The relatively least important reason for voting "no" was the argument
that "taxes were already too high on cigarettes, tt which again is gen
erally consistent with Oregon's ranking as one of the lowest in the
nation for taxes on cigarettes.
Important Sources of Political Information
General Attention to Information Sources.

Television viewing be

havior in both counties appears to be similiar: 62 percent watch tele
vision in the evening only; 14 percent rarely watch; 11 and 13 percent
respectively (Benton and Douglas county) watch television most of the
time (Table VII).
categories.

This includes persons in each of the population

In Benton, all ages, persons of both sexes, and at each

educational le\el prefer to watch television only in the evening.

MOre

people under 39 say they rarely view television and then only for the
news.

Douglas county respondents follow the same general pattern.
In Benton, 92 percent of regular voters read the newspapers daily

whi~e

in Douglas county respondents indicate an 83 percent incidence of

daily newspaper readership.

Not surprising is the finding that those

who regularly vote also regularly attend to newspaper coverage of current
events.

Again this holds true for persons of both sexes, each age and

occupational group.
Attention to Campaign Messages.

Both county sample populations

report that most of their information on this ballot measure was obtain
ed from, first, regular news reports, and second, radio and television
advertising.

The Voters' Pamphlet and conversations with friends or

relatives were third and fourth in importance, with conversations named
as slightly more important to Douglas county voters.
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TABLE VII

GENERAL A'ITENTION 'It) TELEVISION AND NEWSPAPERS
RELATED TO EACH COUNTY

Benton

Douglas

'N

PeNT

N

PCNT

8
0
44

, 11%
0
62
7
14
1

9
0
43
3
10
0

5

~

13%
0
62
4
14
0
7

71

100%

69

100%

65
3
1
1
0
0
1

92%
4
1
1
0
0
2

57
6
1
3
0
0
2

83%
9
1
4
0
0
3

100%

69

100%

I. TELEVISION
MOst of the time
Daytime
Evenings
News only
.Rarely
Never
No Response
Total

II.

5

10
1
3

NEWSPAPERS
Daily
Most days
Once a week
Several days a week
Less than once a week
Never
No response
Total

-

71

-
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Regular voters said the least important channels for obtaining
information was public debates or speeches.

The limited attendance

at the state wide series of meetings attested to by meeting sponsors
bears this out

However, Douglas county respondents, when asked which

graup they viewed as most influential in campaigning, replied that it
was legislators.

Since the majority of public endorsements by member's

of the Oregon legislature came from press reports of speeches made at
public meetings, it appears that public debates'were

important~

but only

as a means for relaying information through the more frequently used
medium of the press.
Channe 1 s of InfllE nce
Voters were asked, nWhat information sou rces were the most impo,r
tant in their decision on how to vote?"
viced.

Two sets of responses were pro

The first included typical channels for disseminating campaign

information, television or radio advertising, public speeches, regular
news reports, organizational newsletters, or conversation.

The second

set listed personal influence sources such as the husband or wife, par
ents, neighbors or friends, community leaders.
The purpose of this question was to discover which channels of
influence in both categories were most important in election choices.
General Channels. Only 16 persons in the Benton sample and nine in
Douglas said that they attended public meetings or debates on this issue.
Of these approximately the same number voted for or against the measure,
indicating little in the way of positive or negative influence from such
meetings.
The largest number of respondents in the sample said that they

156,
were influenced by reading regular news reports (58 percent in Benton;
50 in Douglas); and of these, 76 percent in Benton and 48 percent in
Douglas voted "yes" (Table VIII).

In other words, the newspaper re

ports were first in importance as information channels for those voting
"yes" in both counties.

As influence sources, newspapers were only

third in importance to residents of Douglas.
The chief influence source named in Douglas county was the Voters'
Pamphlet (61 percent).

For those voting against the tax in Douglas,

conversations with friends ranked first (58 percent); in Benton county,
the Voters' Pamphlet (41 percent).
Compared to Benton county, Douglas is a media isolated area.

Ap

parently information sources critical to the "yes" vote in Benton, were
unavailable to Douglas voters.

Regular news reports were more limited

in Douglas because of the smaller circulation of the large Portland
da,i1ies.

Radio and television advertising supporting the tax were al

most totally absent.

This may account for the greater dependence of

Douglas county voters on the Voters' Pamphlet (61 percent named it first
in influence) and conversation with friends (ranked second in importan
ce at 52 percent).
Other Influence Sources
Questions designed to discover the most important influence source
in vote decisions were those asking about the typical campaign channels
a1teady mentioned, and those asking about influence sources from persons
both public and private: family members, friends, community leaders,
and public officials on a state level (the' governor, secretary of state,
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TABLE VIII
INFLUENCE CHANNELS FOR CIGARETTE TAX MEASURE
RELATED TO YES-NO VO'lE IN EACH COUNTY*

BENTON

Advert is ing
Voters Pamphlet
Speeches or Debates
Newspaper Reports
Organizational Nsl trs-;
Talking with Friends
Other

*

DOOOLAS

YES
PCNT
N

NO
N PCNT

YES
N PeNT

N PCNT

33
23
3
44
12
27
3

16
16
2
14
4
11
1

24
19
1
24
5
14
0

26 52%
12 39
1 50
26 52
4 44
19 58
1 100

67%
59
60
76
75
71
75

33%
41
40
24
25
29
25

48%
61
50
48
56
42
0

;NO

Includes total responses in each category of influence channel
and for the yes-no vote
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agency heads, etc.).
officials

~re

In Both counties the spouse, friends and public

rank'ed highest in importance.

More people in both counties ranked infl uence from a husband or
wife as first in importance, public officials and friends second and
third respectively.

But for people voting "yes" in Benton, leaders

were the most important influence (93 percent).

In Douglas county,

"yes" voters looked chiefly to a spouse for direction (50 percent),
with community officials and leaders also important, although fewer
people named this group (Table IX).
The large number of public endorsements and private canpaigning
performed by officials and leaders during this campaign may account for
the surprisingl y higher ranking of officials over pensonal influence
through social contacts--particularly in Benton.

Local leaders were

relatively inactive in Douglas, which may explain the high rank order
14

of state officials specified as influential .in that county.

Apparen

tly the activity of local and state influentials communicated to the
voters their concern that the measure pass •
.Group Roles
It was deemed important to know how the public viewed the activity
performed by special interest groups in the campaign.

The field inves

tigation revealed that college youth were active, particularly within
the institutions they attended; that legislators publicly endorsed the
ballot measure; and that employees in higher education and leaders of
state and local ORA and OSEA units worked in a variety of ways to assure
passage.

Senior citizens organizations did little beyond lend their

endorsement and name to a coalition cause group.
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TABLE IX
VOTER RANKING OF PERSONAL INFLUENCE SOURCES

A.

Number of total influenced by various classes rank ordered.
Douglas County

Benton Countz

Spouse
State Official
Friends
Community Leader
Conmunity Ofcl
Parents
Church Ldr

B.

N

(R)

37
22
31.
14
12
11
9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Spouse
Friends
State Official
Community Ldr
Parents
Church Ldr
Community Ofcl

N

(R)

32
16
13

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8

7
7
6

Rank order listed in Table IX-A is contrasted with the % of Yes
votes as influenced by various classes
Benton Count.l

Community Ldr
Parents
Community Ofcl
Church Ldr
State Ofcl
Friends
. Spouse

93%
91
83
77
73
71
70

4
6
5
7
2
3
1

DouSl as Countx:
Spouse
Community Ldr
CODlllunity Ofcl
State Ofcl
Parents
Church Ldr
Friends

50%
50
50
46
43
43
37

1
4
6
3
5
5
2
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Voters were asked which of these groups were most influential in
the election outcome of the election in their areas: senior citizens,
college students, teachers, state employees, state legislators r busines
ses, higher education, the governor.

It was this question that revealed

the greatest difference between the two sample counties.
Benton respondents named higher education as the most important
and influential group, college students as second in importance, and
members of the state legislature third.

Douglas county felt state leg

islators were first, the governor second, and higher education third.
In view of actual campaign activity performed by

rep~esentatives

of these

groups,. the voters appear to have been cognizant of group efforts.
State employees were ranked fourth in Benton county where they
actually performed a number of campaign functions, but since many members
of the OSIA are also on the Corvallis campus, the categories of higher
education and state employees may be said to overlap.

A distinction

between the two interest groups is narrow and cannot be expected to be

ci~ar to survey respondents. (See Table X for ranking of influence)
Summary of Infl uence Sources
Based on the survey findings, influence sources important to the
voters in this election were (1) relatives, (2) friends, and (3) local
and state leaders.

From this we can say that direct personal influen

ce within social groups remained critical in persuasive effect, but the
greatest percentage of persons who voted "yes" in Benton county said
they did so because of influence outside of the primary group_
Impersonal information sources chiefly used were (1) newspaper
15

reports of events or pseudo events, (2) radio and television advertising,
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TABLE X
RANKING OF GROUP INa UENCE

UWhich groups were most important to the outcome of the election
in your area?tt
Benton
Groups
Higher ec:hcation
Co11e,ge Studen ts
State Legislature
State Employees
Teachers
Governor
Businesses
Senior Citizens
Other'

*

Responses include total named.

.,--

23*
19
18
16
14
11
9
9
1

Douglas
#

17
10
24
7
9
20
6
7
6
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and (3) editorial information.

The only groups relying heavily on the

Voters' Pamphlet 'Were the "yes" voter in Dougl as, and the "no" voter in
Benton.
Group influences were thought to be (1) higher education, 42)
students. and (3) state legislators in Benton county; (1) legislators,
(2) the governor, and (3) higher education in Douglas.
In both counties most of the people who voted "yes" did so because
they believed that defeat of the tax would mean (1) less property tax

relief t and (2) cuts to state agencies t not because they fel t there·.. ·
would be a personal impact on them from a tax defeat.

OJ;.

Persons voting

"'no" did so largely because they believed that (1) the tax was regres
8i~,

and (2) that it was too much like a sales tax.
"Yes n voters cited as the second most important reasons (1) the

possibility of cuts to public schools, and (2) the fact that smoking is
dangerous therefore an an appropriate commodity for ta.:x:ation.

The uno"

voters used the opponent argument that there was no guarantee of proper
ty tax: relief as their second most important reason for opposing the

tu.
A high proportion of persons in both counties felt that the issues
ware muddy and that fiscal impact of a tax defeat on them was unclear.
Baturally those voting affirmatively believed p. .ponent arguments were
~ll

presented and free of confusion

w~ile

the opponent cause was un

clear; those registering dissenting votes believed the opposite.

III. LEADERSHIP SURVEY
Hearly every known participating legislator and interest group
leader was mailed a questionnaire requesting information similar to that

163

asked the voters plus specific questions directed at obtaining tes
timony on their role in the campaign.

Only those legislators who

were active through coordinating work or public speaking appearances in
favor of the tax were queried: seven responded.

Sixteen organizational

leaders were sent questionnaires and of these, fifteen replied.

There9

fore it is felt that the responses from all leadership sources represent
accurately those persons involved in or close to the supporting side of
the campaign.
Leadership Involvement
Both legislators and interest and cause group leaders were asked
how they viewed their role in the campaign, the tasks they performed,
and the manner by which they became involved in the effort to pass the
state ballot measure (Table XI).
Legislators responded to the question of, "What was your role in
the campaign?" by naming legitimizing of the campaign effort as most
important.

Of secondary importance was their role as information sources,

according to the majority of responses.

Cause group leaders asked the

same question said their primary role was legitimizing the campaign on .
.t he state level and initiating activity on both a state and local level.
The answers were consistent with roles uncovered in the field investi
gation.

They saw themselves as information sources to the general

public as only moderately important.
In response to "What tasks did you or your group perform in the
campaign?" four legislators replied that their primary job was the
making of public statements that were quoted in the press.

The other

three felt that the chief task they performed was fund raising.

164

TABLE

n

LBADERSHIP ROLES AND TASKS PERFORMED

-

ROLl

Leg 1t imize r:
State Level
Local Level
Initiator:
State Level
Local Level
Information source:
To General Public
To Members

Legislators
#

Leaders
--,

5

S

0

.5

0
1

7
6

1

.5

8

6

TASKS PERFOro.BD
Fund Rais ing

3

Mailings to constituents
Public Statements Quoted
Public Speaking appearances
Inter-organizational coordination
Recruiting or organizing workers

o
4
7

o

o

3

ab

11
7
6

Arncludes primary and secondary functions named by interest group
leaders.
b"to members"
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Organizational leaders felt that their primary tasks were issuing
public statements to be quoted in the press, mailing information re
garding the tax measure to their members or other interested citizens,
and the third most important function was public speaking appearances

or inter-organizational coordination of the campaign.
Only organizational leaders were asked the question, "How did you
become involved in the cigarette tax campaign?" (Appendix G)

Six re

sponded that it was ,an independent decision made by their organization's
board of

director~;

four replied involvement occurred as a result of

personal contacts by individuals or group leaders outside their organi
zation who were already involved; and 'four said that involvement was a
decision made independently by themselves or their organization's leader
ship.
Interest group leaders were also asked whether or not they would
have been involved if the tax defeat meant fiscal impact on their mem
bers.

Only slightly over half said they would not have been active.

Information Channels and Influence Sources
Questions parallel to those asked the voters of Benton and Douglas
counties were posed to legislators: (1) informational channels important
to the voters, and (2) groups most influential on the outcome of the
election (Table XII).
Legislators were asked which in a series of channels were impor
tant in the election outcome: television, radio, newspaper advertising,
regular newspaper reports, public speeches, etc.

Slightly over half of

the legislators, queried felt that television was extremely important in
the vote outcome.

Also slightly more than half believed that newspaper
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TABLE XII

LEADERSHIP OPINION ON INFLUENTIAL INFORMATION
CHANNELS AND GROUPS

Legislators
N Impt

Impt

Leaders
Impt

N Impt

INFORMATION CHANNELS:,
Television
Radio
Newspaper ads
Newspaper reports
Publ ic Speeches
Door-to-door contact
Mailings to voters
Personal contact
GROUPS
Higher Ec:h cation
Public Employees
Public education
Businesses
Senior citizens
Youth
Organized Labor
Other

* l=L6ast

important
2=Mbderate1y important
3=Extreme1y important

5
3
3
3
2

2
0

5
4

4

0
3

3
8
3

0
5
4

1
1

1

3

4

1
2

3

3

4

3

1

-1*

2

3

1

2

3

1
1

1

12
10

1

2

4

0

1

6

0
3
3

4

2
0
0

3

2
4

6
6

4
5

2
1
1

2
5
1

4

1,

3
2
2

4

1

0

0

7
0

7
2
3
8
1

1
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advertisements were moderately important; and the same proportion felt
that news reporting and editorial support was least important.
Interest group leaders were asked the same questions regarding
important information channels.
~portant,

They believed that television was most

followed by regular news reports.

These same leaders felt

that of all channels available to the voters, radio and door-to-door
campaigning were least important.
As to the influence of special interest groups on voter choice,
legislators felt almost unanimously that public employees and higher
education were extremely important.

Public school educators and organ

ized labor were felt to be moderately important, and senior citizens
and business interests least important.

Organizational leaders felt

that higher education, public employees, and young people were most im
portant.

Only moderately important were senior citizens, organized

labor, and public educators.

Business was considered unimportant.

With respect to questions of interest group influence the responses
of interest group leaders were only somewhat closer in assessing influ
ence than were state legislators.

The voters too viewed higher educa

tion as critical in the vote outcome, however all classes of state em
ployees were rated higher.
Both legislators and leaders were asked to rate the proponents
on clarity of the issues.

A definite majority of both legislators and

interest gro'lp leaders fel t that the issues were only somewhat clear
(all legislators; four out of seven replies of leaders).

The same ques

tion was asked regarding clarity of the issues presented by the oppon
ents of the tax increase.

Again, a majority from both groups felt that

the opponents were not at all clear in explaining the issues; a finding
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consistent with what we might expect from leadership supporting the
ballot measure, but not altogether supporting the methods used in the
campaign.
Importance of Issue s
The response to the question, "Which issues were important in the
voters decision on how to vote?" offers the most striking contrast be
tween the voters and leaders active in the campaign (Table XIII).
Legislators named cuts to state agencies, property tax relief, and in
creased tuition at state colleges and universities as extremely impor
tant to the "yes" vote.

They named as only moderately important the

issue ·of cuts to Basic School Support and property tax relief.
Least important to the legislators was the issue of out-of-state
tobacco interests gaining more from a tax defeat than the Oregon elector
ate.

Few felt that the issue, "smoking is dangerous,ft was a factor in

election choices, whereas voters from both counties named it as second
in importance as a reason for voting "yes."
Organizational leaders felt that property tax relief was most
important and second only to a threatened cut to state agencies.

Again,

the survey found that organizational leaders are more accurate in asses
sing voter reasons for supporting the tax.

The question of which issues were important to the "no
also asked.

tt

vote was

Legislators felt that similarity of the cigarette tax to

a sales tax was extremely important in the "no tt vote, as was a judgment
that most voters were against all taxes.
lators queried

fe~t

erate importance.

Fewer than half of the legis

that voter resistance to all taxes was of even mod

Most fel t that the issue of least importance was
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"threat to property tax relief."

This was in contrast to the voters

who believed that threats to property tax relief was a primary reason
for opposing the tax, apparently believing the opposition claims.

None

of the legislators fel t that the i.ssue was most important and four said
it was least important of all suggested.
The leadership representing interest and cause groups felt that
the issue of "regressive taxation, tf was the most important reason voters
said "nott.

This is consistent with voter survey results.

The second

most important reason named was that nall taxes are too high. It

Third

most often mentioned issue was the argument that the cigarette tax was
too similiar to a sales tax.

None of the leaders questioned felt that

"danger to property tax relief

lt

was of any significance in voter deci"",

sions
Summary of Leadership Survey

One of the chief reasons for conducting a leadership survey that
paralleled one polling the voters, was to discover the extent to which
their judgments conform to those held by the Oregon voter.

The study

asked if leaders are accurate in assessing why voters decided to vote
for or against the tax.

The data reveals that certain important dis

crepancies do exist between the leadership el ite and regul ar voters in
regard to (1) their opinions of political communication channels that
are most important to the voters, and (2) the importance of specified
issues in election choice.
The voters were asked how they' obtained their infoDmation and

the sample replied that the most important s'ource of information on the
sales tax was newspaper reports and conversations With friends.

Oregon'"s
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political elite were at odds on this question, both with each other and
with the voters.
The voters were asked their reasons for voting yes or no.

They

said key issues in their decision to vote "yes" were (1) need for con
tinuing property tax relief, (2) threats to the Basic School Support
fund, and (3) the danger of smoking.

The "no" voters answered (1) the

cigarette tax is a regressive tax, and (2) there are no guarantees of
property tax relief.

Leaders, particularly legislators, felt that other

issues were more important to the voters.

None thought that "smoking

is dangerous," or "threat to property tax: relief" were issues affecting
the vote.
Not at all surprising was the finding that the public felt the
issues were clear only if they voted "yes" ; unclear if they voted "no."
Leadership felt generally that the campaign on the proponent side had
made the issues clear to the voter, but all of those polled favored the
tax.
Voters believed that the most influential groups active in the
campaign were (1) higher education, (2) students, and (3) state employe
es.

In this, leaders were agreed, although there was a variety of opinion

difference between interest group leaders.
IV. SURVEY OONCLUSIONS

While the data cannot fully answer each question posed in the
statement of thesis objectives, the following general conclusions have
been drawn regarding the voters surveyed:
1.

Regular voters use in general the same channels
for obtaining politically relevant information:
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regular newspaper reports, radio and tele
vision advertising, and the Voters' Pamphlet.
2. Voters of higher education and income depend more
on newspaper coverage of campaigns; lower socio
economic groups rely more on "low effort" radio
and television advertising. 16
3. The chief audience for political campaign messages
in general and this campaign in particular, seems
to be those between the ages of 30-49, in the middle
income levels, and who are socially active in their
communities.
4. Attention to campaign communication is not directly
related to voting frequency. Regul ar ~loters over
60 years of age rarely attend to the usual cam~
paign channels. 17

s.

Regular voters are accurate in assessing the cam
paign participation of special interest groups.

6. It is more difficult to convince lower income pop
ulation groups (of all ages) of complex facts in
fiscal legislation, and this tax measure in particular.
7.

Fear appeals can have a "boomerang" effect. The
inaccuracies of campaign messages on both sides in
this campaign resulted in voter confusion, espec
ially t~, real impact of the ballot measure defeat
on the 'General Fund.

8. Voters are more likely to go to the polls if the
issues are accurately presented. Where there was
less confusion there was a greater turnout and a
greater percentage of ttye sft votes. While these may
not be causally related, there is evidence to sug
gest that uncertainty and negative votes are. 18

By comparing the voter survey data to that derived from the leader
ship survey these conclusions have been drawn:
1. There is little congruence between what regular
voters believe to be important issues and what
public and private influentials believe.
2. While regular voters are accurate in assessing the
campaign participation of special interest groups,
the leadership in these groups differ in regard to
the same question.
3. Interest group leaders are somewhat more accurate

l7~

in ascribing motives to the voters than are
legislators.
4.

MOst legislators were aware of inaccuracies in
the campaign from the political committees on
both sides of the issue, and felt them to be a
negative element in the campaign effort.
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l8Kennedy, interview.

c'HAPTERVI

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study was to bring together the full range
of activity in the 1971-72 cigarette tax referendum campaign.

The in

vestigation included an analysis of (1) past tax elections in Oregon,
(2)

the events leading to a referendum on the cigarette tax, (3) the man

ner by which public and private individuals and groups became involved,
(4) the communication initiated by campaigners, and (5) the voter's reac

tion to general campaign strategies.
The thesis hypothesis argued that the critical variable in the suc
cess of the 1972 cigarette tax campaign was the involvement of major socio
economic interest groups.

The proposition was tested in the field inves

tigation by examining activities of individuals and groups which were
designed to manipulate the behavior of the voters to the campaigners'
1

advantage.
studied:

In other words, each major element in the campaign was
(1) the campaigners, (2) their strategies, (3) the setting,

(4) the voters, and (5) election results.
The purpose of the final chapter is to briefly review what was
revealed by the investigation and draw certain generalizations in support
of the thesis hypothesis.
I. SUMMARY

The manner by which the cigarette tax campaigners tried to "sell"
the electorate was only in some respects parallel to what is described
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by campaign researchers as the "usual method" of passing a state bal

lot measure.
funding."

There was I ittle debate regarding "technical ities of

When budgets are cut, went the reasoning, services to the

people are cut.

If this logic failed to capture the favor of the

voters; there were others:

nonsmokers would not have to pay yet would

receive the same services gained by those who did.

Attempts were made

to shift attention away from the issue of "regressive taxation": smokers
did not have to smoke, so it was an optional tax rather than a "select
ive tax. It
These and other arguments appeared in the campaign literature and
media reports of campaign events.

They were del iberately and carefully

selected, and used by institutional leaders in many segments of Oregon's
political life.

In the referendum campaign, public appearances, person

al contacts, and mass communication channels were utilized by state of
fic~als,

the governor and state legislators.

Strategies were suggested,

debated and implemented by the State Committee.

In addition, other

approaches were used by independent campaigners reptesenting large pres
sure and cause groups.
The State Committee said that the fear appeals were deliberately

chosen and were necessary to mobilize groups that could be hurt by a
revenue reduction.

But these same fear appeals, compounded by similiar

methods issuing from the opposition, may have created voter confusion,
and more important, voter distrust.
The coordinators also said that there was no effort to respond to
opposition attacks in the implementation of the pre-established strategy;
but certain state officials did respond and gained wide public atten
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tion when they charged the opposition with deliberately misleading and
and false statements, and equally wide attention when they in turn were
charged with misconduct in the performance of their duties.
Campaign coordinators said that the time limitations made for a
tightly knit campaign.

Only a few' people made key decisions on slogans,

timing, and channels that would be used to disseminate the arguments.
But again, an analysis of the campaign demonstrates a contradiction.
While there was no time for internal organizational dissention, leader
shi~

fragmentation did occur in the absence of any concerted efforts to

bring them together.

Each group carried out its own strategy decisions.

The interest group leaders

~ere

not permitted to see results from the

public opinion polls, they were not consulted on the way funds should be
spent, and they were not asked their opinions about the best structur
ing of the arguments.

As a result they felt no particular obligation

to conform to State Committee decisions.

There is a very real possibil

ity that had the campaign lasted longer, latent dissatisfactions with
the course taken ,by the State Committee might have become manifest and
created serious problems for the united effort.
The fragmentation of activity carried out by different interest

and cause groups makes analysis difficult.

Some leaders said that

student contribution was of critical importance; others that participa
tion by state employees was the deciding factor.

MOst infonnants had

different notions about what contributed to success: personal influence
through. individual contacts, said some leaders; mass persuasion utiliz
ing metropolitan Portland media, said others.

But the voter disagreed

with both and said that they obtained the buik of their information from
regular newspaper reports.
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Media reports generally dealt with matters peripheral to the
issues: (1) synthetic opposition surfacing in the form of committees
designed to counter the influence of the youth-aged coalition, (2)
demands for apologies for corrupt practices violations coming from both
sides of the battle line, and (3) leading supporters of the tax labeled
"prostitutes of the governor" by the opposition, and leading opponents
called "carpetbagging out-of-state 'ers" by the proponents.
In the 1971-72 cigarette tax campaign only one factor remained
constant--resistance of Oregon voters to taxes.
long-time tradition was challenged.

And yet, even this

A state official said in an inter

view inmediately following the election that "the public has finally
accepted the fact that government is not adequately funded.

They believe

2

something has to be done."
It was for the purpose of resolving some of the remaining causal
questions that the voter.-Ieadership survey was undertaken as a followup to

t~e

field investigation.

The purpose was to discover voter opin

ions regarding the effectiveness of communication generated by special
interest groups and their reasons for voting as they

~id.

These opinions,

described in the previous chapter, assume importance in connection with
the following conditions which existed in Oregon at the time of the
campaign:
1.

The cigarette tax increase was the only immediately
available solution to a serious budget deficit. An
alternative source would have required another special
session, another 90 day waiting period, and the
threat of another referendum.

2.

This was the first recent tax, measure with support
from legislative leaders of both political parties:
Democrat and Republican Senate leaders; Speaker of
the House; and house members from both parties.

:l

3.

The tax revolt in Oregon was not the product of
depressed conditions, according to all economic
indexes, but reflected a nation wide dissatisfac
tion with property taxes. 3

4.

This was the first state campaign conducted under
the federal constitutional amendment granting the
vote to those between the ages of 18 and 21.

s.

It was the first time Oregon politics had witnes
sed a coalition of young and old people working
side by side with large permanent interest groups.

6.

It was the first time that a concerted effort was
made by members of Oregon's higher education com
munity in support of a general tax.

7.

Campaign strategy called for directed appeals to
special interest groups and attempted to define
issues in terms of fiscal impact on special groups.

8.

In each of the 12 counties where the tax increase
passed there was either a major institution of the
state system of higher education, a community col
lege; or an important complex of state government.
But there were also colleges in five counties where
the tax was defeated: Jackson, Coos, Douglas, Clatsop
and Deschutes.
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Certain inferences should also be included as part of the analysis:
1.

There was a great amount of public consternation
over misrepresentation of the "facts," resulting in
extensive voter confusion about the truthfulness
of campaign lOO.ssages.

2.

Public confusion was most evident in the reasons for
the "no" vote, and in voter judgnents regarding the
fiscal impact of the cigarette tax defeat on them.

Taken together, facts and inferences suggest that a great many
variables were at work in the vote outcome.

Without a comprehensive

survey of the entire state we cannot say with certainty that the measure
passed Qecause of, or in spite of the campaign.

However, comparisons

of voter opinions in two Oregon counties provides evidence that strong
ly suggests the campaign was a qualified success.

l8G
Relation of Field Investigation to Survey Results
The survey findings reveal some serious weaknesses in the cig
arette tax campaign.

Rather than countering opposition statements that

the property tax relief account would be eliminated if the tax passed,
supporters of the measure on a st~te wide level continued with their in
itial campaign strategy:
be"

suggesting that the two percent cuts "could

leveled at one or several agencies rather than across-the-board to all

services as provided for in a companion bill to H.B. 3064.

As a result,

many voters remained uncertain about the property tax relief question,
and those who do not always vote in special elections, responded to their
uncertainty by vot ing "no."
This information, taken with data provided by the professional pol
ling agency irmnediately following the election, provides evidence that
certain strategy decisions worked to prevent a larger victory.
Countering the voter indecision were the strong appeals made to
and by members of both formal interest groups and temporary cause groups-
~otably

the youth-aged coalition and Friends of Higher Education.

These

organizations attempted direct personal influence by instigating activity
on a local level, working to convince members that they would be directly
affected, by the two percent cuts, not "selective cuts," if the tax were
defeated.

The arguments they used included:

(1) budget cuts to (a)

higher education, (b) departments of Human Resources and Environmental
Quality, (c) State Basic School Support, (d) community college operating
reimbursements and (e) direct property tax relief.

The same arguments

were used by each group with an emphasis placed on the one most relevant
to the particular audience.
Voters were influenced by these arguments, and the survey revealed
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that those who voted "yes" did so largely because of them.

Moreover,

voters were aware of interest group activity in their respective counties
and named higher education, students and state employees as most influential
in the campaign.
Voters were influenced by their elected leaders, the governor as
well as legislators, and articulated this influence on the questionnaires
returned.

The .,survey al so demonstrated the importance of contributions

made by state and local influentials.

There is evidence to indicate that

although leadership endorsements were influential, particularly to those
voting "yes," their reasons for favoring the tax were not.
II.

CONCLUSIONS

The thesis hypothesis stated that the clucial variable in the suc
cess of the referendum campaign was the involvement of special interest
gro~ps.

Interest groups were defined as permanent pressure groups and

temporary cause groups.

The following pressure groups were most active:

the OSEA, the OEA, and Friends of Higher Education. The most publicized
4
Business interests and organ
cause group was the youth-aged coalition.
ized labor did contribute to the campaign effort, but to a lesser extent;
the former donating money and several volunteers, the latter a campaign
contribution and public endorsement.
While the data cannot fully answer every question posed in the
statement of thesis objectives, the central proposition was supported.'
The investigation revealed that interest groups were effective, chiefly
because of the many roles they performed in each phase of the campaign:
as initiators of campaign activity, as legitimizers, as fund raisers,
and as channel sources for disseminating information to both their own
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members and to the general publ ic.
(I) Initiators.

The OSEA and youth-aged coalition was instrumen

tal in initiating a pro-tax campaign and were, with the governor's
office, responsible for establishing an official campaign committee.
Although they had little to say about strategies developed by the State
Committee, without them a central campaign committee would not have been
possible.
As initiators they oper£d up the channels of communication by
defining the problem and relaying this information to other potentially
affected groups and individuals.

They also performed a ,legitimizing

function as the formal organizational leaders publicly endorsed the tax
measure in the early stages of the campaign.

Other roles they perform

ed were perhaps more significant, but the early endorsements establish
ed a precedent for involvement and were critical in later mobilization
of affiliated local groups and the snow-balling endorsements by other
influentials that followed.
(2)

Message disseminators.

The most impo rtant role performed by

all interest groups was as channel source.

Each group had existing

mechanisms for getting information to a large number of a people within
a minimum period of tine.

Since the campaign was necessarily of such

short duration this was doubly crucial.

Each group, including the student

organization, had immediately available multiple communication channels
over which they had substantial control.

The. most important channels

were pr.inted media (newsletters, student newspapers, and various other
specialized publications originating within

~he

organization), and per

sonal contacts (local legislative chairmen, presidents of local chapters
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or college student groups, affiliated organizational officers).
Many press statements were made and public speeches given in the
40 day campaign, many of which were facilitated by the interest groups.
Fully half of all speeches made by state influentials were done through
the sponsorship of the employee o'rganizations.

While few of the voters

surveyed actually attended the public meetings, they read about them in
their daily newspapers or listened to quoted statements made by legis
lators or officials over the regular news reports on television and
radio.

Speeches given by faculty and students on college campuses

likewise received notice in both the pub~ic press and in university
publications.
(3)

Fund Raisers.

The availability of multiple channels, espec

ially in higher education, made possible the third role.

Permanent

interest groups had existing funds available for just such a purpose
an~

needed only the approval of their respective governing boards to

release the money.
~nd

Friends of Higher Education had no such ready source,

yet, because of their contacts with persons committed to quality ed

ucation, were able to raise an amount almost equal to that contributed
by other groups.

Fund raising success went beyond support of the State

Committee media effort in its effect.

By obtaining small donations

from many individuals, they obtained increasingly greater committment.
"Get a man's dollar and you get his vote t" said one campaigner.

There

is good reason to believe that this is true, and the mobilization of
human. resources was in this way advanced.
The roles were self-starting and self-perpetuating.

Because there

was no effort on the part of the State Committee to involve anyone out
side the immediate'working team in the decision making process, the

184

interest groups felt no obligation to be guided by them.

MOst of the

groups refused to use printed literature put out by the State Commit
tee and instead wrote and distributed their own, using essentially the
same arguments concerning economic impact on specified population groups,
but structured with less exaggeration and emotionally loaded language.
Based on the interviews conducted in this study, we do know that per
suasive messages originating with the groups had a large audience, col
lectively totalling in excess of 80,000.

Using the mail and personal

distribution by students at Oregon college campuses, potentially eight
5

percent of all registered voters in the state were reached.
It would be inaccurate to say that the campaign would have suc
ceeded without media support in an area with the largest population in
the state.

Our survey demonstrates that radio and television advertis

ing are important sources of information for the Oregon voter; however,
me~ia

appeals would not have been possible without the fund raising

activities of the interest groups.
Nor were attempts at interest group coordination carried out by
the State Committee completely ineffectual.

But many of the other act

ivities of the central campaign organization had a counter-productive
effect--their overstated arguments drew fire from the opposition that
might have been avoided, and gave the press cause to publicize the sen
sational news of corrupt practices violation charges rather than news
of the substantive issues.
-Por all of the teasons named above we must conclude that the
mediating activity of state and local

infl~entials,

through the mech

anisms of special interest pressure and cause groups, provided a crit
ical balance and made the difference in the campaign success.

I8.?

Recommendations for Future Research
Timing was a significant weakness in the design of both the field
study and the voter survey.

Specifically, it would have been desirable

to conduct the field investigation during the actual campaign rather
than some months later.
gard

The time factor was even more crucial in re

to the voter survey, although every effort was made to counter

this problem.

Although the sample was considered representative, other

evidence suggests that many more young people voted than those

repr~sen

ted in the survey.

An extensive voter registration drive was conducted on the Oregon
State University campus.

Because a majority of students return to their

family homes during the summer months, it may be that many did not re
ceive the questionnaire in time to return it by the survey deadline.
For this reason, we do not have adequate information on the student vote-
the issues youth felt were important, the way they teceived their info
~ation,

or the chief source of influence on their vote decision.

Future

research would do well to account for seasonal residence among college
youth in any study of campaign effects.
A very real need remains in local or state campaign research in
many areas, particularly: perceptual differences between the leadership
elite and the average voter; the long-range effects of campaign credi
bility on voter choice; and voting trends among population groups on
referendum issues.

It would also be profitable to discover whether a

particular combination of interest groups provides greater momentum and
role possibilities in other state political

~ampaigns.

This investigation revealed not only that special interest groups
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are often active in state ballot measure efforts (both as initiators
and as campaign sponsors), leadership from this group are more nearly
in tune with voter attitudes in every aspect of a campaign.

Therefore,

a more narrowly focused study on differences among the el ite in their
assessment of voter opinion ought to be conducted.

Because a campaign

is nothing more or less than the people who run it, a careful analysis
of such leadership perceptions would be of real value to studies of
local or state referendum campaigns.

A longitudinal study of source credibility within similiar types
of campaigns likewise should be attempted.

By a variety of means, the

voter seeks to remind his leaders the implications of his disbelief on
passage of a tax proposal, but leadership too often discounts this as
a factor in election.results.

National as well as state leaders behave

as though the voters could be won merely by deciding on the "best"
slogans, the most efficient timing, and the most persuasive arguments.
It would be interesting and valuable to discover how extensive distrust
is among the various popUlation groups and the extent to which distrust
motivates them to vote for or against tax measures.
Many other potentially profitable avenues for investigation present
themselves.

Questions of the effect of membership affilliation on vote

have not been adequately answered.

Nor haye que stions regarding the ef

fects of overlapping group membership on

vote

decisions.

More careful

analysis of the relationships of party affiliation to susceptability of
influence from partisan leaders needs to be done.
Summary
Although it is clearly difficult to find conclusive answers through
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one or several research methods because of the complexity and scope of
state political campaigns, this investigation has thrown some light on
the influence of interest groups in a nonpartisan, state referendum
campaign.

All of the data obtained through both the field investiga

tion and voter-leadership survey suggest that interest group involve
ment was important to the success of the campaign.

We can also conclude

that future successful campaigns will witness a new coalition of influ
entials and another combination of interest groups, perhaps differing
in composition from those active in the 1971-72 effort, but combinations
which will most certainly perform the same roles and make use of the
same channels.

A future referendum would also do well to place credi

bility as a top

prio~ity

in planning campaign strategies.

To be sure,

there are always charges to be answered originating from the opposition,
and issues to be structured in the most persuasive fashion.

But if

Oregon is ever to obtain voter approval for any proposal that goes
beyond a "band-aid" solution to what has become a biennial fiscal crisis,
responsible campaigning is essential.
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Notes
lNimmo, p. 10.
2pos t , interview.
3"Public Opinion and Taxes," Advisory Commission; "Oregon Labor
Force Trends, If Oregon Department of Labor (January, 1972).
4Tbe State Committee was not defined as an interest group because
it was made up of professionals paid to work in behalf of the measure
and who otherwise would be unlikely to take an active part.

~mbership mailing list: OSEA, 17,000; OEA, 19,500; potential
university publication readership, 54,000; potential community college
publications readership, 40,000; OSBA, 2,500.
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APPENDIX A

TAX PROPOSAL VOTING RECO!ID

-

Date

Tax Proposed

1930

Personal Income Tax

1933

-Yes

No

105,189

95,207

Sales Tax

45,603

167,512

1934

Sales Tax

<'64,677

156,182

1936

Sales Tax

32,106

187,319

1947

Cigarette·Tax

103,794

140,876

1952

Cigarette Tax

233,226

413,137

1956

Cigarette Taxa

280,055

414,613

1960

Personal Income Tax

115,610

570,025

1963

Personal-Corporation Income Tax

103,737

362,845

1966

Cigarette Tax

310,743

181,957

1968

Ii

310,743

181,957

1969

Sales Tax

65,077

504,274

1972

Cigarette Tax

245,717

236,937

Percent Tax Limitation

aA1so in 1956, a measure providing that the Emergency Clause
could be used on tax proposals was defeated by 487,550 to
175,932.
bA measure placed on the ballot by initiative.

Defeat meant no

change in tax structure.
Source:

Oregon Blue Book 1955; Oregon Blue Book 1971-72.
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APPENDIX C
JANUARY 18, 1972, SPECIAL ELECTION
SUM1ARY OF COUNTY VOTE

-Yes

CoUntI
Baker
Benton
Clackamas
C1atsop
Columbia
Coos
Crook
Curry
Deschutes
Douglas
Gilliam
Grant
Harney
Hood River
Jackson
Jefferson
Josephine
Klamath
Lake
Lane
Lincoln
Linn
Ma1heur
Marion
Morrow
Mu1tnomah
Polk
She !'man
Tillamook
Umatilla
Union
Wallowa
Wasco
Washington
Wheeler
Yamhill

1,393
10,551
21,118
2,843
2,952
5,661
1,010
1,116
,3,491
5,898
319
681
674
1,558

No

887
2,774
3,634
503
24,989
2,642
7,033
2,132
20,024
537
68,342
5,238
284
2,016
4,690
2,650
785
2,569
21,922
199
4,795

1,680
4,507
19,497
4,239
3,852
7,925
1,405
1,657
3,749
9,223
311
907
824
1,566
9,807
1,091
5,180
5,829
998
24,140
3,422
9,257
1,442
15,478
603
59,842
4,105
403
2,602
4,622
2,076
815
2,611
16,762
314
...i.z196

245,717

236,937

7~807

Totals

-

Source: Official Abstract of Votes SE!cial Election 1972.
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~PENDIX

D-l

lPUBLIC OPINION SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES
VOTEk3

SECTION

I

1.

How often do you vote in state-wide elections?
(1) every election
(2) most elections
(3) some elections
(4) few elections
(5) rarely

2.

Would you have been affected if the cigarette tax measure had been
defeated?
(1) yes
(2) no
(3) uncertain
If you answer was yes, please indicate how it would have affect
ed you.

3.

If you voted FOR the cigarette tax measure, check the two reasons
most important to you.
(1) continued property tax relief.
(2) possibility of cuts to state agencies if new revenue was un
available.
(3) possibility of increased college tuition if new revenue was un
available.
(4) possibility of cuts to public schools.
(S) out-of-state tobacco interests would benefit more than Oregon.
(6) because smoking is dangerous anyway.
(7) other.

4.

If you voted AGAINST the cigarette tax measure, check the two reasons
most important to you.
(1) the tax is regressive and hurts a special group.
(2) the tax is the same as a sales tax of which I disapprove.
(3) cigarettes already cost too much.
(4) taxes should not be increased until government learns economy.
(5) all taxes are too high.
(6) property tax relief is not guaranteed by the tax measure.
(7) other.

5.

How did you learn about the measure?
(1) television or radio advertising.
(2) the Voters' Pamphlet ..
(3) public speeches or debates.
(4) regular news reports.
(5) organization newsletters or bulletins.
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(6) talking to friends or relatives.
(7) other.
6.

What information sources were the most important to you in your
decision on how to vote?
(1) public meetings in your area.
(2) newsletters from organizations.
(3) newspaper reports.
(4). newspaper editorials.
(5) television or radio advertising.
(6) conversations with friends or neighbors.
(7) other.

7.

Other than the information sources already mentioned, what source
was most important in your decision on how to vote?
(1) husband or wife.
(2) one or both parents.
(3) neighbor or friend.
(4) community leader.
(5) church affiliated leader.
(6) community official.
(?) public official (on a state level)

8.

Many groups worked in the cigarette tax campaign. Please indicate
which group you think had the most influence on the outcome of the
election.
(1) senior citizens.
(2) ,college students.
(3) teachers.
(4) state employees.
(5) state legislators.
(6) businesses.
(7) governor's office.
(8) higher educat ion.
(9) other.

9.

Were you contacted personally by anyone from a group listed above?
(1) yes.
(2) no

10. In your opinion, were the opponents of the cigarette tax measure in
your area clear in explaining important issues?
(1) extremely clear.
(2) somewhat clear.
(3) not at all clear.
11. In your op1n1on, were those supporting the cigarette tax measure in

your area clear in explaining important issues?
(1) extremely clear.
(2) somewhat clear.
(3) not at all clear.
12. Are you a member of a professional association or union?
. (1) yes.
(2) no.
If yes, please name the organization:
If no, please skip to Section II.
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13.

Row often do you attend association or union meetings in comparison
with others in the organization?
(1) regularly.
(2) frequently.
(3) occasionally.
(4) rarely.
(5) never.

14.

Row often do you read the organization's newsletter or bulletin?
(1) regularly.
(2) frequently.
(3) occasionally.
(4) rarely.
(5) never.

15.

Was your association or union involved in the cigarette tax campaign?
(1) yes.
(2) no.
(~) uncertain.

16.

If your answer to the above question was yes, please indicate the
functions your organization performed in the campaign.

SECTION II
1.

Howl often do you view television?
(1) most of the time.
(2) daytime oUly.
(3) evenings only.

(4) news only.
(5) rarely watch television.
(6) never watch television.

2. How often do you attend public debates or speeches of a political
nature?
.
(1) regularly.
(3) rarely.
(2) frequently.
(4) never.
3.

How often do you listen to political advertising prior to an election?
(1) regularly.
(3) rarely.
(2) frequently.
(4) never.

4.

How frequently do you read the newspaper?
(1) daily.
(4) several times a week.
(2) most days.
(5) less than once a week.
(3) once a week.
(6) never.

S.

How often do you talk with frienlls, neighbors or busine ss associates
about political issues or state ballot measures such as the cigarette
tax?
(1) often.
(3) rarely.
(2) occasionally.
. (4) never.

6.
7.

Please indicate your age:
Your sex:

8.
9.

occupation:
grades of school completed:
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10. Your political party:

11. Type of living community:
12. Your approximate income:
LEADERS *

1.

What part did your organization or group play in the recent cigaret
te tax campaign?
(1) a major role.
(2) a minor role.

2.

How would you characterize your organization or grbup's role in the
total campaign?
(1) as legitimizers of the measure on a state level.
(2) as legitimizers of the measure on a local level.
(3) ini~iating activity on a state level.
(4) initiating activity on a local level.
(S) initiating activity within your organization.
(6) information source to the general public.
(7) information· source to your mem~ership.

3.

What were some of the tasks your organization or group performed in
the campaign?
(1) fund raising.
'(2) mailings to your members.
(3) mailings to general public.
(4) public statements quoted by the press.
(s) public speaking appearances.
(6) inter~organizational coordination.
(7) recruiting and/or organizing manpower.
(8) other.

4.

How did your organization become involved in the cigarette tax campa
ign?
(1) personal contact by another involved individual or group.
(2) decision made independently by your organization or group_
(3) decision made independently by your organization leadership.

s.

If the tax measure had been defeated, what would have been the projec
-ted fiscal impact on your organization or group?
(1) considerable.
(3) very little.
(2) slight.
(4) none at all.

6.

If your answer to the last question was positive, would your organi
zation have been involved if there had not been the possibility of
major fiscal impact?
(1) yes
(2) no
(3) uncertain

7.

In your district or county, w~ich communication channels listed below
was the most important in the election outcome?
(1) television
(5) public speeches.
(2) radio.
(6) door-to-door campaigning.
(3) newspaper advertising.
(7) mailings to voters.
(4) news reports.
(8) editorial comment.
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8.

In your county or district, which communication channels were used
for getting information to the voters?
(1) television.
(5) public speeches.
(2) radio
(6) door-to-door campaigning.
(3) newspaper advertising.
(7) mailings to voters.
(4) news reports.
(8) editorial comment.

9.

What impact do you think the following groups had in the campaign on
the state wide level?
(5) senior citizens.
(1) higher education.
«(0 youth.
(2) public employees.
(7) organized labor.
(3) public education.
(8) other.
(4) businesses.

10. How would you rate the organization of the cigarette tax campaign on
a state wide level as compared with other campaigns on state tax
measures?
(1) very well coordinated.
(2) poorly/coordinated.
(3) cannot compare.
11.

How do you rate the clarity of the proponents of the measure in
explaining important issues?
(1) extremely clear.
(2) somewhat clear.
(3) not clear.

12.

How do you rate the clarity of the opponents of the measure in
explaining important issues?
(1) extremely clear.
(2) somewhat clear.
(3) not clear.

13.

Of the issues selected, which had the most impact in persuading the
members of your organization or group to vote in favor of the tax?
(1) property tax relief.
(2) cuts to state agencies.
(3) increased college tuition.
(4) against out-of-state tobacco interests.
(5) smoking is dangerous.
(6) state support to public education cuts.
(7) other.
.

14.

Of the issues selected, which had the most impact in persuading the
members of your organization or group to vote against the tax?
(1) regressive, tax.
(2) similarit y to a sales tax.
(3) all taxes too high.
(4) high cost of cigarettes.
(5) danger to property tax relief.
(6) other.

*

Questionnaires mailed to legislators substituted the wording, "your
organization or group," for "you," or ftyour'constitutents.tt
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APPENDIX D-2

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS TO
INFLUENTJ.ALS*
1.

How did you or your organization become involved in the canpaign?

2.

What was the extent of your involvement?

3.

In your judgment, would you say that the campaign was well planned?
Were the most important issues used? Were appropriate campaign
techniques utilized?

4.

What was the most important factor responsible for the outcome of the
campaign? (Campaign themes, choice of communication channels, success
in educating the public, etc.)

S.

What was the impact of the media used?

6.

Which interest groups active in the campaign had the most impact on
the final vote? Why?

7.

Can you identify key influentials who made public statements support
ing the ballot measure, and .can.you judge the impact of theit; public
stance?
.

8.

How does this campaign effort compare with previous campaigns you
have been involved in? What are the similarities? The differences?

9.

Would another campaign run :in the same way succeed? Why or why not?

10. What was the attitude of your membership or constitutency toward the
issues selected? Why do you think they voted as they did? Did your
activity in the campaign have any influence on their vote? Why?

*

Includes major questions posed to influentials but not necessarily in
this order. Spontaneous comments were solicite~ whenever possible.
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APPE..."ID IX E

SAMPLE OF PRO-TAX CAMPAIGN COmITTEE FLIERS

WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN 'IO THE POOR (MEN, IDMEN AND KIDS) • • •

if the 5¢-a-pack Cigarette Tax doesntt pass on January l8?

The answe r is obvious: THE POOR WILL BE HI T SO HARD, IT WILL MEAN
A "LIVING HELL."

If

it's been touch "surviving" on only 80% of what is necessary to
live on, I~INE LOSING ANOTHER $2z903,000~

AND IT COULD GET A LOT WORSE -- WITHOUT ANY PROMISE OF GETTING BETTER.
"SUPPORT l-DNIES" -- that t s the official phrase for food and shoes and
.clothes -- MIGHT BE CUT A LOT mRE THAN JUST $9,903,000 -- LIKE
$17,200,OOO~!!
.
OLD AGE ASSISTANCE COULD BE WIPED OUT -- GOING FROM
$63.69 PER MONTH 10 $2.69!
AID 'ID DISABLED COULD BE

2!!!

TO $27 82 PER MlNTH.!

AID '10 DEPENDENT CHILDREN COULD BE SLASHED BY $92
POR A FAM[LY OF FOUR!
THE ABUNDANT roOD OR FOOD STAMP PROGRAMS COULD BE
REDUCED TO 39% OF THE STAt'IDARD NECESSARY TO SIMPLY
SURVIVE!

And one more paint

IF THE $17,200,000 WERE TAKEN AWAY, YOU (x)ULD .Al80 LOSE
$21,700,000 IN FEDERAL HELP!
We know your Christmas and New Year will be a tough, miserable and pain
ful time as it is.

BUT YOU CANNOT SIr ON YOUR HANDS AND LET THE CANCEROUS CIGARETTE LOBBY
DBFBAT THE CIGARETTE TAX -- SO THA T YOU CAN STARVE A LITI'LE BIT MORE.
TALK TO YOUR FRIENDS.

MAKE THEM KNOW WHAT COULD HAPPEN.

And. • • BE SURE THAT YOU AND YOUR FRIENDS VOTE ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 18.
VOTE "DS" ON THE CIGARETTE TAX.

'\
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WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN TO OREGON t S HIGHER EDUCATION -
if the 5¢-a-pack Cigarette Tax fai1es to pass in the January 18
State-wide Special Election?

FACT:

Governor McCall has stated that he WILL CALL ANOTHER SPECIAL
SESSION SHOULD mE CIGARETTE TAX FAIL.

FACT:

Governor McCall has also stated that he WILL NOT ALLOW FURTHER
"ACROSS-THE-BOARD" CUTS ON OUR STATE BUDGET. (We've already
cut more than $36,000,000 from the originally proposed budget.)

FACT:

"SELECTIVE PROGRAM CUTS AND/OR TAX INCREASES WILL HAVE TO BE
MADE (shou1d.the Cigarette Tax fail) to both balance the State
Budget (a Constitutional requirement l ) and provide the necessary
monies to ~alvage priority State services and programs.

FACT:

Either of these "SELECTIVE" programs could be DIRECTED
OREGONtS HIGHER EDUCATION!

FACT:

If the ENTIRE $17,200,000 expected to be raised by the Cigarette
Tax were taken from the Higher Education instruction budget,
THE LOSS OF MONEY COULD BE RECOVERED BY A NEARLY DOUBLED INCREASE
IN TUITIONS FOR RESIDENT UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS FOR THE 1972-73
SCHOOL YEAR.

AT

('ruitions would have to be raised $344 over the present $378 -
RAISING TUITIONS TO $722 PER YEAR!)
FACT:

If it was determined that this loss of State revenue should be
recover:-ed by REDUCING TEACHING FACULTY in the State System of
Higher Education, IT WOULD REQUIRE .A REDUCTION OF 1,140 TEACHING
FAL"1JLTt MEMBERS FOR THE 1972-73 SCHOOL YEAR.
THIS RBllJ CTION OF STAFF WOULD BE EQUAL TO THE ENTIRE TEACHING
STAFF OF THE UNI VERSITY OF OREGON • • •
.

lArticle XI, Section 7: The Legislative Assembly shall not lend the
credit of the State nor in any manner create any debt or liabilities
which shall • . • exceed the sum of $50,000. • •n

Source:
Note:

Citizens Against Raising Property Taxes, 300 Jackson Tower,
Portland, Oregon. Bill Gilbert, Treasurer.
The first page of each flier is reproduced here in its entirety.

\
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.t\PPENDIX F

TABLES REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT

'table F-1

I

RELATION OF AGE TO YES-NO VOTE:

!
18-21
22-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60

;BENTON
YES
NO
---peNT
N
peNT

100%
89
60
53
75
73

3
8
12
8
9
8

0
1
8
7
3
3

0%
11
40
47
25
26

poUGLAS

'YES

NO

N---PCNT
1
8
3
4
8
6

100%
89
30
24
62
44

N

PCNT

0
1
7
13
5
9

0%
11
70
76
38
56

Table F-2
RELATION OF SEX TO YES-NO VOTE
BENTON
YES
NO
N ---PCNT
N
PCNT
Male
Female

17
31

71%
67

7
15

29%
33

DOUGLAS
YES
NO
N --peNT
N
PCNT
13
18

50%
45

13
22

50%
55

Table F-3
RELATION OF RESIDENCE TO YES-NO \UTE
BENTON

-

OOUGLAS

YES

N
Metropolitan
Suburb
City or Town
Open Country

2
4
37
4

NO

PCNT

N

peNT

67%
80
73
40

1
1
14
6

33%
20
27
60

-

YES
N
peNT
0
3
20
6

0%
50
47
43

NO
N -PCNT
2
3
23
8

100%

SO
S3
S7
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Table F-4
RELATION OF EDUCATION TO YES-NO VOTE
BENTON
YES
NO
N
PCNT
N -PCNT
Some High School
High School
Some College
College
Post College

1
10
11
10
15

25%
59
65
77
83

3
7
6
3
3

75%
41
35
23
17

DOUGLAS

YES
N-PCNT
2
8
7
7
5

40%
35
39
64
8,3

NO
N

PeNT

3
15
11
4
1

60%
65
61
36
17

Table F-5
RELATION OF OCCUPATION TO YES-NO VOTE
BENTON
YES
NO
PCNT
N -PCNT
N
Farm Operator
Housewife
Professiona1-Tchn1
Bus iness-Mngrl
Retired
Unemployed
Clerical-Sales

0
22
13
3
4
1
1

0%
79
59
43
57
100
100

0
6
9
4
3
0
0

DOUGLAS

YES
N -PCNT

0%
1
21
8
13
41
57
3
3
43
0
0
0
1

50%
40
57
38
43
,0
50

NO
N

PCNT

1
12
10
5
4

50%
60
43
63
57

1

50

a

~o

Table F-6
RELATION OF INCOl:1E TO YES-NO VOTE
BENTON
NO
YES
PCNT
N
N -PCNT
Under $5,000
$5,000-9,999
$10,000-14,999
$15,000-25,000
$26,OOO-PLUS

11
9
14
12
2

65%
75
67
80
67

6
3
7
3
1

35%
25
33
20
33

DOUGLAS

NO
N -PCNT

YES
N -PCNT
5
11
12
3
0

56%
52
57
23
0

4
10
9

10
2

44%
48
43
77
100
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Table F-7
: RELATION OF ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP 'TO YES-NO VOTE
BENTON
NO

YES

Mem.ber
Non-mem.ber

N

PCNT

11
37

55%
74

N

9
13

PCNT

45%
9
26
23

'OOUGLAS
' NO
: YES
N-PCNT
N

43%
50

12
23

PCNT

57%
50
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Table F-8
ORGANIZATIONAL LEADER INVOLVEMBNT
, ROW DID YOU BECOME INVOLVED IN THE CAMPAIGN?
Res~onse

Number

4

Personal contact by another individual or group:
Decision made by organization independently:
Decision'.made by organizational leadership independently:

6

4

WHAT WAS THE EXPECTED FISCAL IMPACT ON YOUR ORGANIZATION OR GROUP?

Res20nse

Number

Considerable
Slight
Very little
None at all

11
1
1
2

WOULD YOUR ORGANIZATION HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IF
THERE RAD NOT BEEN THE POSSIBILITY OF MAJOR FISCAL IMPACT?
Res~onse

Yes
No
Uncertain

Number
3

4
4

